An analysis of the development and the importance of oil and gas resources in Russia and their relationship to the Russian economic growth and foreign policy by Kara, Göktuğ
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF OIL AND 
GAS RESOURCES IN RUSSIA AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE RUSSIAN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
A Ph.D Dissertation  
 
 
 
by 
GÖKTUĞ KARA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of 
International Relations 
Bilkent University 
Ankara 
September 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF OIL AND 
GAS RESOURCES IN RUSSIA AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE RUSSIAN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
Bilkent University 
 
 
by 
 
 
GÖKTUĞ KARA 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfilment of  the Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
in 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
September 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Professor Erdal Erel  
Director 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Professor Norman Stone 
Supervisor  
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Professor Dr. Hasan Ünal  
Examining Committee Member 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
Examining Committee Member 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in in International Relations. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Asst. Prof. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya  
Examining Committee Member 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in 
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in in International Relations. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Asst. Prof. Sean McMeekin 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 iii
ABSTRACT 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF OIL AND 
GAS RESOURCES IN RUSSIA AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE RUSSIAN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN POLICY  
 
Kara, Göktuğ  
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Norman Stone 
September 2008 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the development of the oil and gas sector in Russia 
with a view to understand the role of these assets on the formation of Russian state 
interests and consequent policy prioritization, both at the domestic and the international 
level. The study identifies economic and political issues on which the influence of the oil 
and gas resources has been significant.  
The dissertation elucidates the various links between Russian economic 
development and revenues from the oil and gas sector, and well as explicit and implicit 
connections between Russian foreign policy and the oil and gas sector. In the changing 
world order, strategic manipulation, communication, persuasion and economic 
incentives became as important as military might or an outright threat in order to shape 
the outcome of international issues.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, oil and gas diplomacy, pipeline 
politics, subsidised energy deliveries, threats to cut-off energy deliveries coloured 
Russian attempts to revitalize influence throughout the territory of the former Soviet 
 iv
Union. Russia today is wedged between net consumers of energy which are competing 
to secure best terms for their oil and gas deliveries. As the Russian military capabilities 
fell after 1991, the policy around these vital resources has become the primary drivers of 
Russian domestic and foreign agenda.  
Another aim of this analysis is to contribute to the study of international relations 
by emphasizing its analysis of a state’s domestic agenda’s effect on the international 
arena. Domestic factors have a crucial relevance to relationships shared by actors at the 
international level. This dissertation will use Russia’s development of the oil and gas 
sector as a case for evaluating and understanding the relationship between domestic and 
international issues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Russia, oil, gas, energy policy, energy security, Russian economy, oligarchs, 
Yeltsin, Putin,  
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ÖZET 
 
RUSYA’DA PETROL VE GAZ KAYNAKLARININ GELİŞİMİ, ÖNEMİ VE BU 
KAYNAKLARIN RUS DIŞ POLİTİKASI VE EKONOMİK BÜYÜMESİ İLE 
İLİŞKİSİNİN BİR ANALİZİ  
 
Kara, Göktuğ 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Norman Stone 
Eylül 2008 
 
Bu tez, Rusya’daki petrol ve gaz sektörü gelişimini, Rus Devleti çıkarlarının ve 
politika önceliklerinin oluşumu ile ilgili bu değerlerin  rolünü anlamak amacıyla hem 
ulusal hem de uluslararası seviyede incelemektedir. Tez, petrol ve gaz kaynaklarının 
etkisinin önemli olduğu ekonomik ve siyasi konuları belirlemektedir. 
Tez, Rusya’nın ekonomik gelişimi ile petrol ve gaz sektöründen elde edilen 
gelirler arasında ve aynı zamanda Rus dış politikası ve petrol ve gaz sektörü arasında 
açık ve kapalı çeşitli bağlantıları izah etmektedir. Değişen dünya düzeninde, stratejik 
manipülasyon, iletişim, ikna ve ekonomik tedbirler, uluslararası hususların sonuçlarını 
biçimlendirme hususunda askeri güç veya direkt tehlikeler kadar önemlidir. 
Sovyetler Birliği’nin çöküşünün ardından, petrol ve gaz diplomasisi, boru hattı 
politikası, sübvansiyonlu enerji teslimleri, enerji teslimlerinin kesilmesi tehlikeleri, eski 
Sovyetler Birliği bölgesi genelinde Rus etkisini canlandırmaya yönelik girişimleri 
renklendirmiştir. Rusya bugün, petrol ve gazlarını en iyi koşullarda güvenceye almak 
için rekabet eden net enerji tüketicileri arasında sıkışıp kalmıştır. Rusya’nın 1991 yılında 
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askeri kabiliyetlerinin azalmasından sonra, bu önemli kaynaklar etrafındaki politika 
Rusya’nın dahili ve harici gündeminin birincil etmeni olmuştur 
Bu çalışmanın diğer bir amacı, bir devletin ülke içi gündeminin uluslararası 
arenadaki etkisinin  analizini vurgulayarak uluslararası ilişkilerin araştırmalarına katkıda 
bulunmaktır. Ülke içi faktörlerin, uluslararası düzeydeki oyuncuların paylaştığı ilişkiler 
hususunda can alıcı bir bağlantısı vardır. Bu tez Rusya’nın petrol ve gaz sektöründeki 
gelişiminde ulusal ve uluslararası ilişkileri değerlendirmek ve anlamak için 
kullanılacaktır. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, petrol, gaz, enerji politikasi, Rus ekonomisi, oligarşi, 
Yeltsin, Putin 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
METHODOLOGY, THEORY AND THE ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
1.1. Subject and Scope 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the development of the oil and gas 
sector in Russia with a view to understand the role of these assets on the formation of 
Russian state interests and consequent policy prioritization, both at the domestic and the 
international level. The study will identify economic and political issues on which the 
influence of the oil and gas resources has been significant. In order to achieve this aim, 
the dissertation also provides a detailed account on the historical development of the oil 
and gas industry.  
While describing the development of Russia’s oil and gas industry through out a 
certain period, the assessment of the hydrocarbon industry in Russia will be conducted
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under the rubric of a broader analytical framework. In this respect the dissertation 
elucidates the various links between Russian economic development and revenues from 
the oil and gas sector, and well as explicit and implicit connections between Russian 
foreign policy and the oil and gas sector.  
The economy and resource base of a state is an important variable in formulation 
of foreign policy. The link between foreign policy and economic performance operates 
in two directions. A lively economy, strong resource potential and robust growth can 
encourage the decision-makers to embark upon ventures that they otherwise might 
refrain from taking in fear of insufficient resources. Similarly, economic opportunities 
which may generate more revenues for the state and stimulates policy makers to pursue 
more assertive courses of action. On the other hand, a strong downfall in economic 
performance might induce decision- makers to opt for more moderate courses of action.  
Accordingly, the revenues from oil and gas exports have a direct correlation with 
the Russian economic well-being and its consequent international posture. The 
dissertation argues that a combination of ample oil and gas production rates, high energy 
prices and strong revenue flow emboldens Russia in its international engagements. The 
argument is supported with examples of assertive Russian foreign policy actions during 
such periods. Also, the study provides examples of how low price-low production rate 
combination influences Russian economic and political arena. In this respect, the study 
also explores some scenarios regarding future course of economic and political 
development for the Russian Federation in view of the current trends in the energy field. 
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Particularly, in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse the account of state power 
gradually started to include the economy, culture and the capability to influence the 
course of events. In the changing world order, the soft power of states began to matter as 
much as hard power. In order to shape the outcome of international issues, strategic 
manipulation, communication, persuasion and economic incentives became as important 
as military might or an outright threat. The liberalization of national economies 
increased the number of actors and international organizations. The vested interests of 
these actors in multiple countries establish strong international links, bridges and 
avenues for communication and influence. More important is the fact that the 
international world order after the Cold War is more conducive to the efficacy of these 
means (Nye, 2005).  
In this respect, Stulberg (2007) provides another analytical basis for this 
dissertation with his analysis of decision-making in the context of using national 
resources as leverage. Stulberg argues that the attention to risk in decision-making 
allowed the framework to go beyond rational utility-maximization and an initiator’s 
market power in a specific energy sector and operation within a clearly-delineated 
regulatory system at home enables the actor to shape another country’s decision-making, 
such that compliance with the intended policy provides more favorable prospects than 
non-compliance.  
This study demonstrates how states can and have used oil and gas policies to 
gain influence and to justify non-military intervention on vital national security issues. 
Russia’s vast resources and its advantageous ownership of the Soviet supply and 
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distribution networks offers powerful leverage for influence. Russia utilises its energy 
policy to create economic growth and extend political influence. Supply interruptions, 
threats of supply interruptions, pricing policy, usage of existing debts, creating 
dependencies via accumulation of debts, hostile take-overs of companies and 
infrastructure has been ways of employing energy lever for the Russian foreign policy. 
This, however, does not imply that Russia is not a reliable supplier or makes arbitrary 
use of its energy assets. On the contrary, Russia has been a reliable energy supplier to its 
clients even at the height of Cold War years.  
Preferential price schemes and subsidised deliveries were common strategies for 
managing political control, mitigating instability and maintaining the cohesion of the 
Soviet bloc during the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, oil and gas 
diplomacy, pipeline politics, subsidised deliveries, threats to cut-off deliveries coloured 
Russian attempts to revitalize influence throughout the territory of the former Soviet 
Union. Russia today is wedged between net consumers of energy which are competing 
to secure best terms for their oil and gas deliveries. As the Russian military capabilities 
fell after 1991, the policy around these vital resources has become the primary drivers of 
Russian domestic and foreign agenda.  
Moreover, the political profile of energy security has heightened during the last 
decade. Russia is also aware of this situation and pays particular importance to promote 
economic growth and to extend Russia’s international influence by being a reliable 
supplier. Russia also has grown ambitions to substitute oil and gas exports with 
industrial exports to extend its economic reach for political reasons. The sales of arms 
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from Russia have shown notable increase and provide Russia an independent policy 
course. However, arms exports contribute as only a fraction of the revenues from oil and 
gas.  
Another aim of this analysis is to contribute to the study of international relations 
by emphasizing its analysis of a state’s domestic agenda’s effect on the international 
arena. Domestic factors have a crucial relevance to relationships shared by actors at the 
international level. Specifically, by addressing the state-society relationship, this study 
will strengthen the understanding of state-state relationships (Halliday, 1994).  
This dissertation will use Russia’s development of the oil and gas sector as a case 
for evaluating and understanding the relationship between domestic and international 
issues. Historically, development of the oil and gas sector gave leaders the necessary 
economic clout to run the Soviet Union and currently these resources heavily influence 
Russia’s policy priorities. 
 The study consists of four chapters. Each chapter relates to a certain period of 
time during which the oil and gas sector was transformed into a different regulatory and 
operational structure. The development of oil and gas sector went through different 
stages since its beginnings under the Russian Empire. The study follows the issue from 
the Russian Empire until the recent presidency of Vladimir Putin. Political and economic 
consequences are discussed as they pertain to the relevant time periods. The study will 
also present an assessment of important aspects of the recent presidency of Vladimir 
Putin in terms of their political and economic impact on the progress of Russian policy.  
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The first chapter starts by delineating the beginnings of the oil sector in the 
Russian Empire, the emergence of Baku as a global oil terminal and the Soviet takeover 
of the industry. Baku marks the first major milestone in familiarisation of the Russian 
state with the nature and extent of the oil industry and trade. It was during this time 
period that the Baku oil fields increased in prominence both as an internal asset to 
Russia and on a more global scale. Congruence of important factors such as adequate 
technology, shallow oil fields and sufficient capital turned Baku and gradually Caucasus 
into leading oil production centres. However, for the Russian Empire, oil trade was 
never as important as the revenues from the export of grain or timber. It was because 
around the early 20th century the applications of oil as source of energy were limited. 
Therefore, the first chapter, although integral to the rest of the thesis, only partly utilises 
the analytical framework established.  
Under the beginnings of the Soviet regime, collectivisation and industrialisation 
were the two major episodes which changed the role of oil for the Russian state 
irreversably. Collectivisation destroyed the Russian agriculture that consequently left the 
Soviet Russia a major importer of grain for the rest of the century. The loss of revenue 
from the export of grain had to be compensated and oil became a crucial mender. 
Industrialisation drive of the 1940s and 1950s would not have been possible without the 
abundant presence of these sources.  
The first chapter spans the timeframe from the oil industry’s beginnings to the 
Second World War and discusses the discovery, development, transportation, 
refinement, and global market trade during that period. The role of foreign expertise and 
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capital in this boom is examined. Further, it explains the nationalization and 
restructuring of the industry after the Bolshevik revolution, as well as the difficulties 
experienced during the Second World War.  
 Chapter two provides the details of the development of the oil and gas sector in 
the Soviet Union that contributes to the analytical framework by analyzing the intensive 
use of hydrocarbon policy by the Soviet Union as a means to support both the domestic 
economy and impact the international engagements. The chapter further explains the 
Soviet Union’s determination to unite the Soviet sphere of influence via its use of oil and 
gas resources. In this regard, the rigid Soviet planning system and its impact on the 
development of the oil and gas industry is elaborated. The beginnings of gas industry in 
the Soviet Union came as a reaction to an impending oil production crisis.  
The chapter argues that without the effective use of its oil and gas assets, the 
Soviet Union would have collapsed much earlier. The oil and gas resources provided the 
Soviets with the necessary economic clout to keep the wasteful economic system going. 
The second chapter also accounts for the oil crises of the 1970s, as well as the Soviet 
Union’s response to them. The oil price hikes played a crucial role in helping the Soviet 
leaders to make fresh starts in international policies. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
would not have been thinkable without the robust revenue and production growth of the 
1970s. However, an oil production crisis in the mid 1980s and the US’ deliberate policy 
of weaknening the international oil prices precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The chapter examines these aspects and ends with the fall of the Soviet Union.  
 8
The third chapter explores the transition of the oil and gas sector into a market 
economy following the collapse of the Soviet Union and takes account of the effects of 
this imperfect transition on the sector. The chapter further analyses the lack of adequate 
institutional structures and an efficient regulatory framework which led to the emergence 
of a hybrid form of semi-market economy in Russia. Compromise with the established 
political power centers, corruption, and criminalization were the endemic features of the 
Russian form of market economy. Insufficient capitalization, permanent money flight 
and a weak financial system grossly undermined the operations of the oil and gas sector 
and had a ruinous impact on the Russian oil production levels. In this respect, the 
chapter also exemplifies what happens to the Russian political and economic scene 
during times of oil production crises exacerbated with the weak international oil prices.  
The third chapter also discusses the privatization of the oil and gas sector. In this 
context, financial industrial groups, widely known as oligarchs, rose; a development that 
significantly influenced the Russian Federation’s course of political development. 
Ultimately, this chapter analyzes the actions of the Russian state during a turbulent 
period of transition as a case study of how the foreign policy of the Russian state 
evolved during a period of domestic disorder and weak international energy prices.  
 The fourth chapter discusses the changes that have taken place in the oil and gas 
sector since Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000. The chapter considers the effect of 
Putin’s vision for the Russian Federation and the reflection of this vision on the 
development of the Russian oil and gas sector. The chapter analyses Putin’s pursuit of 
power to create stronger state apparatus and explains Putin’s belief that the natural 
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resource base guarantees Russia’s international position and ensures macroeconomic 
growth. Putin’s views on diversifying the industrial basis of the Russian economy to 
become a leading economic power are also explained.  
In this respect, the chapter also examines Putin’s stance vis-à-vis the oligarchs 
and explores the selective renationalization of certain parts of the oil and gas sector, 
attempting to explain the rationale behind the policy as well as the policy’s effects on 
Russia’s foreign relations. During this period, the Russian Federation managed to 
achieve a resurgance in oil and production while international oil and gas prices have 
consistently increased to historical heights. The Russian Federation enjoyed the 
substantial positive effects of this revitalisation on its economy. The first decade of the 
new millennium has witnessed the rejuvenation of the Russian Federation’s economic 
strength and political clout. 
The last chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of a synthesis and an 
evaluation of the similarities and differences between the effects of Russian hydrocarbon 
policy on international relations through the time periods discussed and presented. The 
chapter also compares the hydrocarbon policy of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire 
to that of the post-Soviet Russia. Finally the conclusion also argues that the policy 
around development and trade of oil and gas resources has become major drivers of the 
Russian political and economic agenda as never before. In this respect, the conclusion 
elaborates on several resource development and price scenarios taking into account the 
Hubbert peak oil theory. 
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1.2. Methodology 
 Research methodology in social sciences generally derives from two intellectual 
traditions. Hollis and Smith (1990) state that the rise of the natural sciences since the 
16th century constitute one of those intellectual traditions, while the other tradition 
comes from 19th century ideas of analysis from within. The former tradition takes the 
perspective of an empiricist assessing information as it is relayed through observation 
and analysis, while the latter tradition attempts to understand the perspective of the 
actors and the meaning of events that drive the outcomes of particular situations. In the 
field of international relations, this division within the social sciences is reflected by a 
traditional difficulty of analysis as well as the prevalence of varying methodologies. 
Being an outsider to object of analysis requires, at least, self-proclaimed objectivity and 
implicitly recognizes that there are laws, or causal regularities, in the social world that 
are waiting to be discovered through the formulation and testing of hypotheses. Thus, 
according to Waltz (1979), successful theorization requires abstraction from facts and 
finding general patterns from which one can deduce the outcome of interactions among 
the objects of analysis 
Being an insider, however, allows the researcher to access the particulars of 
every research situation. The uniqueness of social reality and its ultimate dependence on 
human cognition do not allow the creation of general patterns and causalities. This 
interpretive approach is the systematic analysis of social action through detailed 
observation in order to understand how social actions are created and maintained. 
According to the interpretive approach, the social sciences are self-referential and 
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include learning processes. The structure of social reality entails the study of a portion of 
the world. However, the objects of study are facts only through mutually-constituted 
social action and shared understanding of meaning, action, interpretation and reaction 
(Ferguson & Mansbach, 1991). 
 In this respect, methodologically, the study invites all relevant socioeconomic 
and political factors to understand the increasing role and importance of oil and gas in 
Russian political society and its impact on the formation of Russian policy priorities. 
The effort is to provide an account of a situation throughout a historical period and try to 
understand the outcomes. While doing this, the study will relate the outcomes in the 
political and economic arena to decisions in the oil and gas sector.  
 A further point of clarification concerns the units of analysis. There is a constant 
systemic relationship between the units and the set of circumstances in which these units 
interact. Systemic or structural theories treat the units as functionally equivalent, 
rational, and assume that the units will engage in similar behavior when faced with 
similar circumstances. The unit level theories concentrate on the attributes of the units 
and assume that outcomes can be explained only by understanding the interaction within 
and among the units (Ferguson & Mansbach, 1991). 
 Although it must be accepted that behavior takes place within a certain set of 
rules and with a certain degree of rational expectation in a Weberian sense, to subsume 
unit-level action unconditionally to an unseen structure in a Waltzian fashion abstracts a 
substantial part of the relevant facts from the analysis. The explanations in this study 
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will try to strike a balance between instrumental (structures) and reasoned (unit) 
rationality. 
In this study, the units of analysis are as follows: the state as an international 
actor (state as unit in the international system), state as a domestic actor (state as system 
to its constituent parts), and non-state actors (as international and national units). The 
subject at hand is multifaceted (business interest groups, bureaucratic interests, political 
interests) and involves multilevel interfaces (state to state, within and among 
bureaucracies, state to non-state), with each unit assuming a different set of interests. 
 Conceptual and explanatory dimensions are also important. This study will 
employ many concepts from different paradigms of international relations. At first, it 
may not be obvious that there has been difficulty defining the state in the field of 
international relations. Generally, scholars of the field employ the term “state” to refer to 
a national-territorial totality. In this form, the state is a legal entity, a sovereign subject 
of diplomacy; it includes the government, people, society and the individual. An 
alternative view of the state relates to the domestic functions of the state: a social-
territorial totality that employs a specific set of coercive and administrative institutions 
through an executive authority (Halliday, 1994). 
 The orthodox use of state in the field of international relations provides 
analytical simplicity by assuming that states are equal, that they are representative of 
their population, and that they control their territory. This theoretical simplicity also 
implicitly separates the fundamental link between the domestic and international 
domains of the state. However, in reality, these two domains share strong ties. 
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Developments in the international domain may trigger change in the domestic workings 
of the state, and vice versa (Ferguson & Mansbach, 1989). This study will use the 
concept of the state within a broader perspective, which includes both its functions: legal 
and social. The state is seen as a specific type of socioeconomic ordering (capitalist, 
communist, feudal) in which the social elements (academia, workers, business, military, 
and bureaucracy) interact with each other for influence. As such, the state coexists in an 
international system of states and abides to a certain code of coexistence. 
 Another conceptual clarification is required regarding the international system. 
This study does not presume an anarchical international order in which self-help and the 
balance of power are treated as a given. Instead, the dissertation assumes that the 
workings of the international system depend on perceptions, as well as the formative, or 
dominant, ideology of shaping and defining the means of influence in the system. As 
Wendt (1992) argues, “Once constituted any social system confronts each of its 
members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviors and discourages 
others” (p. 391).  
Fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors, through 
their practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction. 
Moreover, reproduction of the practice of international actors (i.e., states) depends on 
the reproduction of practices of domestic actors (i.e., individuals and groups); therefore, 
fundamental changes in international politics occur when beliefs and identities of 
domestic actors are altered, thereby altering the rules and norms constitutive of their 
political practices. To the extent that patterns emerge in this process, they can be traced 
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and explained, but they are unlikely to exhibit predetermined trajectories that can be 
captured by general historical laws, be they cyclical or evolutionary. (Lebow, 1997)  
Therefore, the conduct of actors comprising the system of international relations 
cannot remain constant if a structural shift, such as collapse of an alternative form of 
government, occurs (Ruggie, 1986). This is the case especially when the collapse is 
experienced by one of the two main sources of order in a bipolar world. 
 The perceptions of others (homogeneity, history, shared culture, values) shape 
the method and character of conduct in the international system The formative/dominant 
ideology (capitalism, communism, feudalism) in the system or sub-systems defines the 
roles of states and the avenues through which influence is expanded. Therefore, state 
interests are constructed and pursued in relation to the domestic and international 
socioeconomic order. This study also agrees with the Marxist position that the analysis 
of international relations should include reference to capitalism, including the social 
formations capitalism generated and the international system it generated (Cox, 2002). 
This concept is particularly important following the collapse of communism. 
 The study utilises the term energy leverage as a part of Russia’s foreign policy 
construction. The term is used interchangeably with the concepts energy tool, energy 
lever. The acts of Russian oil and gas corporations are assumed to reflect Russian state 
preferences in line with state’s ability to dominate the sector’s agenda.   
The research in this study stems from primary and secondary sources in both 
English and Russian. The primary sources include the Russian statistical archives, 
correspondence, reports and documentation prepared by governments and international 
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organizations. The sources also include correspondence, reports and documentation 
prepared by companies. Secondary sources include books, articles from academic and 
commercial journals, conference papers, annual reports of companies, news magazines 
and newspapers. Like the primary sources, the secondary sources are written in both 
Russian and English.  
 
1.3. Theory 
 As Cox argues, all theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive during a 
position in time and have a context in contemporaneous events. Any social and political 
theory is bound to its origin since it is always traceable to a historically-conditioned 
awareness of the actions of contemporaneous actors and events (Cox, 1981). In this 
respect, the end of the Cold War was an important landmark for the study of 
international relations. The field, which has thrived on its claim to predict events through 
its positivist epistemology,1 found itself in disarray after failing to predict the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. It was a significant failure. The time period after the Second World 
War and the onslaught of the Cold War was one of the great catalysts of the 
development of international relations as a field of the social sciences (Holsti, 1998).  
The failure to expect or seriously consider the possibility of far-reaching foreign 
policy change in the Soviet Union was a failure. International relations scholars were 
misled by conceptions about the behavior of great powers in general and the Soviet 
Union in particular. These conceptions determined the questions they thought important 
                                                        
1 Epistemology refers to how knowledge is defined or arrived at, as in a study of the theory of and the 
grounds for knowledge, especially in reference to its limits, range of validity, and assumptive elements. 
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and researchable and directed scholarly attention toward the explanation of continuity 
and stability and away from the study of the prospect of change.  
Soviet and Eastern European specialists were similarly slow to grasp the 
revolutionary potential of Mikhail Gorbachev. They underestimated the possibility of 
significant political change in the Soviet Union and exaggerated the stability of Eastern 
Europe's communist regimes. The post-Brezhnev leadership was not expected to sponsor 
major political or economic reforms to address the Soviet Union's intensifying economic 
crisis. (Kappen and Lebow, 1995)  
Failure to predict the sudden end of the Cold War triggered a lively discussion on 
the utility of the methodologies and theorizations used by the international relations 
field. Positivist conceptualizations came under fierce criticism and were accused of 
limiting the ontological2 openings. Previous clashes between theories of international 
relations resulted in further expansion in the literature.  
 At its beginnings, the field of international relations used three main strands of 
thought – namely, Machiavellian (realists), Grotian (internationalists) and Kantian 
(idealists). Idealism, the philosophical foundation for international economic liberalism 
as it is known today, came to be accepted until a series of global events and conflicts 
presented issues that idealism could not explain. Due to the inability of other theories to 
explain recent turns of events, realism3 was posited as an alternative explanation.  
                                                        
2Ontology to be understood as a body of formally represented knowledge based on a set of 
conceptualizations: the objects, elements, agents and other entities that are assumed to exist in some area 
of interest and the relationships that hold among them. Every knowledge-based system, body of 
knowledge, or knowledge-level agent is committed to some such conceptualization, explicitly or 
implicitly.  
3 The realist paradigm focuses on the nation-state as the principal actor in international relations; realism’s 
central proposition revolves around a theme of survival in a hostile environment, represented by a large-
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 Following this period, many new theories of international relations flourished 
during the Cold War. This expansion in theories resulted from the security threats posed 
by nuclear proliferation and the bipolar world. Due to its ability to explain the Cold War, 
the realist paradigm came to dominate theorization in the field (Smith, 1996). However, 
the end of the Cold War altered fundamental realist presumptions (Buzan, 1996). At its 
simplest, the end of the Cold War meant the triumph of the capitalist form of 
socioeconomic organisation over its communist competitor. In his celebrated article, 
Francis Fukuyama even claimed the end of history, or “the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 3). From this perspective, the collapse 
of communism has important implications for the theory of the international relations.  
 In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the international system, and along with it 
the global practice of international relations, underwent a structural shift. The emerging 
international order did not fit into a theoretical model in which rational 
national/territorial units interacted within a given anarchical structure. Conceptualization 
and theorization around the theme of all-encompassing anarchy lost the explanatory 
                                                                                                                                                                   
scale power struggle. Self-help, sovereignty, national interest, and balance of power are important 
conceptual tools for explaining action in the realist conception of international relations. The distinction 
between domestic and international is clearly demarcated, as the latter lacks a clear hierarchical authority. 
Through the use of the tools mentioned above, the realist paradigm offers the prospects of predicting 
international events and prescribing policy. Realism, as it exists and is used in the current environment, 
constitutes a positivist methodology. Specifically, theorization starts by considering the interaction of 
national/territorial and functionally-equivalent units, called states. According to realists, the state is 
sovereign and represents all segments of its population. Therefore, the actions of states constitute the 
subject of international relations. The distribution of power is significant, and state power is represented in 
terms of hard power, such as the state’s military capability for destruction and deterrence. Realists conduct 
research to predict states’ actions based on the international context. 
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power it once enjoyed during the Cold War. The number, the character and the roles of 
players in the field of international relations altered fundamentally (Gaddis, 1992). 
 In addition to economic actors and international organizations, the monetary 
interaction between independent actors, without any influence or affiliation with respect 
the state, emerged as a powerful force. Arguably, the international capital that freely 
circulates in the global economy became a major force in itself, affecting international 
events and relationships. Two common examples include the 1998 currency devaluation 
in Thailand, which was one noted cause of the Asian financial crisis or the recent sub-
prime mortgage credit crisis all over the world. Such examples show the importance of 
capital flows to the analysis of international relations.  
 Additionally, during the dynamic recent period, states also were forced to adjust 
to increased interaction with international terrorism. Terrorism’s impact on domestic 
security policy increased the number of actors on the international stage. Similar to the 
non-state actors recently acknowledged in theories of international relations, terrorist 
organizations have no national affiliation (Halliday, 2001). The destruction of the World 
Trade Center in 2001 provides an extreme example of how terrorist actors can drive 
international policy in specific directions. As a result of the attack on domestic soil, 
America focused its foreign relations policy on the eradication of the perpetrators of the 
event and on the preservation of its global power. The U.S. declaration of “War on 
Terror,” solidified the treatment of terrorist groups as influential actors in international 
relations.  
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 All these changes led to an explosion of research subjects in international 
relations. The endless number of actors with complicated interests made it increasingly 
difficult to abstract data for the sake of theorization. The long-held emphasis on 
abstraction in international relations theories gradually gave way to acknowledging the 
myriad explanations and causes for international events. The dissertation takes 
advantage of the opening up of new research areas in the field of international relations. 
It also introduces the domestic issues in to analysis of the international policy which 
provides another way of analysing relationships between states by looking at a state’s 
relationship with the society within its own borders. In this way, a new framework that 
includes the domestic policy agenda of a given state can provide additional insight to the 
theory of international relations.  
In many areas, the state acts in conjunction with influential interests within the 
society. Therefore, there is an organic connection between the international and national 
functions of the state. On the one hand, the state, if required, creates and/or recruits non-
state actors to fulfill its international purposes. On the other hand, the shifts in ideology 
(from communism to capitalism), attitude (egalitarian to utilitarian) and geography can 
change the balance between different social groups, which can lead to changes in the 
processes within society (Halliday, 1994). These changes are both influenced by, and 
can influence, the relationship between a state and the international system. Russia’s 
development of the oil and gas sector is presented here as a case study to enhance the 
understanding of the relationship between the domestic policy agenda and that policy’s 
affects on the international relations of a given state. 
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 The theoretical challenge is to show that international relations theories need to 
account for what is occurring on a domestic policy agenda as much as it emphasizes 
external factors that occur between nations. Reviewing events as they play out on the 
international stage provides a valuable collective source of information. The 
international domain, referred to as ‘outside,’ acts as a homogenizer – a collective source 
of values and information. In other words, appearing to act as others do in the 
international domain can add a sense of legitimacy and congruence to analysis from that 
domain. Instead, this study attempts to show that the inside of the state itself provide an 
equally important source of information for pertinent analysis. States, while acting in the 
international domain, seek to look and act like each other. The domestic domain, which 
this study refers to as “inside,” establishes a set of interests to be pursued, providing the 
source of state strength.  
 The pluralist paradigm of international relations, which focuses on sub-national, 
supranational, and trans-national actors, seems fit to deal with such a setting. According 
to pluralists, foreign policy has less to do with ensuring the survival of the state, and 
more to do with managing an environment composed of newly politicized areas and a 
variety of actors (Hollis & Smith, 1991).  
 Moravschik’s (1997) liberal theory of international politics provides further 
insight to this study. Liberal international relations theory uses both domestic and 
international functions of the state to understand the state behavior in world politics. 
According to Moravscik, the relationship between the states and the surrounding 
domestic and trans-national societies in which they are embedded critically shapes state 
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behavior by influencing social purposes underlying state preferences. State preferences 
change as a result of changing context and information. 
Moravschik (1997) assumes that the primary actors in international relations are 
individuals and private groups who constitute the domestic society from which the state 
derives its legitimacy. The state as a subset of the domestic society seeks to realise its 
aims in a framework of action that imposes constraints on both domestic and 
international behavior. It is the concept of state preferences as established by the 
domestic society that influences the outcomes in international relations. 
Stulberg (2007) provides another important perspective, introducing the notion 
of strategic manipulation. As noted above, Stulberg argues that a state can influence 
another state’s policy choices by altering its decision-making situation. As decision-
makers are forced to accommodate risk and uncertainty, Stulberg believes that states can 
manipulate a target indirectly by altering the opportunity costs and risks of compliance 
without precipitating a crisis. This requires, however, that domestic actors in charge of 
energy issues follow the guidelines of the statecraft.  
Statecraft entails the deliberate use of specific policy instruments to influence the 
strategic choices and foreign policies of another state. It constitutes a unilateral attempt 
by a government to affect the decisions of another government that would otherwise 
behave differently. Economic statecraft, which includes threats, inducements, or use of 
limited force to extract behavior, becomes a means to explain state behavior (Baldwin, 
1985). 
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 The study also considers the strategic dimensions of soft power that involve 
persuading targets by shaping the context and opportunities available to other actors. 
Nye (1990) argues that states can control policy outcomes not only by exerting direct 
pressure, but also by setting the political agenda and framing the terms of debate. Nye 
defines the changing nature of state power emanating from three sources: the 
attractiveness of a state’s culture, its political values and the legitimacy of its foreign 
policy (Nye, 2004). The oil and gas revenues in the last decade have greatly helped 
Russia to recover its soft power. After a decade of depression period, Russian economy 
and culture is reviving once more.    
According to Nye (1990), these intangible forms of power have been made more 
powerful by the changing nature of international politics. He argues that power has been 
passed, and will continue to pass, from the countries and individuals with capital to 
those who possess information. Nye states that intangible changes in knowledge can 
affect military power. In line with Nye’s argument, the dissertation suggests that power 
has become less transferable, less coercive and less tangible. Russia’s economic 
recovery and its use of energy as leverage have increased its ability to wield soft power. 
This implies that in the new world order Russia is once more fast becoming a global 
power this time on the shoulders of its vast energy sources.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE RISE OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE AS A GLOBAL OIL POWER: 
BAKU 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 In order to understand the primary importance of oil and gas resources for the 
Russian state, it is crucial to look at the history of the sector’s early development and the 
various issues that affected the beginning of the oil industry. The initial years of the oil 
industry shed light on later development trends. It was during these years that the 
Russian state acclimatized to the nature and extent of the international oil production and 
trade.  
 This chapter deals with the oil industry in the Russian Empire and the Soviet 
Union from the beginning of the industry until the Second World War. It explains how 
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the oil in the Baku and the Caucasus region was discovered, developed, transported, 
refined and exported to the global markets. It discusses the impact of the First World 
War and the Second World War on the progress in the oil fields. It also deals with issues 
related to the industry’s boom and its consequent bust. During this period the Baku oil 
fields rose to global eminence. After the Soviet rule, Baku fields started a decline and 
gradually lost its significance, particularly following the Second World War. 
This decline is in line with the peak oil theory which was proposed by M. King 
Hubbert. According to Hubbert fossil fuel production in a given region over time 
follows a bell-shaped curve. He assumes that after fossil fuel reserves (oil reserves, coal 
reserves and natural gas reserves) are discovered, production at first increases 
approximately exponentially, as more extraction commences and more efficient facilities 
are installed. At some point, a peak output is reached, and production begins declining 
until it approximates an exponential decline.(Deffeyes, 2002)  
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Hubbert Peak Oil Graph  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Hubbert Peak Oil Graph  
Note: From Deffeyes K. S. 2002. Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press p.5 
  
 
The peaking oil production is usually countered by employing several measures. 
In the early times the simple response of the industry was to drill somewhere else. When 
production in a region lost its economic attractiveness the geologists were deployed 
looking for easily accessible, shallow and economic oil fields. The other measures relate 
to technological advances in exploration and drilling technologies. The general 
principles of hydrocarbon development are easily observable in the Russian Empire and 
it provides an explanation to the permanent shift of the production centres.  
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These occurrences will be viewed through the analytical lens established in the 
introduction. However, it must be mentioned that oil has never become an equivalent of 
grain and timber for the Russian Empire. This was because the oil was not extensively 
used as a source of energy until the mid-20th century. Therefore, the relationship 
between the hydrocarbon potential and Russian Empire’s international engagements is 
difficult to observe. Yet, in any case, the first chapter contributes to the general 
understanding of the thesis. The early development of the oil industry under the Russian 
Empire helps to trace the development trends of the Soviet oil and gas industry. 
 The oil sector in the Russian Empire emerged around the Baku region in the late 
19th century and flourished mainly around Baku and the Emba on the Caspian shores, 
and Maikop and Grozny in the Caucasus. Thanks to the seizure of Baku, the Russian 
Empire got involved in the oil politics almost at the time of its emergence as a global 
phenomenon (Reynolds, 1916). 
 As part of this role, concessions to foreign entrepreneurs, worker unrests, 
bargains with international financiers for large investments in infrastructure, export 
routes, the competition for markets, privatisation as well as nationalization have always 
been on the Russian Empire’s agenda since the early days of the oil industry and, 
naturally, shaped the implementation of strategic and political decisions.  
 Contrary to its later development, the beginnings of the Russian oil industry were 
dominated heavily with foreign investment and foreign presence. Such a domination of 
the oil industry by foreigners was never seen in the history of Russia (Yergin, 1991). 
About 60% of capital investment in the petroleum industry in 1914 was foreign-owned, 
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and approximately 50% of Russian production was controlled by three foreign trusts: the 
Nobel Brothers and their pioneering of the Baku region, Royal Dutch-Shell, which 
bought the Rothschilds’ holdings in 1912-13, and the Russian General Oil Corporation, 
founded in London in 1912.(Goldman, 2007a) Aided by foreign capital, Russian Empire 
became the leading world producer at the turn of the century, reaching a peak production 
in 1901 of 11,7 million tons.  
 
Figure 2 
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union Oil Production Rates 
 
 
Figure 2 : Russian Empire and Soviet Union Oil Production Rates  
 
Note: From Mäkivierikko A. 2007. “Russian Oil a Depletion Rate Model estimate of the 
future Russian oil production and export”, p. 32  
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This period was also marked with openness to technological innovation. Russia 
adopted and applied exploration and drilling techniques from the West’s innovation. The 
private initiative for higher profits produced many ideas to cut costs and simplify 
transportation. For instance construction of the Baku-Batumi railway in 1890s was 
directly related to the oil transport capacity. The first pipeline from Baku to Batumi was 
again built to boost the exports on the face of low domestic prices (Gillette, 1973). The 
quest for profit drove these developments. 
 The early stages of oil production served the production of an oil by-product: 
kerosene. Kerosene was an illuminator; it was much cheaper and more durable that any 
of its competitor products. In a very short span of time, the use of kerosene boomed in 
the United States, Europe and the Russian Empire. Later on, spurred by the widespread 
use of automobiles, energy consumption patterns changed. Oil replaced wood, coal or 
any other product as the primary provider of all forms of energy. Russia had much to 
gain from this transformation.  
 
2.2. Early Beginnings 
 Although the commercial exploration of mineral oil started only in the second 
half of the 19th century, its use and value were common knowledge centuries earlier. 
This was even the case in Russia. In the 16th century, Russian travellers mentioned the 
use of oil for medical purposes and as lubricant by the tribes of the Timano-Pechersky 
region at the Ukhta River. In 1597, the oil from the region was brought to Moscow 
(“Istoriia nefti,” 2007).  
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In 1745, entrepreneur Fedor Priadunov was granted permission to extract oil 
from the Ukhta riverbed, which led to the construction of a primitive oil refinery plant, 
which exported certain oil products to Moscow and St. Petersburg. In 1823, the Dubinin 
brothers, renowned chemists, launched a full-fledged oil refinery in Mozdok (“Istoriia 
nefti v. Rossi,” 2007). The emergence of the modern oil industry in the world was 
associated with the first oil well at the Bibi-Aibat oilfield near Baku in 1846 more than 
10 years ahead of the first oil well in the United States.         
  
2.3. The Boom 
 When Edwin Drake, a retired colonel and an adventurer, established the first 
successful oil well in Pennsylvania in 1859, the fate of the oil industry changed 
irreversibly. His oil well technology spread rapidly in the United States. Under the 
successful entrepreneurship of Rockefeller kerosene started replacing vegetable and 
mineral oils for lubrication first in the American and then in European markets (Yergin, 
1991).  
Baku, which was formally annexed by the Russian Empire in 1806, remained an 
insignificant oil centre for decades. Capital investment in the oil industry is typically 
front-loaded. It requires time and economies of scale to recuperate the initial investment. 
In this respect, demand from the Russian Empire and easily accessible shallow oil fields 
of Baku led to a congruence of supply and demand. In such a setting, capital availability, 
large projects, better management and know-how generated great added value (Grace, 
2005). Initially divided and weak, Baku’s primitive petroleum industry was no 
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competitor to that of the United States, which started its boom thanks to abundant 
finance, innovative technology, competent human resources and strong domestic market.  
In the second half of 1860s the United States was supplying 80% to 90% of the 
rapidly-growing Russian demand for kerosene. In 1872, partly as a response to growing 
dependence and partly in view of profitable opportunities on the horizon, the Tsarist 
government decided to employ private initiative to kick-start the Russian oil industry. 
(Goldman, 2007a) The beginning of governmental direction of hydrocarbon capabilities 
had begun. 
 In the late nineteenth century, the main priority for the Russian government with 
respect to industrial development included developing transportation, stabilizing the 
ruble through convertibility and building up an export surplus as a prerequisite for 
enabling the Russian government to borrow from abroad. In addition, further goals 
included stimulating the development of new industries in Russia and protecting these 
industries in their infancy. Possessing rich mineral oil deposits of its own, the Russian 
government was first determined not to remain dependant on the import of the American 
kerosene. It was also interested in exporting oil to help implement its industrialization 
policy (Kahan, 1967). 
The significance of enormous oil deposits of Baku was not fully grasped by the 
Tsarist regime for a long time. As a result, although the beginnings of the oil industry 
date back to earlier times, its further development proceeded very slowly (McKay, 
1984). The development of the oil production in the Baku area and the legal patterns of 
the possession could be divided into three distinct periods: the Lease System (1821-
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1872), the Auction System (1873-1896) and the Auction-Royalty System (1897-1917) 
(Martellaro, 1985).  
 In the first half of the 19th century, the oilfields were basically leased to tax-
farmers for periods of four years. These tax-farmers were not concerned about anything 
but maximum profits, due to uncertainty over future possession of the oilfield. Since the 
contract could have been cancelled any moment, investments in the fields were at a 
minimum. There were no concerns over the matters of ecology or sophistication of 
technology (Pogodin, 2006). 
 As a first step, the Tsarist government annulled the practice of tax-farming and 
promoted the privatization of the oilfields. In 1872, the Tsarist government issued a set 
of rules to regulate the production, taxation and privatization of the oil fields, titled 
“Rules on oil production and excise on the photogene production” and “Rules on the 
return of the public oil resources situation in the Caucasion and Trans-Caucasian 
territories from auction to individuals.” The oil industry was declared free, the main oil 
product – kerosene – declared open to removal (40 copecks per pood) and the oil areas 
were given to individuals by public auctions, to be paid only on one occasion. The first 
auction took place on December 31, 1872. It was a successful tender, as the estimated 
sum of half a million got up to three million rubles. Following other auctions in January 
1873, prominent entrepreneurs such as Kokorev, Gubonin and Mirzoev established the 
Baku Petroleum Company (Bakinskaia neftianaia kompaniia) (Pogodin, 2006).  
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 By the end of 1898, the total length of the oil pipelines of the Baku oil fields had 
reached 230 km, with a carrying capacity of one million tons of oil. From 1896 to 1906 
the construction of 833 km long Baku-Batumi pipeline was completed, the diameter of 
the pipes was 200 mm and its carrying capacity was 900,000 tons per year (McKay, 
1984). 
 As the Russian production grew with the innovative and progressive policies, 
there was a marked decrease in imports from the United States. As can be observed from 
the following table, the production of oil and the consumption of kerosene in Russia in 
1870-1872 increased notably. Oil consumption is measured in puds.4 
 
Table 1 
Production and Consumption of Oil and Kerosene in Russia, 1870-1872 
Year 
Oil 
production in 
Russia 
Local 
kerosene 
production 
Import of 
kerosene 
Total kerosene 
consumption on 
Russia  
The share of 
imported kerosene 
in total 
consumption 
1870 
1,704,455 
(30.430 
tonnes) 
339,119 1,440,971 1,780,090 80.9 percent  
1871 
1,375,523 
(24500 
tonnes)  
444,062 1,720,420 2,164,482 79.5 percent 
1872 
1,535,981 
(24700 
tonnes)  
474,000 1,793,201 2,267,201 79.1 percent 
 Note. From Matveichuk, A.A. 2005. “Iz istorii nachal’nogo perioda aktsionernogo 
uchreditel’stva v neftianoi promyshlennosti Rossii.” In Borodkin, L. I. (Ed.). (2005). 
Ekonomicheskaia istoriia: Obozrenie (10th ed.). Moscow. 
                                                        
4 Pud is a measurement unit that is equivalent to approximately one eighth of today’s standard oil barrel. 
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Soon afterwards, the share of the imported kerosene steadily declined down to 
only 19.7 percent in 1879, compared to 74.9 percent in 1873 (Matveichuk, 2005). This 
was a remarkable market capture by any standard.  
 Russian production rose consistently in the second half of the 19th century. By 
1890, the minimal interventionist approach of Tsarist government to oil industry 
produced substantial achievements. Oil production, which was around one million puds 
(around 17800 tonnes) in 1870, increased to six million puds in a decade and then to 15 
million puds (around 267800 tonnes) by the mid-1880s (Grace, 2005). 
 The successful rise of Baku as an oil center owed much to Robert Nobel, the 
elder son of a Swedish immigrant to Russia, who bought a refinery in 1887 and 
revolutionized the industry. The Tsarist government encouraged the Nobel brothers to 
introduce cost-cutting logistical innovations, like pipelines and barges. The Nobel family 
kept effective control over the export routes, which also gave them the leverage to 
control the oil prices (McKay, 1984). 
 The near monopoly status of the Nobel brothers continued uninterrupted until the 
arrival in the region of the Rothschild family following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-
1878. The Rothschilds, who were the major customers of Rockefeller lamp oil in 
Europe, saw a business opportunity, establishing a base in Batumi, which became a free 
trade zone after the war. In 1886, the controlling stock of the Batumi Oil and Trade 
Company (Batumskoe neftepromyshlennoe i torgovoe obshchestvo) was acquired by the 
Rothschild family. The Rothschilds renamed the company Caspian-Black Sea Oil and 
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Trade Company (Kaspiisko-Chernomorskoe neftepromyshlennoe i torgovoe 
obshchestvo) (Matveichuk, 2005). Shortly after, in June 1892, the Regulations of the 
Oilfields (Pravila o neftianom promysle) that regulated the legal and economic rules of 
oil production were approved by the Russian government (Furman, 2004).  
 The remoteness of Baku from consumption centers remained the biggest problem 
that hampered the growth of the industry. This is another important theme that had major 
implications on the development of hydrocarbon industry in Russia. Without proper 
logistical support the economic value of hydrocarbon resources are greatly diminished. 
For most of the Baku oil production, which was destined for Empire’s internal market, 
this was exactly the case. The oil production suffered from lack of transport 
infrastructure.  
There were two solutions to the transportation problems. One was to build and 
use the railway line to carry crude oil. The Russian Empire favored and implemented 
this solution rather swiftly, as railways also served military needs. In 1879, the 
Rothschilds acquired an imperial license to construct a railway line between Baku and 
Batumi. The project was finalized in less than five years and changed the balance of 
trade in the region fundamentally (van der Leeuw, 2000).  
 In 1884, seeking a solution to the chronic imbalance of crude oil supply and 
demand, and in light of the critical importance for increasing the share in foreign 
markets, the Russian government also looked at the possibilities of constructing a 
pipeline carrying crude oil from Baku to Batumi and other refineries on the Black Sea 
coast. Although the rail line between Baku and Batumi had been constructed, the 
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pipeline scheme was not realized until 1903 due to the clashing interests of refiners, rail 
operators, bureaucrats and financiers (McKay, 1984). Once constructed, pipelines create 
strategic dependencies. The route of pipeline is an important decision and provides 
privileges to many of the stakeholders involved in its investment. It is a long-term 
decision that has a connection to the growth of demand and supply markets.  
 The last decade of the 19th century witnessed the influx of vast amounts of 
foreign capital and entrepreneurship in Baku under the Tsar’s auspices. Marcus Samuel, 
son of a London-based merchant who mainly traded exotic shells, rose to the scene in 
the same period. Samuel had accurately foreseen the likely increase in Japanese demand 
for lamp oil. He signed a delivery deal with the Rothschild family and solved the 
transport problem by introducing the first double-hull ocean-going oil tanker (Henriques, 
1960). 
 The successes of Samuel had not gone unnoticed. Within a short time, his 
venture started threatening the Dutch oil enterprise in the Far East, which had been the 
unrivalled market leader with the support of Dutch colonization. Hence, Royal Dutch 
decided to launch an initiative in Baku as a part of the struggle going on between global 
market players. (van der Leeuw, 2000).  
 Under the Russian Empire, Baku’s peak year for production was 1901 when the 
output of crude oil reached 11.7 million tons, compared to the United States’ 9.5 million 
tons. The production from the rest of the world was 1.7 million tons. Out of 655 million 
puds of crude oil produced in Baku, 39 million was exported as such, and from the 
remainder, 128.3 million puds of lamp oil, 287.3 puds of fuel oil and 15 million puds of 
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lubricants were distilled; sixty percent was exported via Rothschild’s trans-Caucasian 
railway, while 40% was sold in the Russian Empire and Persia (Wolf, 1976). By 1900, 
16 companies controlled more than 65 percent of the overall oil production, while 70% 
of the total kerosene sales were carried out by only two companies: the Nobel Brothers 
Company and the Mazut Company (Liashchenko, 1956). The oil production of the Baku 
oilfields and the prices for certain petroleum products in the last decade of the 19th 
century can be seen in the following table:  
 
Table 2  
Baku Oil Production and Prices of Petroleum Products 
Year  Crude oil 
production 
(million puds) 
Price per 
pud (in 
ruble) 
Lamp oil 
production 
Price 
per 
pud 
Fuel oil 
production 
Price 
per 
pud 
1891 274 (4.9 
million tonnes)  
5 74.3 17 --- --- 
1892 286 (5.1 
million tonnes)  
1.5 78.5 7 --- --- 
1895 377.5 (6.7 
million tonnes)  
7 87.8 13.5 175.9 16 
1900 600 (10.7 
million tonnes)  
17 23 23 287.3 18.5 
Note. From Tolf, R. 1976. The Russian Rockefellers: The Saga of the Nobel Family and 
the Russian Oil Industry. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.  
 
2.4. The Demise 
 Several developments hindered further development of the Baku fields in the 
first decades of the 20th century. First of all, the demand for oil both in the Russian 
Empire and Europe started faltering because of rising prices. The situation became 
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apparent to the Nobels, the Rothschilds and Royal Dutch during the early 1900s. The big 
three tried to respond by forming a syndicate and connecting Baku and Batumi with a 
pipeline in order to boost exports. The pipeline was constructed, but the war with Japan 
in 1904-1905 ended in a severe defeat for Russian Empire. During the war industry 
workers went on strike, protesting appalling living conditions. The uprising of 1905 
followed the strike. Tensions between oil trading partners, social upheaval and political 
trouble all contributed to the gradual decay and eventual breakdown of the Baku oil 
industry. Most of the oil wells in Baku were set ablaze during the events of 1905. 
Production rates did not recover to their peak level until the early 1930s (van der Leeuw, 
2000). 
 Political stability is very important for continuation of any long term economic 
activity. Once the Russian Empire plunged into disorder the oil production faltered that 
put extra pressure on the prices. The events of 1905 also taught the investors the virtue 
of diversifying the source of their oil supply fields. Afterwards, more systematic efforts 
were undertaken to explore oil in different parts of the region, particularly the Caucasus. 
The idea was also appealing to the cash-starved Russian Empire. The oil industry 
responded to the crisis by turning to Grozny, a city that was founded as a military fort to 
contain Chechen warriors. The entry of Henry Deterding5 in the Caucasian oil field 
greatly affected the abrupt rise of Grozny as a major center of production. Deterding was 
aware of the fact that the demand for gasoline in Europe was sharply increasing and he 
                                                        
5 Deterding was one of the master strategists of the Royal Dutch company. Soon after he assumed his post 
in Royal Dutch, he proposed a merger with Marcus Samuel’s Shell company who was already highly  
concerned with the Russian intentions to monopolise the maritime transport of Baku oil for Russian 
flagged vessels. By 1910, Royal Dutch Shell had become the third power in Baku.  
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started investing heavily in Grozny fields to capture the major market share with 
gasoline-rich oil produced there (Gillette, 1973).  
 
Table 3 
Oil Output in the Russian Empire, 1912-1920 
 
Year Baku Grozny Cheleken Kuban Maikop 
1912 48.5 (6.9 
million 
tonnes)  
8 (1.14 
million 
tonnes) 
0.45 (0.06 
million 
tonnes) 
0.01  0.82 (0.11 
million tonnes) 
1915 43 (6.14 
million 
tonnes) 
10.5 (1.15 
million 
tonnes) 
0.37 (0.05 
million 
tonnes) 
0.08 (0.011 
million 
tonnes) 
0.37 (0.05 
million tonnes) 
1917 35(5 million 
tonnes) 
12.5 (1.78 
million 
tonnes) 
0.08 (0.011 
million 
tonnes) 
0.13 (0.018 
million 
tonnes) 
0.05 (0.007 
million tonnes) 
1919 22.5 (3.21 
million 
tonnes)  
5 (0.71 
million 
tonnes) 
0.09 (0.012 
million 
tonnes) 
0.21 (0.03 
million 
tonnes) 
0.05(0.007 
million tonnes) 
1920 15.5 (2.21 
million 
tonnes) 
7 (1 million 
tonnes) 
0.03 (0.004 
million 
tonnes) 
0.09 (0.012 
million 
tonnes) 
0.01 
Note. Figures are measured in millions of barrels per annum. From Van der Leeuw, C. 
2000. Oil and Gas in the Caucasus and Caspian – A History. London: Curzon Press.  
 
 Prior to the First World War, four big groups were more-or-less at an equilibrium 
and understanding with regard to production and market shares. The big groups included 
the Nobels, the Rothschilds, the Royal Dutch Shell and the united kustari.6 In 1912, the 
Rothschilds, concerned over the rise of anti-Semitism in the Russian Empire, sold their 
entire holdings to Royal Dutch Shell.  
                                                        
6 Kustari was the name used for minor local producers and traders. 
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 During the First World War, oil production faltered significantly. The Russian 
Empire suffered millions of casualties. This caused an immense shortage of skilled 
labor, first due to the conscription waves before the war and then to the loss of 
workforce during the war. Lack of proper transport infrastructure and insufficient 
logistical support from the Empire made it almost impossible to continue the oil supply 
– not even to support the war effort properly. The price of oil during the First World 
War soared to prohibitive levels (Grace, 2005). 
 The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 heralded an episode of turmoil and disarray in 
the Caspian and the Caucasus. The Bolsheviks had far-reaching objectives when they 
assumed power in October 1917. A planned economy directly controlled by the 
community would replace the market, and money would cease to exist as a medium of 
exchange. Yet in the summer of 1917, Lenin and his comrades had other priorities, such 
as establishing state control and partial state ownership in order to end the economic and 
social chaos raging across the country. By the summer of 1918, civil war and foreign 
intervention were at their height, and for two years the Bolsheviks were embroiled in a 
desperate struggle for survival (Hosking, 1992). 
 Between 1916 and 1920, the Russian Empire was devastated by revolution, 
domestic strife and foreign intervention. The Trans-Caucasian republics of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia briefly gained their independence. The power struggle in Baku 
continued between the Ottoman Empire, the British and the Soviets until the early 
1920s. By the early 1921, the Red Army had forcibly reunited the Caucasus and the 
Caspian region under the power of the Soviets. Thus, the Bolsheviks held all the 
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principal oil regions of Russia, except Northern Sakhalin, which was under Japanese 
rule. The Soviet nationalization decrees had come into practical effect at Baku and 
Grozny (Gillette, 1973). 
 
2.5. Early Beginnings with the Soviets 
 The Civil War had destroyed the oil sector in Russia; the production of crude oil 
was reduced to a minimum. Investment in the sector virtually came to a halt and 
development of the industry stopped due to hostilities and prevailing unstable 
environment. The total uprising in Baku in 1918 organized by the oil workers left the 
city in ruins and more than half of the oil wells in flames (Davies, 1994).  
 By 1920, at the end of the Civil War, crude oil production had fallen to a mere 25 
million barrels a year (approximately 3.5 million tons), less than 30% of pre-
revolutionary levels. All assets of the petroleum industry were nationalized. By the 
beginning of 1921, the country had plunged into a disastrous fuel, transport and food 
crisis, and unrest spread to industrial workers. There was an excess supply of workers 
and an untapped potential for labor. The large reserve of unemployed ensured that wages 
remained low (Siegelbaum, 1992).  
 Oil output in 1921 only reached a fifth or less of 1913 level; in the case of iron 
and steel production levels were below 5%. The factories produced on order from 
Vesenkha7 (VSNKh) and received materials and fuel in order to carry out the orders. 
                                                        
7 Vesenkha (VSNKh) (Vysshiy soviet narodnogo khoziaistva) was the All-Union Council of State 
Economy or Supreme Council of the National Economy in the Soviet Union. The Vesenkha was formed in 
1917 and dissolved in 1932. Its purpose was to supervise and control the newly nationalised industries. It 
had rights of confiscation and expropriation. In each of the union republics of the Soviet Union, 
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The result was a monstrous growth of bureaucracy and an unworkable degree of 
centralization. Beginning in July 1921, some structural reforms were introduced. Energy 
producers again charged for their services and wages were paid in cash. To enable 
industry to operate this way, it was necessary to divide it into sectors, instead of treating 
it as part of VSNKh. Smaller industrial units called trusts were established, which 
controlled varying numbers of enterprises. Each enterprise was expected to operate 
commercially. Making profits and avoiding losses again became operational goals. 
 For purposes of production, the oil industry was organized into three State 
Trusts, each operating in the fields of Baku, Grozny and Emba. The Oil Syndicate, in 
which the three trusts had representation, supervised the market. The nationalization of 
the fields under the Bolsheviks simplified the industry and provided a rational plan of 
development, making possible larger economies of operation. In 1922, the three trusts 
formed Neftesindicat, a commercial syndicate with full monopoly powers over oil 
exports and foreign activity. Neftesyndicat was succeeded by Soiuzneft, which was then 
succeeded in 1926 by Soiuznefteeksport. (Piatilnie Plani razvitiya, 2007)  
 By the end of 1922, there had been substantial progress in restoring the oil 
industry in Baku. A new commercial base overtook the state industry. The rebuilding of 
the oil industry shed surplus staff and compelled more efficient operation by making 
management pay its way. Under the New Economic Policy, Lenin was prepared to go to 
great lengths to restore the economy. Enormous effort was made to build up stocks of 
                                                                                                                                                                   
subordinate organisations existed. Any large scale industrial enterprise was controlled by one of the 
industrial sector departments of the all-union VSNKh. 
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oil, and scarce foreign currency was used to import locomotives and machinery (Nove, 
1969). 
 In the second half of 1920s, foreign trade began to grow again. Imported 
locomotives, farm machinery and other equipment all contributed greatly to recovery. 
By 1923, Soviet crude oil flows reached 5.4 million tons (mt) per annum, which was 3.5 
mt over the 1920 production but still lower than the industry peak prior to the First 
World War. Both crude oil flows as well as Soviet control over the essential oil industry 
increased steadily throughout the 1920s. Baku remained the Soviet Union’s main oil 
supplier but the almost obsolete state of the oil industry in the region was acknowledged 
by the Soviet government (Considine & Kerr, 2002).  
By 1927, Soviet oil production reached 10.18 mt per annum, only 1.05 mt tonnes 
below the previous industry peak, 11.72 mt in 1901. The steady increase in output is 
shown in the following table:  
 
Table 4  
Soviet Oil Production, 1920-1928 
 
Year Soviet Oil Production in Metric Tons 
1913 9,215,911 
1920 3,893,000 
1921-22 4,629,000 
1922-23 5,166,372 
1923-24 5,942,290 
1924-25 6,960,600 
1925-26 8,142,000 
1926-27 10,184,000 
1927-28 11,502,000 
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Note. From Soviet Information Bureau. n.d. Industry. Accessed April 21, 2007 from 
http://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/1928/sufds/ch05.htm 
 
In the 1920s, the Soviet energy balance relied heavily on low-calorific sources of 
primary energy – in particular, firewood. As the decades went on, the industrial 
production gradually shifted from firewood to mineral fuels (primarily coal). However, 
in the early 1930s, Soviet domestic demand for oil and refined petroleum products 
remained low, because the years of civil war had taken a severe toll on the economy. 
The lack of domestic demand left more oil available for export. The increasing volumes 
of oil exports had a staggering impact on the global oil markets. The flood of surplus 
Soviet oil soon exceeded existing export capacity, inspiring a new wave of ambitious 
construction projects that were determined to increase infrastructure to acceptable levels. 
A second pipeline between Baku and Batumi was completed in 1928 and the port of 
Tuapse was linked by pipeline (Considine & Kerr, 2002). 
 Beginning in 1926 under Stalin, the scope of administrative controls widened 
and the role of market forces declined. The new economic policy (NEP) initiated under 
Lenin was coming to an end. Many branches of industrial activity still operated with 
considerable autonomy until the end of the decade; however, the contours of the future 
command economy were becoming increasingly visible. The 15th Party Conference 
aimed to enact a regime of planned discipline in the activities of all state organs (Nove, 
1969). 
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 Preparatory work for a long-term development plan began in 1927.8 During 
formulation of the VSNKh’s first Five-Year Plan, the targets became increasingly 
politicized, rarely based on the actual available resources and technical capacity. In 
April 1929, a variety of options for the first Five-Year Plan were submitted to the 16th 
Party Congress for approval (Considine & Kerr, 2002). In hindsight, the first Five-Year 
Plan was far too optimistic in its economic goals. It was impossible to simultaneously 
increase investment and consumption, industrial and agricultural output and labor 
productivity by such tremendous percentages, even with the help of revolutionary zeal. 
 In the first Five-Year Plan the alternatives which would govern the evolution of 
the Soviet oil industry from October 1928 to September 1933, included a base scenario 
requiring 62% increase in the production of crude oil from the 10.18 mt reported in 1927 
to 19 mt in 1932. In addition an optimal scenario was prepared specifying an 85% 
increase in the level of Soviet oil production to 21.7 mt by the end of the first planning 
period (Hassman, 1953). 
 Taking into consideration that the actual consumption of the crude oil during 
1927-1928 was 7.92 mt, and for the year 1932-1933 was estimated as 12.8 mt (compared 
to the estimated production rate of 21.7), the prospects for the export of crude oil and 
petroleum products seemed promising (Grinko, 1930). The actual production of crude 
oil for the above-mentioned period did not diverge much from the planned numbers, 
                                                        
8 The formation of the plan required an immense amount of detailed work, for which there was no 
precedent. During elaboration of the plan, two main schools of thought competed. Gosplan (The State 
Planning Authority set up in 1921) favored “a strictly scientific plan based on collating existing figures 
and predicting future relationships between different sectors of the economy.” VSHNKh concentrated on 
the heavy industry sector and wanted all other sectors arrange themselves according to the needs of this 
sector. 
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reaching 11.6 mt in 1928, 21.4 mt in 1932 and 28.5 mt in 1937 (“Ekonomika 
promyshlennosti SSSR,” 1956). 
 By the end of 1929, Soviet crude oil production reached 13.86 mt, an 18% 
increase over the 11.76 mt reported in 1928. Approximately 1.6 billion rubles were 
invested in the Soviet oil industry between the years 1928-1932. By the year 1932, 
Soviet crude production reached 21.6 mt, below the official planned target by a small 
margin (Considine & Kerr, 2002). 
 During 1929, the strains of the investment program of the Five-Year Plan began 
to affect all sectors of the economy. The dilemma of capital accumulation and farm 
surpluses was becoming increasingly acute. Ignoring proposals to increase grain prices, 
Stalin decided to launch a direct attack on the peasants, which came to be known as 
collectivization. Approximately six million people died in the process and in the end the 
Russian peasantry was liquidated as a class. The net result of collectivisation, apart from 
its horrendous human toll, was that it literally destroyed the Russian agriculture sector. 
Grain, which has been Russia’s main source of export revenues, was subjected to a 
sudden and deadly shock. With the increases in urban population following the Second 
World War, grain production did not keep up with the growing demand. (Gaidar, 2006)  
 In the four years that defined Stalin’s first great leap forward (1928-1932), the 
Soviet oil industry became a lucrative and highly dependable source of foreign exchange 
reserves. It was around this time that Soviet oil production regained the output levels in 
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1901, thanks to the adoption of new rotary drilling technology.9 Engineering advances 
provided a marginal increase in the production levels in the 1930s. Combined with still 
lower domestic demand, low-price, high-quality Soviet oil exports reached 6 mt in 1932, 
mounting to 18% of Soviet’s hard currency receipts. Still, however, timber accounted for 
the largest share in export earnings (Grace, 2005).  
 
Table 5 
Soviet Oil Exports, 1918-1931 
Year Volume 
1918 Not available 
1919 Negligable 
1920 31.3 
1921 169.8 
1922 381.9 
1923 815.1 
1924 1504.4 
1925 1685.3 
1926 2097.1 
1927 2787.0 
1928 3625.0 
1930 4712.0 
1931 5224.0 
Note. Volume measured in 1000 tons per annum. From Ebel, R. E. 1970. Communist 
Trade in Oil and Gas: An Evaluation of the Future Export Capability of the Soviet Bloc. 
New York: Praeger Publishers. 
 
The second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937) targeted a fourfold increase in oil 
production, to around 80 mt, by 1937. However, production of crude oil fell short of 
ambitious targets (Considine & Kerr, 2002). One reason for this shortcoming was the 
                                                        
9 At the turn of 20th century, the oil drillers adapted to a new technique which was essentially applied in 
water well drilling. Rotary drilling uses boring method to cut through rock structures. It requires less crew 
and can penetrate much deeper levels of earth compared to cable-tool rigs.  
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impact that 1937-38 purges, executed fiercely on direct orders from Stalin all over the 
Soviet Union, had on Baku. Thousands of oil workers and scientists were summarily 
executed (Nazaroff, 1941).  
 Until the third Five-Year Plan, export revenues steadily increased, which left the 
economy flush with much-needed cash. Soviet planners’ attention had always been on 
recovery of oil, and extensive systematic oil exploration efforts were not undertaken. 
The Soviet oil industry started the third Five-Year Plan with newer, more ambitious 
targets for production (Hassman, 1953).  
In this sense, it can be concluded that a trend was established for future oil 
issues. The production of hydrocarbon resources was driven by the short-term 
requirements of those in charge of the centrally-planned economy. Exploration, as is 
required in order to sustain future production, could have been undertaken with the 
resources available to the economy at the time. The Soviet government, however, would 
have had to reduce short-term gains in order to execute such exploration.  
 The annual recovery of oil was targeted to attain 54 million metric tons as 
against 30.7 million metric tons in 1937. However, the third Five-Year Plan turned out 
to be a failure. This was Hubbert’s theory at work, which was evidenced in the 
production rates in the fields of Caucasus and Caspian that peaked around an annual 
figure of 30 million metric tons. In 1941, the Soviets admitted the failure of the 
production program (Nazaroff, 1941).  
Here, the results of not concentrating on both exploration and production were 
clearly visible. It became clear for the Soviets that without exploration of new resource 
 48
basins production rates were almost certain to gradually diminish. This theme recurs 
throughout the study as short-term decisions that promise increased cash flows were 
favored by the Soviet governments over longer-term goals to smooth production over 
time. Systematic exploration was not carried out as long as production form the existing 
wells satisfied the short term needs.  
During the third Five-Year Plan, a substantial increase in domestic consumption 
of oil had profound implications for the level of petroleum exports. The increase in 
demand was due to to the tremendous investment in the production of fuel guzzling 
capital goods. Stalin was determined to transform the Soviet Union from an agricultural 
economy into an industrial giant. For this purpose, substantial amount of surplus capital 
was invested in the construction of the Dnepr and Svir' hydroelectric stations, the 
Semirech'e railway, the Volga-Don canal, and massive metallurgical and engineering 
enterprises in the Volga-Urals. The Soviet Central Executive Committee envisaged a 
constant expansion of work on industrialisation and electrification to strengthen the 
USSR's defensive capacity and achieve economic independence. Transport industry was 
seen as the most important asset to connect and integrate the backward regions to the 
Soviet industrial core.  
As also shown in the table below, by 1937, Soviet oil exports had fallen to 1.93 
mt per annum, the lowest level to be recorded in over a decade (Ebel, 1961).  
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Table 6 
Soviet Oil Exports Table 
 
Year 
 
Volume 
1930 Not available 
1931 Negligable 
1932 31.3 
1933 169.8 
1934 381.9 
1935 815.1 
1936 1504.4 
1937 1685.3 
Note. Volume measured in 1000 tons per annum. From Ebel, R. E. 1970. Communist 
Trade in Oil and Gas: An Evaluation of the Future Export Capability of the Soviet Bloc. 
New York: Praeger Publishers. 
 
 
 As explained above, the decreasing export earnings triggered a new wave of 
exploration activities (Considine & Kerr, 2002). At the end of the 1930s, another very 
important trend was traceable: establishing oil production targets that always exceeded 
the ability to find new oil. The conclusion was that the Soviet planning mechanism 
imposed itself a self-inflicted lust to obtain as much as oil in the shortest term possible. 
The consequences were poor management of the reserves and early resource depletion. 
This trend was traceable through out the existence of the Soviet Union.  
 As highlighted already, during the 1930s, virtually all Soviet oil came from the 
North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. Thanks to new discoveries and application of better 
technologies the oil industry expanded during the 1930s. In the late 1930s, major fields 
around Baku, Emba, Grozni began to decline, and total oil output stagnated in the 
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absence of new fields capable of supporting further output expansion (“Ekonomika 
promyshlennosti SSSR,” 1956).  
 The Soviet geologists were aware of potentially large deposits in the Volga-Ural 
fields. Production in these fields was scheduled to leap from two million metric tons to 
12 million metric tons in 1942 (Nazaroff, 1941). Yet the declining petroleum reserves of 
the Caucasus and Caspian were not replaced by the new Volga-Ural finds until the mid-
1950s due to the interruption by the Second World War. 
 The Second World War had severe consequences for the Soviet petroleum 
industry. Before Operation Barbarossa was launched in December 1941, Germany’s oil 
reserves were depleted. Hitler, acutely aware of this situation, was worried that the 
whole war initiative could come to a halt due to an undersupply of fuel. German military 
units were relying principally on the occupied Rumanian oil fields, which were 
vulnerable to Soviet air raids. Protection of the Rumanian fields, as well as acquisition 
of further supplies, was crucial for Germany to continue a prolonged battle (Yergin, 
1991).  
 Hitler therefore planned the operation Fall Blau (Case Blue), a major campaign 
during the summer of 1942, which sought to protect Rumanian oil centers from Soviet 
air attacks through pre-emptive offensives in the Crimea, and to reach Baku through a 
powerful penetration to the Don River and then into the Caucasus. The capture of the 
Caucasus oilfields, he believed, would relieve Germany’s critical oil shortages and 
deliver a material blow to the Soviet economy and war effort. On June 1, 1942, four 
weeks before the summer campaign began, Hitler told the assembled senior officers of 
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Army Group South that if Germany did not acquire the oil of Maikop and Grozny, then 
he would have to end the war (Hayward, 2000).  
 This event presents an example of oil being used as a means of leverage and 
control over international conflicts. In such a critical situation, oil could drive the plan of 
attack in a war, or the plan of capital investment in peacetime. Hydrocarbon policy in 
general, and oil policy in particular, are particularly susceptible to the detrimental effects 
of government intervention for the perceived short-term gain of the actors.  
 As the German army occupied Kuban (an oilfield in North Caucasus) and moved 
towards Grozny, there was not much oil left except blown-up installations and oil wells 
in flames. The Russian oil engineers and workers abandoned the oil fields and moved to 
Baku, carrying with them whatever supplies were available. Ironically, the German 
armies that were marching to capture the Caucasus oil reserves ran out of oil on the 
passes of the Caucasus (van der Leeuw, 2000). 
 The German attempt to break through the mountain passes toward Grozny and 
Baku was repulsed in November 1942. However, the crude oil industry was literally 
demolished, with the losses of many fields in Maikop, Ukraine, Estonia and parts of 
Grozny. Soviet oil output in 1945 was barely at half of its 1937 level. In the fourth Five-
Year Plan, which was disclosed immediately after the end of the Second World War in 
1946, targeted an increase of GNP by 39% before 1950. A significant amount of the 
total investment budget, 87.9%, was allocated to developing and restructuring heavy 
industry (Considine & Kerr, 2002). 
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 The oil and gas industry was on its way to become the dynamo of the Soviet 
economy in the next two decades to come.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE OIL AND GAS 
SOURCES FOR THE SOVIET UNION 
  
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Compared to most nations, the Soviet Union, throughout its existence, enjoyed 
an enviable position concerning the magnitude and range of its energy resources. In both 
total and individual energy resources, the Soviet Union was endowed with fuel reserves 
and hydroelectric potential much larger than those of many states (Dienes & Shabad, 
1979).  
 However, the development of oil and gas resources in the Soviet Union shared 
little connection to any overall international energy strategy, but was driven largely by 
reaction to the pressing needs, mostly conjectural, of the day. When the economy 
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entered periods of sustained squeeze on the factors of production, land, labor and capital, 
the Soviet leadership played on finding new oil and later gas reserves to break the 
tightening bottleneck (Hewett, 1984).  
 The Soviet energy policy suffered from three major weaknesses. First, it failed to 
deal with the demand side, to establish and implement a proper conservation policy. 
Second, the policy did not strike a consistent balance between different forms of energy. 
Up the end of the 1950s, coal and wood dominated the energy balance. After the 1960s, 
hydrocarbons were excessively favored over coal and nuclear power. (Znachenie 
neftianoi i gazovoi, 1972) 
The third weakness of Soviet energy policy was the unbridgeable gap between 
the policy design and execution. The central planning authority, Gosplan, developed 
annual and Five-Year Plans that did not take into account the needs of the sector. In 
similar fashion, Soviet energy policy favored extraction over exploration, field 
operations over industrial support, short-term output over sound infrastructural 
development (such as housing and roads) and institutional autarky over interdependence. 
There was a chronic tendency to prefer the near term over the long, the safe over the 
risky and narrow objectives over broad ones. As a result, efficiency was sacrificed in 
view of accelerated output expectation, which led to the early exhaustion of many giant 
fields (Gustafson, 1989). 
 As was the case in Tsarist Russia, the main constraints of Soviet oil and gas 
development were always due to location, which specifically meant infrastructure, 
distance and lack of technology. In order to optimize the use of resources, major 
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pipelines with strategic importance were constructed to connect the geographically-
remote hydrocarbon resources with industrialized parts of the country (Montias, 1959). 
The Soviet Union relied on the magnitude and importance of the hard currency 
revenues from oil and gas exports. The Soviet oil production boom during the 1950s 
gradually increased the state’s hard currency earnings (Ofer, 1987). After the oil price 
crisis of the 1970s, export revenues became the single largest source of income for the 
Soviet state. These revenues vitally helped the Soviet planners to subsidize the economy, 
build a formidable military force and make rapid enact and revise domestic policies 
without having to consider the reallocation of resources and skills in the complex 
planning system. Therefore, production of oil and gas was imperative for the political 
and economic cohesion of the Soviet bloc.  
 In order to maintain the increase in the production of oil and gas resources, the 
industry enjoyed the highest investment priority. Moreover, contrary to other sectors of 
the Soviet economy, the oil and gas sectors were able to finance their investments from 
their own resources (Broide, 1972). However, merely analyzing the portion of 
investment budgets earmarked for oil and gas investment may result in an incorrect 
picture.  
Oil and gas investments require at least a ten-year perspective to be able to 
explore and prepare potential wells. In the absence of such planning and proper 
logistical support, the efficiency of production can decrease while costs rise. Also, the 
rule of diminishing marginal rates of return on capital investment strictly applies in the 
development of oil and gas fields. In other words, increasingly-large investments do not 
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yield increasingly-large returns to those investments. Instead, the opposite is the case. 
After a critical threshold, each additional dollar invested yields fewer units of return. 
The Soviets experienced this economic reality in the late 1970s and 1980s. Although the 
oil and gas sector swallowed an increasing share of the investment budget, the rates of 
return on production stagnated and fell (Gustafson, 1989).  
The Soviet Union became one of single largest oil producing countries during the 
1970s. In 1974, it took the title of the leading oil producer in the world producing around 
12 million barrels a day (“Neftianaia promyshlennost’,” 1988). The ample volumes of 
production and exports fundamentally transformed the role of the oil and gas sector with 
respect to foreign policy as well. (Wolf, 1985).  
 The Soviet Union started offering discriminatory prices for oil products and a 
host of additional incentives to seduce third world countries in to the Soviet sphere of 
influence. Oil was bartered for commodities like coffee, cotton, rice, spices and even 
fish. Commodity exchange agreements were usually attached with Soviet technical 
assistance and foreign aid programs. The Soviet-built infrastructure in these developing 
counties, which included electricity plants and refineries, were primarily intended to use 
Soviet oil (Gehlen, 1965).  
 Furthermore, under the framework of the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), the Soviet Union became the primary and direct supplier of 
hydrocarbons for the Comecon Bloc. The Soviet energy commitment to Eastern Europe 
increased steadily. With the exception of Rumania, in the 1980s Soviet petroleum 
covered almost 86% of East European countries’ oil imports and nearly all of their gas 
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imports (Brada, 1988). As a result, the building of a supply pipeline system in 1960-
1964 known as ‘Druzhba’ provided a framework for the Soviet oil and gas supplies to 
East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (“Neftianaia promyshlennost’,” 
1988). 
 The Eastern European energy situation was an example of asymmetrical 
dependence, complicated by the fact that Eastern European economies shared all the 
unfavorable trends of Soviet industrial development, yet enjoyed none of the resources 
possessed by the Soviet Union. As the economic and political profile of oil increased 
considerably after the oil shocks in the 1970s, the Soviets increasingly and constantly 
faced the dilemma of the pressing need for hard currency earnings from oil and gas 
exports versus satisfying the domestic and Comecon needs for the sake of political 
stability (Ellman, 1986).  
 Although subsidized oil deliveries to Eastern Europe exerted enormous pressure 
on production level and resulted in the loss of hard currency revenues, maintaining the 
cohesion and political stability of the Soviet Union as well as its dependents became a 
more pressing concern. For this reason, particularly after the 1970s, the Soviets often 
chose to bear the costs of subsidizing the intra-CMEA trade with cheap oil rather than 
jeopardize political stability (Hewett, 1984). 
 The need for more oil and gas for political purposes helped little, but resulted in 
extra pressure exerted on the supply side. This pressure was managed by immense labor 
effort and by the injection of huge quantities of investment capital. Pressure on the 
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sector fundamentally worsened field operations and prevented restructuring and reform 
of the sector (Klinghoffer, 1977). 
As the supply of resources became more abundant, the Soviets attempted to 
penetrate western markets principally by selling at dumping prices. The Soviet attempts 
to capture markets in Western Europe led to a distress on the international oil prices and 
became one of the major catalysts for the establishment of Organisation for Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). (Wolf, 1985)  
 Although the sector was fundamentally important for maintaining the cohesion 
of the Soviet Union, it was never considered as a primary force aligning foreign policy. 
Through out the existence of the Soviet Union, the predominant actor in construction of 
foreign policy was the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza- KPSS) while the dominant decision-
making body was the Politburo (Politicheskoye Buro). Although the Secretary General 
was only one of several members of the Politburo, his positions as head of the 
Secretariat and the Defense Council gave him pre-eminence in the Politburo. Other 
members of the Politburo also had major foreign policy-making responsibilities, most 
notably the secretaries of foreign affairs and defence, the chairman of the Committee for 
State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti--KGB), and the chief of the 
CPSU’s International Department (Edmonds, 1983). 
Foreign policy making was heavily centralized as it was the case with planning 
the economy. The centralization of foreign policy decision making in the Politburo and 
the prolonged office periods of its members both contributed to the Soviet Union’s 
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ability to plan foreign policy and guide its long-term implementation with a relative 
singleness of purpose lacking in pluralistic political systems (Edmonds, 1983). 
The Soviet foreign policy was driven by the geopolitical context of the Cold War 
and its bi-polar competition with the United States. The structure of the Cold War was 
defined by a dominant security agenda, ideological antagonism, assertive 
interventionism and the arms race. The prevailing perception of the bi-polarity was a 
zero-sum game revolving around military balance of two ideological power blocs which 
were established, by means of persuasion or coercion, and sustained by the United States 
and the USSR (Risse-Kappen & Lebow, 1995). 
 The Soviet government perceived the energy sector as a tool to further foreign 
policy goals but never as a foreign policy goal in itself. There were only very few 
economic issues that could have triggered a change in the foreign policy platform of the 
Soviet Union (Hewett, 1984). When high priority foreign policy goals were involved, 
Soviet leaders chose to risk the political consequences of their economic difficulties in 
an attempt to preserve the core of their foreign policy platform, rather than change that 
platform. 
 In the late 1970s, as oil production growth rates began to decline and costs of 
exploration and development began to rise, there was a change in energy strategy toward 
a stronger emphasis on conservation and coal and nuclear energy, combined with an 
intention to save hydrocarbons for the relatively most valuable uses: motor fuels, 
chemical feedstock and export (Kelly, Shaffer & Thompson, 1982). 
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 Arguably, without the discovery and effective utilisation of oil resources in 
Western Siberia in the 1970s,10 the Soviet Union might have collapsed earlier. Oil and 
gas revenues created significant added value to keep the planning economy going. They 
paid for a huge Soviet military and industrial build-up. In hindsight, it is difficult to 
foresee how the colossal Soviet Union could have survived without such a fundamental 
input (Kotkin, 2001). 
The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe needed new technology, more innovation, 
and greater allocation efficiency to make up for the oil factor in their economies. In the 
final years of the Soviet Union, exactly from 1988 to 1992, the command economies 
were forced either to use less oil, to switch to alternative energy sources, or to do both, 
and in a very short amount of time.  
The price of oil had been artificially set much lower than the world price and 
much lower than its scarcity value within the communist system. This low price coupled 
with virtually unlimited supplies up to the 1980’s, subsidized the Soviet and Eastern 
European economies. However, once the oil became scarce an unprecedented economic 
crisis was triggered. 
The Soviet economy was not flexible enough to cope with diminishing oil 
supply, higher internal and lower international oil prices. In the closed Soviet system, 
the price of oil was set artificially low relative to the outside world and to the 
international market value of oil. When oil production declined, oil prices had to go up 
                                                        
10 Interestingly, between 1980 and 1985, the yearly oil production shortage from the planned amounted to 
40 million tons only in Western Siberia. See Neftianaia promyshlennost’: vchera, segodnia, zavtra. 1988. 
Moscow: VNIIOENT. 
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inside the closed system. The economic problems related to reducing the use of so much 
oil were enormous and led to the end of Soviet Union as a political entity.   
 
3.2. Planning and the Soviet Bureaucratic Structure Related to Oil and Gas 
3.2.1. The Soviet Energy Bureaucracy  
 The institutional establishment of the Soviet bureaucratic structure was 
complicated, involving many layers. The sectors were organized around ministries, 
represented by enterprises that basically belonged to the state. The relationship between 
centers and republics in particular sectors of governmental activity varied, and gave rise 
to three different kinds of Ministries (Nove, 1992). 
 First there were the all-union ministries based in Moscow that ran the activities 
of their subordinate units within the various republics. The second type was the union 
republican ministries, which existed both at the center and the republics. In this case, the 
republican ministry was simultaneously subordinate both to Moscow and to the council 
of ministers of the given republic. Finally there were purely republican ministries, which 
had no direct superior in Moscow, though naturally they had to conform to central 
policies and plans. The primary policymaker in the system was the Communist Party, 
which elected a central committee as the executive body. The party virtually dominated 
all aspects of the state apparatus by deciding on appointments to each and every position 
(Nove, 1992). 
 In the Soviet economy, interrelated production processes were coordinated not 
through lateral communication, but primarily by the administrative command approach 
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(Broide, 1972). In other words, there was not a market mechanism through which 
negotiation and mutual accommodation could take place. Instead, a superior central 
organization, Gosplan, issued direct orders to each lower-level overseer involved in the 
coordination of a particular process.  
Along with Gosplan, the Ministry of Finance, the State Bank [Gosbank] and the 
relevant industrial ministry could also issue the guidelines [normativy]. Poor cooperation 
between the ministries plagued the Soviet system and resulted in a minimum degree of 
communication among enterprises that were subordinated to different ministries (Broide, 
1972). The lack of coordination and disunity of actions hindered effective planned 
development. Nevertheless, the Soviet oil and gas sector was still considered by Soviet 
economists as highly profitable.  
 While many accounts of state socialism assume a monolithic, centrally-
administered form of administration for all sectors, there was no single hub controlling 
oil and gas industries (Arbatov, 1991). Both sectors were horizontally-organized with 
extraction, production, refining and distribution of oil products each coming under 
different ministries. In other words, there was no single vertical authority responsible for 
establishing an overarching energy policy. Five union republican ministries specialized 
directly in the output, processing and conversion of primary energy sources (Dienes & 
Shabad, 1979; Vainer, 1990). These were:  
1)  Ministry of the Gas Industry (Ministersvo gazovoi promyshlennosti) 
2)  Ministry of Petroleum Industry (Ministerstvo neftianoi promyshlennosti) 
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3) Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry (Ministerstvo 
neftepererabatyvaiushchei i neftekhimicheskoi promyshlennosti) 
4)  Ministry of Coal Industry (Ministerstvo ugol’noi promyshlennosti) 
5)  Ministry of Power and Electrification (Ministerstvo energetiki i elektrofikatsii) 
 The Ministry of Geology played a key role in the exploration of oil and gas 
deposits (Broide, 1972). Three union republican ministries were specifically geared to 
supply and serve the energy industry with equipment and facilities (Dienes & Shabad, 
1979). These were: 
1) Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building (Ministerstvo 
khimicheskogo i neftianogo mashinostroeniia) 
2) Ministry of Power Machine Building (Ministerstvo energeticheskogo 
mashinostroeniia) 
3)  Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises 
(Ministerstvo stroitel’stva neftianoi i gazovoi promyshlennosti)  
Extraction came under Minnefteprom and Mingazprom, refineries under 
Minneftehimprom, distribution under Gossnab, and export was controlled by Soyuzneft 
ekhsport – a division of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Ministry of Foreign Trade 
realized more than a third of total export earnings and more than half of its hard 
currency earnings were from the sale of fuels and electricity. It imported large quantities 
of equipment for the energy industries (Considine & Kerr, 2002). At any stage of oil 
production, the Central Bureau [Glavnoe upravlenie] for Transportation, Storing and 
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Distribution of Oil and Oil Products was also an influential office in the Soviet oil 
industry (Vainer, 1990).   
 The Soviet bureaucratic structure, then, was not a simple, centrally-arranged 
hierarchy. Rather, it was a number of different hierarchies in which horizontally-linked 
economic units were formed in the regions. These different levels of authorities had 
considerable administrative control over production at the enterprise level. The 
abovementioned five ministries and the Ministry of Geology were among the largest11 
and the most influential (powerful) in the entire Soviet economy. They were responsible 
not only for current production but also for the feasible alternatives of future 
development. 
 The primary production units of the Soviet energy ministries, the enterprises and, 
where they existed, the regional corporations, were roughly similar to such fundamental 
blocks comprising energy industries elsewhere. Enterprise directors, who were 
appointed by their Ministry with Politburo approval, had little autonomy regarding the 
operations. They negotiated annually with their Ministry, which in turn negotiated with 
Gosplan for a plan covering next year’s activity. It was an extremely detailed plan that 
left few opportunities for local decisions (Gorlin, 1985). 
 Traditionally, middle-level management was represented by the glavk, some of 
which (glavki) were in charge of specialized branches of the industry, certain territorial 
groupings of enterprises, research institutions, financial activities or some combination 
                                                        
11 As for oil and gas industry as a whole, only the scientific and technical personnel of the sector amounted 
to 135,000 men. See Vainer, I. Ia. 1990. “Znachenie neftianoi i gazovoi promyshlennosti v narodnom 
khoziaistve SSSR. Sostoianie i perspectivy neftianoi i gazovoi promyshlennosti.” In Ekonomika neftianoi, 
gazovoi i neftepererabatyvaiushchei promyshlennosti, Moscow: “Nedra,” 3-40. 
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of these. There was an extensive reorganisation during the 1970s to promote 
specialization and efficiency among enterprises. Glavki were grouped into production 
associations or regional corporations, with one director and internal system of 
accounting. They were subordinated to the appropriate ministries either directly or 
through the intermediary of industrial associations (national corporations) (Dienes & 
Shabad, 1979). 
 During the initial years of the perestroika reforms, ministries with overlapping 
jurisdictions were brought under a system called ‘Bureau of the Council of Ministers for 
the Fuel and Energy Complex.’ The Bureau was established to increase cooperation and 
provide efficient coordination to improve the strategic decision making of the energy 
complex. Also with the reform, production and distribution functions were merged 
(Dienes & Shabad, 1979). However, considering the sheer size of the task at hand, the 
efforts to increase cooperation by creating other layers of bureaucracy proved to be 
futile.  
 
3.2.2. Planning and Its Effects on the Oil and Gas Sector  
 Five-Year Plans for the National Economy of the USSR, or Piatiletka, were a 
series of nation-wide centralized exercises in order to achieve and maintain rapid 
economic development of the Soviet Union. The plans were developed by the Gosplan, 
the central planning authority. The plans were based on the theory of productive forces, 
which was derived from the general guidelines of the Communist Party for economic 
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development. Fulfilling the plan was the watchword of Soviet bureaucracy (Levine, 
1962). 
 The Soviet system of heavily-centralized directive planning was different from 
other various types of planning, or market-indicative planning. The Soviet economy was 
managed by a hierarchy. The Politburo remained at the summit and the government was 
responsible for carrying out the policies decided by the Politburo. Nominally, the 
Politburo was accountable to the Central Committee and the Central Committee to the 
Party Congress. The basis of the planning economy was scientific planning and 
execution of the plans through orders. The administrative orders identified what to 
produce, to whom to deliver the product, from whom to obtain inputs and in what 
quantities (Nove, 1992). 
 While these subordinate units were expected to make their own proposals, they 
had to carry out the planned instructions they received. The success of the system 
essentially rested on the ability of the planners (administrative orders) to comprehend 
and analyze the needs of the Soviet society (Levine, 1962). However, the planning 
system proved to be a failure in many respects. 
 First of all, the system lost sense of its direction. Actual control over resource 
allocation was exercised through annual and Five-Year Plans. Both types of plans 
required and generated substantial amounts of documents due to the complex, lengthy 
negotiations among the Soviet bureaucracy.12 The Five-Year Plans established the 
                                                        
12 The excessive size of the oil and gas industry bureaucracy, as for the Soviet state apparatus in general, 
was often mentioned to be a great impediment for the industry. Not surprisingly, one of the first remedies 
of the Perestroika era was the adoption of the Law on State Enterprise on 1 January 1988, which 
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general strategic priorities for the period concerned but did not allocate resources in any 
detail; the annual plans, rather, served this function. In principle, annual plans were 
guided by the Five-Year Plans, but in practice too many things changed during the 
course of application. So there was no meaningful way of measuring success of 
production other than the output statistics which were usually on paper fit for purpose 
but totally unreliable. 
These changes were made even more complicated by the uncontrollable variety 
and volume of data emanating from the enterprises. The requirements of a complex and 
giant economy exceeded the resources available to planners to collect and process data.  
In addition, there were problems associated with extreme centralization and confining 
draft planning to a small group of senior officials. In the end the planning system, rather 
than being the rational steering mechanism for the economy, assumed a more political 
and corrupt character, an ideological tool. There was no meaningful way of measuring 
success of the economy other than the output statistics which were usually on paper fit 
for purpose but totally unreliable. (Considine and Kerr, 2002)  
In this respect, the most critical target was those concerning the growth rate of 
output. Performance relative to growth of output determined the fate of management of 
the enterprise (Hewett, 1984). The only way of survival was to match the performance 
criteria no matter if this served any purpose or not. Cost minimization, profit 
maximization, or satisfying customer requirements played a decisively secondary role in 
guiding enterprise management. The net effect was that the enterprises produced 
                                                                                                                                                                   
immediately reduced the managerial staff of the Ministry of Oil Industry [Minnefteprom] by 12.7 %. See 
Neftianaia promyshlennost’: vchera, segodnia, zavtra. 1988. Moscow: VNIIOENT. 
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thousands of tons of products that did not meet any specifications. The lack of lateral 
communication was visible.  
 Another fundamental flaw in the Soviet command economy was the lack of a 
pricing mechanism. Prices were not allowed to determine the allocation of resources, 
which led to a situation where the sense of direction for the economy disappeared with 
regard to maintaining the market equilibrium (Von Mises, 1981). Goods and services 
were exchanged among enterprises at prices approximating the average costs of 
producing and transporting them. As prices were fixed centrally by the State Price 
Committee, they remained fixed for a long time, and cost increases therefore were not 
introduced swiftly through price revisions. This is the primary reason why the share of 
energy sector in the national income never exceeded 15% while more than one third of 
capital investments were absorbed by it. The prices for natural gas and oil were about 
two to two-and-a-half times lower than the costs (Kuhnert, 1991).  
 An important impact of price control schemes, such as the State Price 
Committee, is the misallocation of resources and over-consumption. Since supply was 
continually increased to provide for the increased demand at the given price, the net 
positive effect of the resources owned by Russia were, in part, squandered in the name 
of price fixing and delivery of a centrally-planned economy with given prices. Accepting 
delivery of a product at below cost where the consumers pay for an economic loss price 
creates an unsustainable misallocation of resources and consumption. 
 Therefore, in the long interval between revisions, prices became an increasingly 
poor guide to what it costs the economy on average to produce a unit of any product. 
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Prices, and any costs13 based on those prices, as well as rates of return, were largely 
irrelevant, their roles officially having been reduced to a minimum by the supremacy of 
Gosplan. The result was that prices were changed infrequently and bore little 
relationship to opportunity costs (Allen, 2001). 
 Another very important shortcoming of the planning system was that it had no 
mechanism to incorporate technological experiments. Unlike market economies, the 
planning system did not have a trial and error methodology where viable technologies 
were separated from non-viable technologies by the pressure of market forces. The 
innovation and invention of consumer goods stagnated, and the only way to catch up 
with the western technology was to import it (Levine, 1962). 
 Though the government funded scientific research, there was no mechanism to 
encourage the translation of a technological idea into one with economic application. 
The planning process, with its emphasis on material balances and set technical 
relationships between inputs and outputs, had difficulty dealing with change of any kind. 
(Luke, 1985) Unlike market economies where poor-quality supplies would trigger a 
change of suppliers, Soviet industry was tied to its suppliers. This lack of market 
discipline made poor quality products an endemic feature of the USSR economy. 
 The way the Soviet planning system worked also had long-lasting effects on the 
development of the oil and gas industry.14 In the energy sector, the problems of 
allocation and optimization presented an imposing dilemma for Soviet resource 
                                                        
13 The more or less flexible wage and payment rate was introduced only after 1986. See Neftianaia 
promyshlennost’: vchera, segodnia, zavtra. 1988. Moscow: VNIIOENT. 
 
14 For detailed bibliography on the Soviet oil and gas production see Dobycha nefti i gaza. 1980. Moscow: 
“Znanie.” 
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planners. The value of assets in the oil and gas sector is usually calculated on a timescale 
of decades; hence, investment decisions have long-lasting consequences. However, the 
Soviet planning system, with its heavy focus on annual growth rate of output, did not 
have the means to accommodate the long-term needs of the oil and gas industry. This led 
to shorter life expectancy for wells, as most of the oil wells were not exploited for the 
duration of their expected economic life (Dienes & Shabad, 1979). 
To carry out the necessary investments, the oil production associations depended 
on the state budget, which had no relationship whatsoever to the market price of their 
product. Hence, the Soviet dogma turned production of physical oil into an end in itself. 
It resulted in a system in which no rational relationship existed between the quantity of 
national wealth devoted to oil and the value of oil brought to the nation.(Grace, 2005)  
The Soviet supply and demand policies in oil and gas were irrational which can be 
summarized in the following way: supply as much as you can in the shortest term 
possible and distribute for free to all Soviets. This in effect meant overly aggressive field 
development and lavish consumption.  
The excessive use of water in field development also played an important role in 
the sudden fall of production for the Sovıet Union. Oil’s density is lower than water and 
when faced with water oil floats to the surface. The Soviet engineers in order to keep the 
production growth widely applied water injection method during the 1970s. However, 
there are some difficulties associated with the water flooding method. First of all a 
massive amount of water needs to be supplied and pumped in to the oil wells. Then there 
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is a certain threshold when the amount of oil from the well gets lower than the amount of 
water extracted. This is called ‘water cut’ by the oil industry. 
Water cut seems to have played a major role in triggering the Soviet oil 
production crises. The massive amounts of water injected in to the ground during the 
1970s had to be pumped back to the surface during the 1980s. For instance, the rate of 
water in the giant Samotlor field increased from 24% in 1980 to 68% by 1985. Most of 
the fields were literally drowning in water, all of which required pumping and 
processing to recover oil which meant more labour and cost.  
 Moreover, there was a constant tension between the energy-producing ministries 
and the ministries that supplied them with equipment for extracting and transporting 
energy. The energy ministries permanently complained about late delivery and the poor 
quality of equipment sent to the production fields. This increased the costs of field 
operations – not to mention the loss of human lives and natural resources. The frequent 
failure of the field equipment adversely affected the construction and operation of 
pipelines. The field exploration teams did not have a chance to switch suppliers, which 
were obsessed with the growth rate of production but not the needs of the end users of 
the product. The manufactured pipelines (drilling or transportation) did not meet 
required standards for diameter and resistance. For this reason, the Soviet Union relied 
on imported equipment for critical parts, such as pump stations and pipelines (Dienes & 
Shabad, 1979).  
 Apart from the immediate field problems, another very important consequence of 
flawed planning was related to the overall development of the Soviet energy balance. Oil 
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and gas are indispensable, able to be used in various manners to produce energy. They 
could be applied in the form of heat, electrical power, process steam and mechanical 
work.  
 Therefore, it is not possible to extricate the oil and gas production from the 
overall economic development perspective of the country. Economic decision-making in 
energy production involves sector and regional allocation, combination and degree of 
resource substitution throughout the energy system in order to maximize overall 
advantage from the use of these resources. 
The demand for and supply of energy sources, particularly oil and gas, are hardly 
flexible. In the Soviet case, incomplete planning led to uncertainty regarding the best 
path of development for oil and gas resources. (Dienes & Shabad, 1979) The producing 
fields were put under severe pressure from the supply side because government leaders 
did not optimize energy allocation for domestic and export needs. The inability to 
control demand and promote conservation resulted in a vicious cycle. Increasing demand 
was met by increasing production that in turn encouraged even further demand. This 
impact of the structural weaknesses of the Soviet energy sector was felt even long after 
the Soviet Union collapsed. 
 
3.3. Expansion and Internationalization: The Second Baku 
 After establishing control of the oil industry around Baku during the 1920s, the 
Soviets always had concerns regarding its excessive reliance on the Baku fields, which 
were vulnerable to military attack. Moreover, following the Bolshevik revolution, the 
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flight of foreign oil companies from the Baku region left the oil industry devoid of 
much-needed technical assistance, as well as investment capital. To further complicate  
matters, the fields in the Baku and the Caucasus region peaked around the late 1930s 
(Hassman, 1953). By World War II, Baku was the major oil plant of the Soviet Union, 
providing 70% of the country’s overall oil production, despite the fact that the 
production of oil in the Soviet Union increased threefold in 1940 compared to 1913 
(Budnov & Budnov, 1985).    
The distribution of the Soviet oil production by the oil producing trusts [trest] is 
described in the following table. 
 
Table 7 
Distribution of Soviet Oil Production by the Oil-Producing Trusts 
Trust 1937 1942 1937 1942 
Kavkaz 
25,706.7  
(499,000  
barrels per day)  
 
35,450 
689,000 barrels 
per day) 90.5% 74.6% 
Vostok 
 
 
1,848.4 (35,900 
barrels per day) 
 
13,300 (258,600 
barrels per day) 
  
6.5% 
  
27.7%
 
Sredniaia Aziia 
 841.6 (15,900 
barrels per day)  
1,710 (33,200 
barrels per day)  2.9%  3.6% 
Note. From Budnov, A. D. and L. A. Budnov. 1985. Neftianaia promyshlennost’ SSSR v 
gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Moscow: “Nedra.” 
 
 Following the Second World War, the Soviets were worried about finding the 
necessary resources to support country’s industrialization. The beginning of the Soviet 
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industrialization drive was marked by high annual increases in aggregate energy 
consumption and was unique in its energy intensity. In 1930, the consumption of 
primary energy resources in the country was around 1200 million giga calories. The 
same figure for 1950, 1960 and 1970 follow, respectively: 2785 mgc, 4740 mgc and 
8230 mgc. Such a gigantic leap in energy demand required significant resource 
development (Dienes & Shabad, 1979). However, the prospects in the Caucasus and the 
Caspian appeared dim.  
 These problems were partially resolved after the Soviet geologists discovered oil 
deposits located on the vast landmass between the Volga River and the Ural mountains. 
The origins of the discovery date back to the Second World War, when Soviet drillers in 
desperate search for oil found the shallow Tuymazinskoe fields. In order to discover 
potential new oil fields in the area, an exploration was conducted in 1944. At that point, 
explorers identified that the basin was home to significant reserves. The new oil fields 
were named ‘second Baku,’ marking an important milestone in the history of the 
Russian petroleum industry. Geographically, the fields were in the heart of the Soviet 
Union, between the industrial district of central Russia around Moscow and the 
industrial region of the Urals, (Grace, 2005) which strongly contributed not only into the 
country’s industrialization process but also to its defence capacity (Budnov & Budnov, 
1985).  
 Volga-Urals is a broad province with four widely-separated producing regions at 
strategic points on the main waterway and railway systems: Molotov, Ufa, Kuybyshev 
and Saratov. As a result, the costs of production and distribution were minimized. In 
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some cases, capital costs per ton of crude oil were around one third that of average costs 
in Baku. This resulted in a sudden shift of attention from Baku and the Caucasus to the 
Volga-Ural oil fields (Lydolph & Shabad, 1960; Budnov & Budnov, 1985). 
 The first great discovery in the Volga-Ural region was the Romashinko oil field 
(peak flow rate of 1.65 million barrels (mb)/d in 1970) in the Tatar Autonomous 
Republic in 1948. The other four giant reserves, namely, Arian, Mukhanovskoye, 
Novoyelkhovskoye, Tuymazinskoye, provided almost half of the production. The Soviet 
planners immediately recognized the importance of the discovery of the oil region, as 
funds earmarked for Volga-Ural gradually and consistently increased (Grace, 2005). In 
1970, the share of the Tatar ASSR in the Soviet oil production amounted to almost 30%, 
although the share of oil wells in use amounted only to 14.6% (Vainer, 1990).  
 
Figure 3 
Volga-Ural Oil Fields and Production-1949-2000 (thousand barrels per day)  
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Figure 3: Volga-Ural Oil Fields and Production-1949-2000 (thousand barrels per day)  
Note: From Theodor F. “Russian Oil – Current Status and Outlook”,  IHS Presentation 
Available at http://energy.ihs.com/NR/rdonlyres/26C6F43E-29F7-4486-9B39-
B9A07C40AB6F/0/felder.pdf 
 
Up to 1955, 38.2% of all oil investments were allocated to the Volga-Ural 
region, which marked a diversion from the established oil wells in the Caucasus and the 
Caspian. By 1958, 45.8% of all Soviet oil and gas investments, approximately 33,068 
million rubles, was committed to the development of the Volga-Ural region (Ebel, 
1970). Combined with technological advances such as water flooding and turbo drilling 
methods, this resulted in a significant increase in production from the region. The 
increase in production is shown in the table below: 
 
Table 8 
USSR Crude Oil Production, 1950-60 (thousand metric tons) 
Republic 1950 1955 1960 
 
Russia (including 
Volga) 
 
 
18231 (354,500 
barrels per day)  
 
 
49263 (958,000 
barrels per day) 
 
118900 (2,3 million 
barrels per day)  
Volga Urals 10985 (214,000 
barrels per day)  
41555 (808,000 
barrels per day) 
104000 (2,02 
million barrels per 
day) 
 
Turkmen  2021 (39,200 
barrels per day)  
 
3126 (60,780 
barrels per day)  
5278 (102,600 
barrels per day)  
Azerbaijan 14822 (288,200 
barrels per day)  
 
15305 (297,500 
barrels per day)  
17800 (346,100 
barrels per day)  
Kazakh 1059 (20591 
barrels per day)  
1397 (27163 
barrels per day)  
1601 (31130 
barrels per day)  
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Note. From Ebel, R. E. 1961. The Petroleum Industry of the Soviet Union. Washington, 
D.C.: The American Petroleum Institute.  
 
The share of the Soviet oil production in percentage during the same period is 
shown in the following table: 
 
Table 9 
Percentage Share and Distribution of Oil Production in the USSR 
Republic, regions, oblasts 1950 1960 1965 
 
UUSR 
 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
 
100.0 
RSFSR 48.0 80.4 82.3 
Volga-Urals 29.1 70.6 71.5 
North Caucasus 16.0 8.2 8.5 
Ukrainian SSR 0.8 1.5 3.1 
Kazakh SSR 2.8 1.1 0.8 
Azerbaijan SSR 39.2 12.1 8.9 
Uzbek SSR 3.1 1.1 0.7 
Turkmen SSR 5.3 3.6 4.0 
Note. From Ekonomika neftianoi, gazovoi i neftepererabatyvaiushchei promyshlennosti. 
1972. Moscow: “Nedra.” 
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Among other Soviet republics with minor crude oil production for the similar 
period (1956-1960), Kirghiz SSR, Tajik SSR and Georgian SSR produced 1.9, 0.9 and 
0.2 million tons respectively (Buianov, 1977). 
 Encouraged by booming production and trade figures, as well as in the face of 
increasing domestic needs, Soviet planners showed clear willingness to expand the 
production basis in the Seven-Year Plan for 1958-1965, which called for a significant 
increase in the level of exploratory and developmental oil drilling. The majority of test 
drillings were to take place in the Volga-Ural region, testifying to the relegated status of 
Caspian and Caucasus basin. For the first time in the history of the USSR, the volume of 
exploratory drilling for both oil and natural gas (6743 meters) exceeded that of 
development drilling (2412 meters) (Dienes & Shabad, 1979). 
 
Table 10 
The Distribution of Test Drilling in the USSR, 1920-70 
Region 1920-
40 
1941-
50 
1951-
60 
1961-
70 
 
Volga-Urals 
 
 
8% 
 
26% 
 
40% 
 
34% 
North Caucasus 29% 23% 20% 15% 
Komi ASSR 2% 3% 2% 5% 
Siberia 0% 0% 2% 10% 
Azerbaijan 42% 25% 11% 5% 
Ukraine 1% 5% 7% 11% 
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Kazakhstan 7% 6% 4% 4% 
Central Asia 4% 8% 9% 10% 
Others 7% 4% 5% 6% 
Note. Percentages are of the total for the USSR From Considine, J. and W. Kerr. 2002. 
The Russian Oil Economy. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar.  
 
In the seven-year planning period, the capital investment in the oil and natural 
gas industry was 171,500 million rubles. This figure was twice more than that of 1952-
1958 period, which was around 72,200 million rubles. This marked a 137.5% increase in 
investment. The rising amounts of investment and exploratory drilling helped further 
expansion of production capability and, eventually, the amount of oil extracted 
(Considine, 2002). 
Despite its considerable oil reserves and industrial potential, the Soviet energy 
policy at the start of 1950s seemed to be questionable compared to the variety of its 
resource potential. In 1950 the share of coal in energy consumption stood at around 
73%, compared to the 20% share of oil and gas combined. In 1960, the energy balance 
of the Soviet Union still pointed to the dominance of coal. More than half of energy 
production was from coal; more than a quarter was from oil. Natural gas accounted for 
only 8% of energy production.15 
 Switching energy resources from coal to oil made economic sense, as the cost of 
production per unit of oil was almost one fourth of coal, not to mention the relative 
                                                        
15 To be more precise, for the year 1955, the production of the so-called combination gas [estestvennyi 
gaz], that is natural gas plus associated gas, amounted to 8.98 %. See Brents, A. D., V. Ia. Gandkin and G. 
S. Urinson. 1975. Ekonomika gazodobyvaiushchei promyshlennosti. Moscow: “Nedra.” 
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logistical advantages in transport of oil and gas compared to coal (Lydolph & Shabad, 
1960). Moreover, with increasing industrialization and the ubiquitous application of the 
industrial method, the importance and share of oil consumption as an energy source in 
production, heating, generating electricity and mobility (including all transport modes) 
increased to unprecedented levels. The workers’ settlements were electrified; railways 
converted to diesel motor, metallurgical factories as well as cement kilns were supplied 
increasingly with oil and gas. Kerosene was replaced by electricity for lighting, coal by 
natural gas for domestic heating, and diesel started to be used as fuel in tractors 
(Lydolph & Shabad, 1960). 
 In May 1955, Pravda published an article stressing the importance of increasing 
the share of oil production in the fuel and energy balance of the Soviet Union. This was 
the first clear indication that the Soviet government was dissatisfied with the status of 
petroleum in the energy balance. The seventh Five-Year Plan mentioned the gross 
imbalance in the energy consumption and advised switching from coal to oil (Considine 
& Kerr, 2002).  
 From 1955 to 1960, a major change in Soviet fuel balance took place, which was 
a direct result of the discovery of the Volga-Ural fields that promised to yield much 
higher returns per unit of investment. The share of coal in industrial production and 
heating gradually shrank while the share of oil consistently increased, eventually to 
substantial levels. The conversion of the Soviet energy source from coal to petroleum, a 
process that started in early 1950s, was entirely achieved by the end of the seventh 
planning period (Lydolph & Shabad, 1960). 
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 From 1960 to the collapse of the Soviet Union, oil and natural gas dominated the 
energy balance by a very wide margin (Brents, Gandkin & Urinson, 1975). Between 
1960 and 1982, oil production grew on average by 6.7% and natural gas production 
grew at a pace of 11.5%. From 1960 to 1970, petroleum production grew at 9% a year, 
but growth rates started falling after 1970 (Hewett, 1984). Such drastic increases in gas 
production were an impressive achievement. Between 1958 and 1970, production of gas 
increased by about 171 billion cubic meters, from 29.9 billion cubic meters in 1958 to 
200 in 1970 – almost sixfold (Varakin, 1971).   
 After the geographical shift in production centres, refineries across the Soviet 
Union began to undergo changes in location and capacity. Before the Second World 
War, most refineries were located near to the production centres – namely, Baku, 
Grozny, Batumi and Tuapse. The products were mostly shipped to consumption centres 
in refined form. Since the distribution of refined products by rail was two to three times 
more expensive per ton-kilometre than crude shipped by pipeline, the development of 
pipelines spurred the construction of large refineries in major consuming areas 
(Hassman, 1953).  
 The rise of the Volga-Urals as the country’s major petroleum-producing region 
led to the development of an inter-regional pipeline system beginning in the late 1950s. 
The crude pipeline network developed in three main directions from the Volga-Urals 
region: west to Eastern Europe (the Friendship or Druzhba Pipeline), northwest to the 
Moscow-St. Petersburg area and east to Siberia (Lydolph & Shabad, 1960). 
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 Among the important oil pipelines, the Friendship (Druzhba) pipeline system 
was completed and put into operation in 1964. The whole pipeline included 3004 km of 
426-1020 millimeter pipe in the USSR, 675 km in Poland, 27 km in East Germany, 836 
km in Chechoslovakia and 123 km in Hungary. The Trans-Siberian pipeline from Ufa to 
Irkutsk was also completed in 1964; the 410 km West Siberian pipeline from Shaim to 
Tyumen was completed in 1965; and the 1000 km West Siberian Pipeline from 
Ust’Balyk to Omsk was completed in 1967 (Prybyla, 1965). 
 The increase in the oil production and the major pipeline constructions had a 
positive impact on net Soviet oil exports, which reached levels of 14.1 mt per annum in 
1959. This was 371% improvement over the 3.8 million tons reported in 1955. By the 
end of 1960s, just before the West Siberian fields were commissioned, production 
reached 300 million metric tons, 5,8 million barrels per day. Exports to communist and 
non-communist nations were 132.5 million tons, 2,57 million barrels per day. The hard 
cash revenues reached $421 million constituting 15 % of the total revenues in 1965. 
Steadily-rising Soviet oil exports and Soviet pricing policies had important 
repercussions on the world oil markets. Soviet oil started penetrating the international oil 
markets on a greater scale after 1957. While Soviet exports were increasing at an 
accelerated pace, the resolution of the Suez conflict facilitated a flood of oil exports also 
from the Middle East. Oil prices plummeted, driving down profits. Major oil companies 
found it difficult to compete with Soviet exports, as there was no visible cost floor for 
the Soviet sales (Parra, 2004).   
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Figure 4 
The Oil Prices and International Events 1947-1973 
 
Figure 4: The Oil Prices and International Events 1947-1973 
Note: From the WTRG Economics web site  
 
Other international opportunities complemented the increase in production 
volumes from Volga-Urals. The Six Day war between Israel and the Arab nations in 
1967, and particularly the Yom-Kippur War in 1973 triggered an Arab oil embargo. Led 
by Saudi Arabia, OPEC announced on October 16, 1973 that the Arab countries were 
cutting production and placing an embargo on shipments of crude oil to Western 
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countries, the US and the Netherlands in particular. At the same time, OPEC imposed a 
complete boycott on Israel. The oil companies and other intermediaries cooperated with 
the embargo; the result was that the world oil prices rose to previously unheard levels, 
four times the previous highs. The economies of the industrialized countries across the 
globe were damaged; by early 1974 most of the world was hit by the worst slump since 
the Great Depression of 1932-1940. 
While psychologically effective for a time, the actual results of the Arab/OPEC 
strategy were primarily price increases, not supply disruption. This provided the Soviet 
Union with ample prospects to increase both the volume and the prices of crude oil 
exports to West European markets. By 1974, Soviet hard currency earnings from oil 
exports had reached $539 million. This marked a 72% boost over the 1962 figures 
(Clark, 1990). With the climbing oil prices and incearing oil production from Siberian 
fields, the Soviet budget revenues came to depend heavily on the oil exports to the hard 
currency markets. This development, which went unnoticed, was actually a signal that 
the Soviet Union would have had very difficult times if the prices were to plummet. 
 During the 1960s, three major interrelated changes occurred in the international 
oil industry that had a direct impact on its evolution and its institutional arrangements. 
First, new production centres developed in the Soviet Union, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and 
the United Arab Emirates. Second, new companies emerged in the market as a result of 
these new resources. Third, controls over oil supplies weakened and the host 
governments’ influence increased. In sum, during the 1960s there was a substantial and 
steady increase in the production of oil from new areas (Penrose, 1979). 
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The new companies did not hesitate to cut prices to sell their oil. Many of them 
lacked adequate integrated outlets and had no stake in older areas. As a result, the new 
suppliers were unconcerned about how their price-cutting would affect prices elsewhere. 
Thus, major international companies’ effective control over the flow of oil continued to 
weaken. As a result, these companies were forced to compete and the pressure on prices 
continued to mount, indicating a growing surplus in world oil markets. Specifically, 
sellers desired to sell more than the market would take at existing prices (Penrose, 
1979).  
 As a new market entrant, the Soviet marketing campaign was also aggressive and 
motivated by practicality. Soviet oil was sold at bargain basement prices in local soft 
currencies, or even bartered for other industrial or agricultural commodities. Further, 
Soviet planners encouraged bartering a certain percent of oil production, as it helped in 
hedging foreign exchange earnings in a highly volatile market (Wright, 1974). As a rule, 
at the time of a steady increase of oil prices, the amount paid by socialist countries was 
often the world market price that prevailed some five years before the deal (Kazankova 
& Sudo, 1998).  
 While the Soviet Union penetrated Western markets by exploiting the 
opportunities arising from the international context and enacting discriminatory pricing 
polices, it was also taking advantage of its captive markets. For instance, East Germany 
was paying $2.70 for a barrel of oil in 1959, whereas the price of same barrel for the 
West Germany was $1.69 (Adelman, 1993). In 1961, Brazil imported a barrel of crude 
oil from the USSR for $1.65, while the posted price in the market was $2.97. The 
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reduced price for Italy was $1.39, and for Egypt it was $1.44. In 1961, Nefteexport was 
supplying 10.31% of West German, 22.9% of Italian, 37.9% of Greek, 38% of Austrian 
and 93.1% of Iceland’s oil requirements (Gehlen, 1965). In 1968, the then-neutral 
Austria became the first Western European country to receive Soviet gas. A year later, 
two Western European energy giants, the German Ruhrgas and Italian ENI, concluded 
contracts to buy Soviet gas (“Torgovlia enegoresursami,” 2007).  
 
Table 11 
Annual Prices for Soviet Crude Oil in East and West Germany, 1959-67 
Year West Germany East Germany 
195
9 
$1.69 $2.70 
196
2 
$1.30 $2.66 
196
5 
$1.40 $2.33 
196
7 
$1.40 $2.04 
Note. All prices are F.O.B. the Soviet border. Currency conversions are based on official 
Soviet exchange rates (1 ruble = $1.11US). From Ebel, R. E. 1961. The Petroleum 
Industry of the Soviet Union. Washington, D.C.: The American Petroleum Institute.  
 
The main reason for this price difference was the pricing mechanisms agreed 
under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) established in 1949 
(Prybyla, 1965). Trade within CMEA nations was conducted with soft currency and 
governed by the strict terms of complex CMEA barter agreements. The prices for all 
goods were set in the CMEA agreements at five-year intervals, on the basis of world 
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market prices that prevailed in some previous five-year planning period (Chadwick, 
Long & Nissake, 1987). 
 The Soviet Union was always in a position to manipulate the terms of trade with 
CMEA nations via its political clout. It discouraged Eastern European states from 
turning to alternative sources of supply whenever it believed that the given commodity 
could be supplied within the bloc. Moreover, with Soviet assistance, 49 major chemical 
and petrochemical plants were built in Socialist countries, mainly to process Soviet oil 
and gas (“Neftepererabatyvaiushchaia,” 1967). In the meantime, as politically-induced 
inelasticity of demand increased, so did the chances for price discrimination (Gehlen, 
1965).  
 Although the captive markets argument seemed valid throughout the 1960s, the 
events of 1970s proved that captive markets materially benefited from the way the trade 
agreements were set with the Soviet Union (Maresse & Vanous, 1983). Besides, a good 
part of the earnings from the Soviet oil exports following the crisis of 1970s were spent 
as aid for the Eastern bloc countries (“Neft’: Bol’shoi soblazn,” 2000). 
 At the beginning of the 1970s, Soviet planners were unconcerned about the oil 
supply. After converting the country’s energy balance from coal to oil, the Soviet Union, 
for the first time in its existence, enjoyed the luxury of cheap energy in all respects. The 
country’s confidence in its abundance of supply was also reflected by the government’s 
decision to allocate less of its budget to the oil sector in the eighth planning period. The 
exploratory activities stagnated starting in the mid-1960s.  
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 Again, it is shown for the Soviets that the exploratory ventures proceeded on a 
cyclical basis of needs. When needs are high, exploration increased greatly; however, 
when needs fall, so did exploration. Overall, this policy led to gluts and shortages. As 
stated previously, the long time-span between the investment and the ability to generate 
returns, or even output, resulted in a mismatch among the above stated lines. 
 In the 1960s, some fields in West Siberia, as well as fields in Nizhnevartovsk and 
in Tyumen were also being developed one after another: Ustbalykskoe field (1961), 
Samotlorskoe field (1961) in the southwest of Surgut and Fedorovoskoe field (1962) and 
the Sovetskoe field (1962) (Considine & Kerr, 2002). Compared to the Volga-Ural 
fields, these remote fields produced little. 
 
Table 12 
West Siberian Crude Oil Production, 1964-70 
Region 196
4 
1967 1970 
Surgut 120 2,56
1 
15,19
1 
Nizhnevartovsk 73 945 11,58
8 
Shiam 16 2,28
7 
4,637 
Total West Siberia 209 5,79
3 
31,41
6 
Note. Production measure in thousands of metric tons. From Ebel, Robert. 1994. Energy 
Choices in Russia. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. And 
from Elliot, I.E. 1974. The Soviet Energy Balance: Natural Gas, Other Fossil Fuels, and 
Alternative Power Resources. New York: Praeger Publishers. 
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Oil production in the Volga-Ural region peaked unexpectedly at the beginning of 
the 1970s; as time went on, production rates started an accelerated decline. Decreasing 
oil production was not affordable for the Soviet Union as the industrial production 
became dependent on cheap oil – not to mention the value added created for the Soviet 
economy by the hard currency earnings. Soviet planners were faced with an urgent need 
to recover the production rates. The planners sought a wave of precautions, which 
consisted of the crash development of the West Siberian oil fields (Goldman, 1980). The 
Russian oil experts were facing yet another peak after the Baku peaked in 1930s. The 
measures employed were essentially the same; explore somewhere else and use better 
technology. Conservation was not considered as a serious alternative.  
 
3.4. Crises and Response: the Siberian Giants 
 Throughout the 1960s, significant changes took place both in the Soviet 
economy and the international oil markets. In line with the global trend, Russia’s 
domestic demand as well as Eastern European demand for oil products had grown 
rapidly after 1950. This increase in demand resulted from the expansion of road 
transport, railways switching from coal to diesel and petrochemicals being used in every 
aspect of industrial production and household consumption (Vainer, 1990). For instance, 
in 1970, the amount of oil processed for domestic industrial needs was 1.44 times more 
than that of 1965 (Federov, n.d.). Moreover, the dramatic actions of OPEC in 1960s 
heralded the radical transformation for the world petroleum market, as the era of easily-
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available oil supplies from the Middle East was over. These factors resulted in mounting 
pressure on Soviet oil supplies.  
 To further complicate the issue, by mid-1970s, it was clear that oil output from 
the Volga-Ural region had declined more sharply than anticipated by industry experts 
and the Soviet planners. Several reasons explain the accelerated decline. First, 
exploratory drilling activity stagnated and then shrank throughout the eighth and ninth 
five-year planning periods due to bureaucratic inertia and a reluctance to shift the focus 
of the Soviet exploration effort from established producing regions (Goldman, 1980). 
The Volga-Ural oil output depended on five major fields and more than half of the 
proven reserves were scattered around in smaller fields. In order to arrest the sharp 
decline, the Soviets needed to invest substantial sums to develop these smaller fields and 
apply new technology to slow down the decline of production in established fields. 
However, such measures required time and were only an interim remedy. In addition, 
the Soviet planners did not have the human and capital resources to sustain effort in 
Volga-Ural while simultaneously engaging in intensive exploration elsewhere. A more 
radical solution was needed to keep the oil flowing (Grace, 2005).  
 As explained above, drilling activity in the Soviet Union was organized around 
targets for meters drilled, rather than reserves proved or number of wells operated. This 
system was biased in favor of development drilling because of the speed and efficiency 
of development over exploratory drilling activities. Exploratory drilling was risky and 
the Soviet planners did not like risky ventures. Moreover, it required more time to 
mobilize and demanded much effort due to the need to carry supportive infrastructure 
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around the fields. In case of a failure of the exploration well, the oilfield equipment 
needed to be moved to another test field, which again required proper logistics and 
resulted in a loss of time and available labour force (Gustafson, 1989).  
 Apart from the problems of the oil sector, there were also accumulating problems 
of a more general and important nature. National income and a host of broad economic 
indices fell short of their targets in the 9th (1970-1975) and 10th (1975-1980) five-year 
planning periods (Considine & Kerr, 2002). As can be observed from the table below, 
the growth rates of the economy initially fell and then stagnated. 
 
Table 13 
Soviet Economic Growth 1951-1978 
 
 1951-
1955 
1956-
1960 
1961-
1965 
1966-
1970 
1971-
1975 
1976-
1978 
1976-
1979 
National Income        
Soviet Official 
National Income 
Produced 
 
 
11.4 
 
9.1 
 
6.5 
 
7.7 
 
5.7 
 
5.1 
 
4.2 
Soviet Offical 
National Income 
Utilised 
 
    
7.1 
 
5.1 
 
4.2 
 
3.6 
GNP 
 
6 5.8 5 5.5 3.7 3.6 3 
Capital Stock 
 
9.9 8 8.6 7.4 7.9 7  
Labour Force 
 
1.5 1 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.6  
Industrial Output        
Soviet Official 
Gross Output 
 
13.1 10.4 8.6 8.5 7.4 5.1 4.7 
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Gross Output CIA 
Estimate 
 
11.3 8.7 7 6.8 6 3.9 3.5 
Industrial Capital 
Stock 
 
12 11.3 11.2 8.7 8.7 8.1  
Industrial Man 
Hours 
4.2 1.1 2.9 3.1 1.5 1.8   
Note. Figures represent percentage of growth per annum. From Hanson, P. 1980. 
“Economic Constraints on Soviet Policies in the 1980s,” International Affairs 57(1): 26.  
 
The Soviet economic slowdown was due to systemic problems which were 
visible in the increasing incongruity between a highly-centralized system of planning 
and management and the demands of a complex economy. In addition, demographic and 
geographical factors contributed to the deterioration. Decades of low birth rates led to a 
growing shortage of labour. The long-abundant inputs to the Soviet economy from 
labour and natural resources were slowing down (Hanson, 1980).  
In addition, the government, fearing and remembering food shortages, invested 
heavily in the agricultural sector during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. Yet these 
investments did not yield profitably, bringing nothing but extra pressure on the already 
strained Soviet economy. Lastly, in view of the Cold War rivalry, the cost of 
maintaining Russia’s military was draining an increasing amount of resources (estimated 
around 25% of the GDP) from the squeezed Soviet economy (Sakwa, 1999). Disruptions 
and shortfalls spread to every sector of the Soviet economy. 
 Even though the economy was slowing down, the wasteful Soviet industry 
required increasing volumes of energy. In view of the poor Soviet macroeconomic 
performance during the 10th Five-Year Plan, saving the oil output level became a 
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government priority for maintaining the cash and budget balance. There was an urgent 
need to commission new resources apart from the already peaked Volga-Ural fields. 
West Siberia was the only feasible alternative (Gustafson, 1989). 
 In 1969, the government published a resolution concerning measures for the 
accelerated development the oil extraction industry in Western Siberia. Yet, from the 
Soviet publications of the early 1970s, it is hard to find any public signs of a high-level 
concern over future energy prospects (Elliot, 1974). The oil industry, as portrayed in the 
press at that time, was not without problems, but these problems were explained as the 
consequences of rapid growth. The average annual increase of Soviet oil production for 
the period of 1965-1970 was 9.4%, while the average annual increase of oil processing 
among leading capitalist countries amounted to only 8.5% (Bogacheva & Pastushenko, 
1971). In his reports to the Party Central Committee in December 1972 and 1973, 
Brezhnev gave hardly more than an insignificant reference to the subject (Akisuitin, 
1991). Neither production nor conservation of energy seemed to be a matter of concern 
or priority.  
It was only at the 25th Party Congress speech in 1976 that Brezhnev showed 
more interest on energy policy than in earlier speeches. At the central committee plenary 
of November 1979, it was evident that the stagnant economy and the loss in oil 
production was becoming a matter of national concern. Brezhnev listed three critical 
bottlenecks in the economy: energy, transport and steel (Akisuitin, 1991).  
 Concerning energy, the goal of Brezhnev’s strategy was to spare oil and gas for 
non-fuel uses. This strategy required that the share of nuclear power and coal increased 
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for electricity production. He gave voice to ongoing public calls to increase the share of 
coal and nuclear energy in the energy balance in order to save oil and gas. In accordance 
with the proposed strategy, large mine-mouth coal power plants were proposed for 
Siberia and Kazakhstan. The produced energy was to be transmitted to the European 
SSR via long-distance electric lines. Also, the share of nuclear power in the energy 
balance was to be radically increased. In order to achieve such a strategy, the Soviet 
investment budget needed a significant re-allocation from oil development to 
construction of coal mines and new nuclear plants (Gustafson, 1989).  
 The rationale behind Brezhnev’s energy strategy was the oil crisis of the 1970s 
and the radical transformation of the world energy market which had its repercussions in 
the USSR The new global perception of petroleum as a relatively scarce, increasingly 
valuable, economically and strategically critical resource was paralleled in the Soviet 
Union. In 1970, the price of light crude oil stood around $1.80 bbl. By 1976, it was 
$12.40, and in 1979 it shot to $30, an increase of 16-fold in less than a decade. These 
price increases had two consequences for the Soviet oil industry. First, transfers to 
Eastern European satellites had to increase, but with a much higher opportunity cost in 
view of ever-widening hard currency market for Soviet oil and gas. Second, it reinforced 
already-present but still tentative ideas about altering the direction of Soviet energy 
development (Russel, 1976). Following the oil crisis, the Soviet Union was estimated to 
earn between 200 and 250 billion current dollars from the export of oil (“Neft’: Bol’shoi 
soblazn,” 2000). 
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The oil market is peculiar because of the varying levels of elasticity of the 
demand and supply in both the short and the long terms. The fluctuations of prices are 
enormous. There is a very well-known economic concept of external shocks. In the 
United States, the world's largest economy, the biggest external shock during the last 
fifty years was in 1974, when oil prices quadrupled and the terms of trade worsened by 
15 percent. For the Soviet Union, skyrocketing oil prices had a much more substantial 
effect on the GDP, which could be measured in hundreds of percentage points. Thus 
began the collapse of the Soviet empire.(Gaidar, 2007)  
The use of petroleum and gas under boilers started to be questioned, as well. 
Accelerating the development of surface coal deposits and increasing nuclear power 
generation capacity were high on the agenda of Politburo discussions. Hydrocarbons 
were to be devoted increasingly to technological uses, as well as to be exported for hard 
currency earnings. Publications of projections started to foresee a greater role for natural 
gas almost in the early 1970s. Also, the 1970s witnessed the beginnings of the oncoming 
debate over how to apply conservation measures in all areas of the Soviet economy 
(Dienes & Shabad, 1979). 
 Toward the end of the 1970s, the Soviets, acutely aware of the rising opportunity 
cost of oil and gas supplies to Eastern Europe, started assuming a tougher position at 
CMEA debates.16 The demand from Eastern Europe grew due to industrialization and a 
changing fuel balance. The Soviets hoped to slow down the oil export growth to Eastern 
                                                        
16 A joint CMEA energy program was developed over the annual CMEA sessions which foresaw 
increasing production of electricity from coal and rationalising consumption of oil. The objective of the 
program was to develop 37 gigawatts of total nuclear capacity outside the Soviet Union by 1990 which 
was to replace 75 million tons of standard fuel consumption per year. 
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Europe to 3% in the country’s 10th planning period, as opposed to 10% average in the 
previous periods. However, oil imports from the Soviet Union reached 1.55 million 
barrels per day in 1979, nearly double the level of 1970 (National Foreign Assessment 
Centre-CIA, 1977).  
 During the 10th Five-Year Plan (1975-1980) the Soviet Union had to make a 
choice. There was a pressing need for more oil to maintain economic growth. This factor 
alone precluded investing in re-shuffling the energy balance. This situation was 
dissimilar to the country’s earlier energy transition, when the Soviets smoothly 
transitioned from coal to oil thanks to the abundant Volga-Ural fields. This time, Soviets 
had to embark upon an oil campaign for the simple reason of keeping the economy 
going. The oil campaign targeted Western Siberia and essentially consisted of the crash 
development of oil and gas resources. The production targets for Western Siberia were 
revised radically upwards in the 10th Five-Year Plan (1975-1980). 
 In late 1977, Brezhnev, in a speech to the plenum of the Central Committee, 
stressed the decisive importance of the Tiumen oil field for this purpose. In the spring of 
1978, he paid a personal visit to Siberia in an attempt to inspire geologists and back up 
his new policy course (Aksiutin, 1991). 
 The oil discoveries in Western Siberia concentrated along the river Ob’s route, 
the major gas finds were farther north in the Yamal-Nenets peninsula. As the oil fields 
moved to the West Siberian fields, the exploratory effort became even harder due to the 
requirement to drill deeper in harsher terrain and poor climactic conditions. Although the 
West Siberian climate is cold, the basin is quite swampy and seasonally soggy. It is one 
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of the most challenging environments to produce hydrocarbons. Between 1970 and 
1979, while exploratory drilling fell from 2.8 to 2.5 million meters, development drilling 
more than doubled, from 6.2 to 13 million meters (Gustafson, 1989).  
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Oil Production Rates in Western Siberia (thousand barrels)  
 
Figure 5: Oil Production Rates in Western Siberia (thousand barrels)  
Note: From Theodor F. “Russian Oil – Current Status and Outlook”,  IHS Presentation 
Available at http://energy.ihs.com/NR/rdonlyres/26C6F43E-29F7-4486-9B39-
B9A07C40AB6F/0/felder.pdf 
 
 
Similar to the early years of development in the Baku region, the transport of 
resources from Siberia proved to be the single biggest problem for the oil industry. The 
nearest refineries were located in the Volga-Ural region, particularly Ufa and Omsk. The 
only possible way to transport oil was via rivers. By 1970, urgent measures were needed 
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to link Shaim with Tyumen and Ust-Balyk with Omsk. The refineries at Omsk and 
Angarsk were to be enlarged (North, 1972).  
Subsequent pipeline developments have mainly involved linking new or 
expanding crude production areas. Development of the new West Siberian fields in the 
late 1960s and 1970s posed a considerable transportation challenge, as they were located 
some 2,400 kilometres further east of the Volga-Urals. Moving crude oil from the 
rapidly-expanding new fields in West Siberia to the main refining centres in the eastern 
portion of the country and the main export points along the western borders required the 
construction of a massive new pipeline network  
This has included a 1220 mm pipeline from Samotlor east through Anzhero-
Sudzhensk and Krasnoyarsk to the refinery at Angarsk, constructed between 1972 and 
1981, the large-diameter Samotlor-Almetyevsk pipeline, which was completed in 1973, 
and the Nizhnevartovsk-Samara pipeline (also 1220 mm), which followed in 1976. 
These lines increased transmission capacity between West Siberia and the European 
parts to about 175 mt per year. Another large diameter pipeline was constructed from 
Surgut to Novopolotsk in Belarus, and was completed in 1984; a second 1220-mm 
pipeline along this route (Kholmogory-Klin) was completed in 1985, each adding 
another 75 mt to westward transmission capacity. (“Joint Committee for Programme 
Development”, 1994)  
 The heightened profile of the oil and gas was also supported by injection of 
capital funds. Soviet investment in the energy sector reached 88.6 billion rubles in the 
years 1976 to 1980, a 45% increase over the 61 billion rubles reported in 1971-75. The 
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energy industry accounted for over 40% of the Soviet Union’s total investment in 
industry (Considine & Kerr, 2002).  
 
 
 
 
Table 14 
Capital Investment in the Soviet Energy Economy, 1965-80 
Five-Year Plan 1961-
65 
1966-
70 
1971-
75 
1976-
80 
Total Soviet Investments 213.3 306.3 437.2 567.2 
Total Investments in Industry 87.7 119.7 168.6 219.3 
Energy 30.0 42.0 61.0 88.6 
Oil 9.3 13.1 20.5 32.2 
Gas 3.9 7.3 13.8 23.7 
Note. Figures are in billions of rubles in January 1, 1969 prices. 1969 prices have been 
corrected with consideration for the new forms for construction introduced in January 
1976. From Considine, J. & W. Kerr. 2002. The Russian Oil Economy. Massachusetts: 
Edward Elgar.  
 
 
 From 1966 to 1978, the majority of the capital expenditures and investment for 
the oil and gas industry were absorbed by the extraction industry. As shown in the tables 
below, the share of oil and gas in the total investment remained around 4%, which did 
not account for the varying costs for the ageing fields (the necessity to drill ever deeper), 
the harsher climate of Siberia and the decreasing returns on developing smaller fields. 
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By 1980, Western Siberia surpassed the Volga-Ural region in terms of investment 
absorbed from the budget. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15 
Capital Investment in the Oil Industry by Region, (1965-85) 
 
 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Russia 63.58 68.50 71.32 83.53 88.15 
North Caucasus 14.80 9.90 5.60 3.20 
Volga-Urals 46.90 45.40 43.10 23.90 24.50 
West Siberia 1.30 5.20 12.50 48.70 56.70 
Azerbaijan 13.42 6.36 4.99 2.58 1.91 
Kazakh 4.90 5.83 7.10 5.54 4.45 
Turkmen 7.88 6.82 4.77 2.39 1.63 
Total RFSFR 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note. Figures expressed as a percentage of the total capital investment. From Considine, 
J. and W. Kerr. 2002. The Russian Oil Economy. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar. 
  
There were three crucial inputs for the continued expansion of the Soviet oil 
production efforts. The availability of capital and labour for the oil sector in vast 
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quantities was a sine qua non. Furthermore, decisions regarding how to allocate 
resources between old and new fields became extremely important. Another pressing 
matter was the decision of how to divide inputs between exploratory and development 
drilling, not to mention the productivity of these inputs (Hewett, 1984). 
 As to the prioritisation of the production fields, the government made the 
decision in favor of the Western Siberia region. The region’s share in the investment 
budget rose (Dienes & Shabad, 1979). The majority of the investments went to crash 
development of the new fields. Yet the Soviet planners failed to estimate the speed with 
which the output of hydrocarbons from remote areas could be delivered to centers of 
demand. The Soviets also underestimated the cost and lead time required to lessen the 
dependence on petroleum as a source of energy. Re-shuffling the energy balance in 
favor of greater coal and nuclear power required huge investments to restructure 
industry as well as develop infrastructure, ambitious conservation programs and a 
transition phase. Soviet energy demand was, on balance, structurally-determined (Kelly, 
Shaffer & Thompson, 1982).  
 Between 1976 and 1980, development drilling increased by 72% compared to the 
period between 1971 and 1976, from 37 million meters to 65 million meters. By 1980 
the West Siberian oil production reached 322.46 million tons, accounting for 53% of 
total Soviet production, whereas the Volga-Ural region contributed less than 30% 
(Nekrasov & Pervukhin, 1977; Considine & Kerr, 2002). USSR crude oil production in 
the 1980s, divided by region, is shown in the table below. 
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Table 16 
USSR Crude Oil Production, 1980-1988 
Note. Figures represent a thousand metric tons. From Considine, J. and W. Kerr. 2002. 
The Russian Oil Economy. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar. 
 
3.5. Crisis and Response: the Gas Campaign and Conservation 
Rising production costs and conversion of the energy balance were recurring 
themes during the Brezhnev era and even for the successor Secretary 
Region 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Kaliningrad 0 1,523 1,511 1,421 1,300 
North Caucasus 18,412 10,521 10,116 9,835 9,380 
Volga-Urals 185,869 135,544 128,394 122,853 115,831 
Komi 18,075 18,215 18,269 17,344 15,600 
West Siberia 322,459 365,805 389,665 403,403 407,845 
Sakhalin na  2,589 2,452 2,410 2,400 
Others 25 178 183 247 384 
Ukraine 6,383 4,835 4,756 4,652 4,487 
Byelorussia 2,551 2,019 2,028 2,041 2,010 
Georgia 3,186 552 179 183 120 
Azerbaijan 5,053 3,909 3,902 3,734 3,700 
Kazakh 18,836 21,493 21,688 21,914 21,925 
Uzbek 18,836 21,493 21,688 21,914 21,925 
Total USSR 603,207 595,291 614,752 624,177 619,401 
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Generals’Andropov and Gorbachev. All of them tried to take measures to lessen the 
consumption of oil in the Soviet Union. Also the dependent situation of the Eastern 
European economies was becoming a more serious problem when the opportunity costs 
were taken into account.   
In 1980-1981, while the struggle for more oil continued Soviet planners and 
leadership made a major decision that changed the course of Soviet energy balance 
fundamentally. During the 11th five-year (1980-1985) planning period, development of 
gas was prioritized, and the government gave a distinct preference to gas over oil in the 
Soviet fuel balance (Gustafson, 1989). The purpose of this move was to ease the pressure 
on declining oil reserves, to accelerate the conversion from oil to gas in energy 
production and to improve energy conservation measures. Switching to gas also meant 
that more quantities of oil could be spared for export, which in turn had a positive 
impact on the hard currency earnings. 
 Natural gas production did not receive any attention from the Soviet planners 
until the 1950s. Most of the Soviet Union’s natural gas production came from the oil 
fields and refining activities. The gas was burned in open flares in most of the 
production fields. As a result of consistent investments, gas production increased 
substantially during the second half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s. Yet gas 
production was still far below the levels needed to serve as a substitute to oil (Lydolph 
& Shabad, 1960). 
 Moreover, natural gas, which is a perfect substitute of oil in all fields of energy 
usage, suffered from a lack of critical infrastructure investments and storage facilities. 
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The idea of transporting Siberian gas via long-distance pipelines initially did not appeal 
to the Soviet planners and appeared costly due to required capital expenditures 
(Gustafson, 1989). 
 On the other hand, the increasing costs of recovering oil and diminishing coal 
resources were two significant factors that convinced the Soviet planners to initiate a 
large-scale investment (Hewett, 1984). An extractive industry can contain rising costs 
via increasing its efficiency through innovation, improving its management and 
continuing vigorous exploration. In the first half of the 1980s, the Soviet energy 
establishment implemented none of these options properly. To keep the energy output 
growing, alternatives were desperately needed. This meant yet another increase in the 
share of energy in total industrial investment.  
In order to provide a bridge for diminishing oil reserves, the Soviets decided to 
increase the existing natural gas output in five years by nearly half, from 435 billion 
cubic meters in 1980 to 630-640 billion cubic meters in 1985. This meant that natural 
gas was to provide 75% of the net addition to the fuel balance. In order the reach this 
challenging target, the gas industry was allocated 36 billion rubles, a sum which was 
more than the allocations of the last 15 years combined (Gustafson, 1989). (From 1966 
to 1980 gas investment grew from 4.05 billion rubles in the eighth plan to 19.3 in the 
10th plan.) 
 The increase in energy investment between 1981 and 1985 absorbed over a third 
of total investment budget growth. Energy in itself absorbed nearly 90% of the 44 billion 
ruble increment allocated to the industry, leaving symbolic figures for the rest. Due to 
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rising unit costs of production, the growing investment burden generated less oil output 
than the previous five-year period. For instance, during the ninth development plan, a 
38% increase in investment had yielded a 28% increase in energy production, whereas in 
the first half of the 1980s, a 48% increase in investment produced only 13% more 
energy. 
 
Figure 6. Average output of new oil wells put in operation in the USSR, 1975-1990  
Note: From Gaidar Y. 2007. “The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil”, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, p.4 
 
Most of the investments under the 11th Five-Year Plan went to gas pipelines 
connecting the West Siberian gas fields with the European SSR. Two-thirds of the 
allocation went to the construction of trunk lines connecting the natural resources with 
industrial and export centers. Despite these difficult goals, the gas industry lived up to 
the challenge. All required pipelines were built ahead of schedule (Gustafson, 1989). 
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 The table below clearly shows that the bulk of the investment budget started 
shifting to oil and gas sector particularly at the end of the 1970s. This shift occurred 
because oil and gas output had started to become the backbone of the economy.  
 
 
Table 17 
Capital Investment in the Soviet Economy, Industry and the Fuel and Energy Sector  
 (1971-1988) 
Note. Figures are in billions of rubles at constant prices. From Kuhnert, Caroline. 1991. 
“More power for the soviets: perestroika and energy,” Soviet Studies 43(3): 501. 
 
 
 Despite successes in the pipeline construction, the Soviet energy elite generally 
failed to capitalize on the improved access to investment as an opportunity to increase 
the efficiency of field operations, to reinforce the industrial base, to increase exploration 
 1971-
1975 
1976-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total 
investment % 
562.8 
(100) 
717.7 
(100) 
843.2 
(100) 
179.5 
(100) 
194.4 
(100) 
205.4 
(100) 
218.2 
(100) 
Of which 
industry  
% of total 
196 
(34.8) 
251.4 
(35) 
300.7 
(35.7) 
65.5 
(36.5) 
71 
(36.5) 
75 
(36.5) 
79.5 
(36.4) 
 
Of which fuel 
and energy 
sector 
 
% of total 
 
% of industry 
 
56.8 
 
 
 
(10.1) 
 
(29) 
 
75.7 
 
 
 
(10.5) 
 
(30.1) 
 
108.9 
 
 
 
(12.9) 
 
(36.2) 
 
25.4 
 
 
 
(14.1) 
 
(39) 
 
27.4 
 
 
 
(14.1) 
 
(39) 
 
30.1 
 
 
 
(14.7) 
 
(40.1) 
 
31.8 
 
 
 
(14.6) 
 
(42.4) 
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and accelerate the development of new Siberian fields or to improve amenities in the 
fields. The main result of five years of Brezhnev’s crash oil program and natural gas 
attack was to aggravate the previous imbalance of the oil industry and thus produce 
further trouble.  
 First, the costs of drilling continued to increase significantly. By 1980, the 
average depth of exploratory wells increased by almost 50%, to 2800 metres. The cost of 
drilling also more than doubled, from 113 rubles in 1960 to 400 rubles in 1980. Despite 
these challenges, better technology and higher-quality equipment could have overcome 
the poor terrain of new well sites.  
However, due to rising Cold War tensions, the trade-offs between military 
investment and investments in the energy sector became starker. For instance, high-
quality steel was reserved for high-priority military uses and was not made available to 
manufacture more resistant drill pipes. Consequently, the Soviet oil industry was obliged 
to resort to drilling techniques that did not require top-grade steels; this limitation in turn 
imposed limits on the depth and speed of their drilling (Meyerhoff, 1980). 
 The situation was made even worse by the chronic deficiencies in the quality and 
availability of materials, equipment, spare parts and supplies. The equipment used by the 
Soviet oil and gas industries was obsolete in design. The manufacturing was poor, 
resulting in frequent failures. Usually deliveries to construction sites did not follow a set 
schedule – not to mention the high rate (almost one-third) of defective equipment 
(Matosich & Bonnie, 1988). The severity of the industrial support problem further raised 
costs and the sector had to substitute missing equipment with more labor. However, 
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despite dramatically-increased compensation for energy workers, there was an acute 
shortage of labor.  
 Last, poor reservoir management and the inability of the central planners to 
account for the different characteristics of smaller reservoirs exacerbated the situation. 
With increasing drilling depths and harsher terrain; these factors considerably affected 
the efficiency of site crews and their ability to extract greater quantities of oil and gas. 
The pressure to recover more quantities in short time to fulfill planning quotas justified 
the excessive use of water flooding, a method that allowed higher yields but a shorter 
well lifespan. As the graph below suggests, exploratory work was almost forgotten 
(Lydolph & Shabad, 1960).17  
 
Figure 7  
Curtailment of new drilling and field development 
                                                        
17 In the water flooding method, new oil wells are drilled in the top of the oil bearing structure, holes are 
driven down the slope on the on the rock structure completely surrounding the field, and water is forced in 
at approximately the same rate at which oil is extracted, thereby maintaining the pressure and eliminating 
pumping. 
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Figure 7. Curtailment of new drilling and field development. 
Note:  From “The Energy Strategy of Russia”, Moscow Joint Committee for Programme 
Development, 1994, p. 134 
 
Further, as indicated in the graph below, there was reluctance as well as inability 
to adapt to enhanced recovery techniques that were commonly used in the oil fields out 
of the Soviet Union (Considine & Kerr, 2002). 
 
Figure 8  
Secondary Production Techniques Used  
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Figure 8. Secondary production techniques used. 
Note:  From “The Energy Strategy of Russia”, Moscow Joint Committee for Programme 
Development, 1994, p. 141 
 
In the first half of the 1980s, the share of oil and gas export revenues in total 
export revenues reached around 80%. In 1980, the total exports of the Soviet Union 
were around $27 billion, out of which the oil industry provided $18.1 billion and the gas 
industry provided $3.1 billion. This was an enormous sum, and the ailing Soviet 
economy did not have alternatives to replace the export of oil and gas.  
On November 10, 1982, Leonid Brezhnev died of heart attack. By the time he 
died, the Soviet oil industry appeared to have contained the threat of declining oil 
output. Production still rose steadily, if far more slowly than in the 1970s. Yet the 
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appearance of stabilization was deceptive. The oil industry owed its growth mainly to 
the continuing transfer of development drilling capacity to West Siberia. 
 Yuri Andropov emerged as Brezhnev’s successor. In his opening speech as the 
secretary general in November 1982, Andropov indicated that he considered fuel 
switching and conservation to be priorities on the energy agenda. The emergency 
response in 1977 had avoided a decline in oil output, and the gas initiative stabilized the 
share of hydrocarbons in the Soviet energy balance. Yet a policy dependent on supply 
condemned the energy industry to absorb an increasing amount of resources, while the 
costs of operations were rising more than ever.  
Andropov’s commitment to the gradual reorientation of Soviet energy policy 
towards conservation and the efficient utilization of alternate energy resources, 
specifically natural gas and nuclear power, was underscored by a noticeable and planned 
reduction in the level of investment in the oil sector. In the early 1980s, it was becoming 
already apparent to Soviet energy experts that conserving a standard ton of energy cost 
one-third of what it took to produce the same value of energy (Melentev & Makarov, 
1983). The worsening cost structure of fuel production, the growing share and 
importance of nuclear energy and other changing energy conditions pressed for a new 
energy program. The Politburo approved a draft of a long-term energy policy in April 
1983. The draft proposed cutting investments in the oil and gas sector and prioritized 
efforts to conserve energy. However, Andropov’s policy of fiscal strictness for the oil 
industry came at the worst possible moment, as the oil industry was about to enter a 
period of further crisis (Kuhnert, 1991).  
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 Andropov’s commitment to energy conservation and changing the fuel balance 
continued under Gorbachev, who assumed power and announced his proposal for radical 
economic reform to the 27th party congress on 25 February 1986. Gorbachev aimed at 
the machinery sector’s becoming the major object of Soviet investment, while the share 
of capital spending on extractive industries was to be stabilized. Another aim of 
Gorbachev’s plan was to decentralize the planning process, allowing enterprises to 
decide on their own needs and be guided by economic, rather than quantitative, 
considerations. In 1987, the Supreme Soviet and Central Committee approved the 
economic reform package, and the basic provisions for fundamental perestroika of 
economic management were adopted (Kuhnert, 1991). 
 Gorbachev’s determination to prioritize the machinery sector as well as 
emphasize conservation and improve the living conditions of the oil industry workers in 
Siberia were measures that reflected the absolute requirement to increase the oil 
supplies. Also, the rise of oil production costs pushed Gorbachev to call for a massive 
reorientation of capital toward conservation, not only of energy but also of all natural 
resources. (Gooding, 1992) Further, the new economic plan preferred modernization and 
reconstruction of existing plants rather than new enterprises.  
The energy sector was the backbone of Gorbachev’s restructuring process, 
because by the time he assumed power, virtually every economic sector came to depend 
on the oil and gas sector’s performance. In a way, the future of perestroika rested on the 
reform of the oil and gas sector (Kuhnert, 1991). However, the events of 1985 
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immediately tested whether Gorbachev was willing to take energy-switching and 
conservation further than mere rhetoric.  
 The cold winter of 1985 obstructed the normal course of oil extraction, while 
concurrently boosting the domestic demand for heating. The situation resulted in a sharp 
drop of the volume of oil available for export. To further complicate the matter, after a 
steady rise in the first half of the 1980s, international oil prices started to decline as a 
result of solid production increases by the OPEC. In particular, Saudi Arabia had moved 
to recapture markets through a price war, driving the price of crude oil down to as low as 
$13.64 per barrel in 1986, compared to $28 per barrel in 1984 (Parra, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9  
Crude Oil Prices and Production Rates by OPEC 
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Figure 9: Crude Oil Prices and Production Rates by OPEC 
Note: From WTRG Economics web site  
 
In one sense, the timeline of the collapse of the Soviet Union can be traced to 
September 13, 1985. On this date, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the minister of oil of 
Saudi Arabia, declared that the monarchy had decided to alter its oil policy radically. 
The Saudis stopped protecting oil prices, and Saudi Arabia quickly regained its share in 
the world market. During the next six months, oil production in Saudi Arabia increased 
fourfold, while oil prices collapsed by approximately the same amount in real terms. 
One of the biggest blunders of the Soviet leadership was to spend a significant 
amount of additional oil revenues in the 1970s to start the war in Afghanistan and to 
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continue to subsidise the Eastern Europe.(Bialer, 1986) The war radically changed the 
geopolitical situation in the Middle East. In 1974, Saudi Arabia had decided to impose 
an embargo on oil supplies to the United States. Yet, by 1979 the Saudis became 
interested in American protection because they understood that the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan was a first step toward--or at least an attempt to gain--control over the 
Middle East.  
Increasing the cost of sustaining the Cold War for the Soviet Union was also part 
of the Reagan administration’s policy. Reagan’s administration provided substantial 
financial and weapon support to the Afghan mujaheedin. The hand deployed surface to 
air attack missiles fundamentally changed the course of Soviet-Afghan war. Reagan, 
based on various CIA reports (1977) also understood the integral function of the oil and 
gas revenues to the Soviet Union. Hence, a policy of pressuring European Community to 
consume less Soviet oil and gas was initiated. Reagan was pivotal in convincing the 
Saudis in a price war against the Soviets. (Schweizer, 1996) Another central instrument 
for putting pressure on the Soviet Union was Reagan’s massive defense build-up, which 
raised defense spending from $134 billion in 1980 to $253 billion in 1989. This raised 
American defense spending to 7 percent of GDP, dramatically increasing the federal 
deficit. Yet in its efforts to keep up with the American defense build-up, the Soviet 
Union was compelled in the first half of the 1980s to raise the share of its defense 
spending from 22 percent to 27 percent of GDP, while it froze the production of civilian 
goods at 1980 levels. 
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As a result, the Soviet Union lost approximately $20 billion per year, money 
without which the country simply could not survive. The Soviet leadership was 
confronted with a difficult decision on how to adjust. There were three options--or a 
combination of three options--available to the Soviet leadership. 
First, dissolve the Eastern European empire and effectively stop barter trade in 
oil and gas with the Socialist bloc countries, and start charging hard currency for the 
hydrocarbons.(Gaidar, 2007) This choice, however, involved convincing the Soviet 
leadership in 1985 to negate completely the results of World War II. In reality, the leader 
who proposed this idea at the CPSU Central Committee meeting at that time risked 
losing his position as Secretary General. This option gradually forced its way towards 
the end of the 1980s.  
Second, drastically reduce Soviet food imports by $20 billion, the amount the 
Soviet Union lost when oil prices collapsed. In practical terms, this option meant the 
introduction of food rationing at rates similar to those used during World War II. The 
Soviet leadership understood the consequences: the Soviet system would not survive for 
even one month. This idea was never seriously discussed.(Gaidar, 2007)  
Third, implement radical cuts in the military-industrial complex. With this 
option, however, the Soviet leadership risked serious conflict with regional and 
industrial elites, since a large number of Soviet cities depended solely on the military-
industrial complex. This choice was also never seriously considered. However, in the 
second half of the 1980s, the Soviet Union started gradually cutting on the military 
expenditures. 
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After the mid-1980s, the Soviet balance of payments came to depend heavily on 
the hard currency earnings from oil exports. Out of 193.5 million tons of oil and oil 
products exported by the Soviet Union in 1985, only 80.7 million tons were to the hard 
currency (or the so-called dollar) zone (Slavkina, 2002). The plummeting prices resulted 
in one important consequence: the Soviet terms of trade worsened. In order to maintain 
the trade balance and continue investments, the Soviet Union had to export larger 
quantities of oil supplies. Yet the basic principles of economics were at work; too much 
supply of Soviet crude further depressed the prices offered (Ebel, 1994). 
 As a significant portion of the Soviet crude oil reserves were already spared for 
the barter trade with the CMEA nations, the tradable volumes had to be sold on the 
international spot market for lower prices. Toward the end of the 1990s, the dilemma of 
political cohesion versus hard currency requirements exacerbated problems for Soviet 
experts (Poznanski, 1988). The table below shows the relationship between the falling 
prices and diversion of crude oil from the Eastern Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18 
Soviet Oil Exports to the Industrialized West and Eastern Europe 
Year Soviet Oil 
Exports to 
Soviet Oil 
Exports to the 
World Oil Price 
Arabian Light 
Value of Soviet Oil 
Exports to the 
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Eastern Europe 
(in millions of 
tons) 
West (OECD) (in 
millions of tons) 
Crude Average 
Spot Market Price 
($US) 
OECD Nations (in 
Millions of $US) 
1980 80.89 57.0 35.69 14,157 
1981 80.13 53.5 34.30 14,066 
1982 74.79 69.0 31.76 16,592 
1983 72.93 77.9 28.80 17,522 
1984 73.70 81.4 28.08 16,596 
1985 75.04 67.5 25.02 12,692 
1986 81.10 77.9 13.64 7,888 
1987 79.90 83.8 17.28 11,214 
1988 77.41 95.3 13.43 10,537 
1989 56.39 78.4 16.35 10,613 
1990 43.36 n/a 21.54 n/a 
Note. From Gustafson, Thane. 1981. “Energy and the Soviet Bloc,” International 
Security 6(3): 72. 
 
Gorbachev, who six months earlier had hinted that he would strive to reduce the 
burden of energy investment and liberate resources for a vast restructuring of the 
economy, now faced essentially the same problem as Brezhnev. He also responded in 
the same way: invest in Tyumen to boost the oil and gas production. 
 The measures employed were also similar. He paid a personal visit to the oil 
fields, initiating a massive oil and gas campaign (Christensen, 1999). There was an 
attempt to revive the growing number of idle wells primarily by flying an ever-larger 
number of well-repair and drilling crews to West Siberia. The intense pressure from 
Moscow, and additional investment funds achieved a substantial improvement in oil 
field equipment, electrical supplies and electricity and even housing (Gustafson, 1989).  
 Crude oil production peaked at around 616 million tons (12.38 mmb/d) in 1983, 
gradually falling to 595.3 million tons in 1985. The recovery and subsequent peak of oil 
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production in 1986 were achieved basically through human factor. However, the 
prospects for the oil industry did not shine bright. Oil and gas production figures are 
shown in the below table.  
The growing burden of well maintenance, repair work and rising crude oil 
producing costs continued to place a formidable strain over the Gosplan budget. The 
average, as well as the marginal, costs of production continued to increase, from 13.68 
ruble per ton in 1985 to 17.12 in 1988, to 21.13 rubles per ton in 1990. The possibility of 
channelling sources to the civilian machinery industry faded away with the rising 
tensions of the Cold War (Considine & Kerr, 2002). 
In the 12th Five-Year Plan (1985-1990), Soviet planners targeted a 22% increase 
in the national income, while domestic energy consumption was expected to increase by 
12%. This required an overly-ambitious conservation program. In the last Five-Year 
Plan, the energy sector received a 35% increase in investment while the total energy 
output was projected to increase by 24% (Considine & Kerr, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
Table 19 
Energy Targets for the 12th Five-Year Plan, 1985-90 
 1985 Actual 1990 Draft Targets 1990 Final 
Targets 
Oil (million tons) 595 630-640 635 
Gas (billion cubic meters) 643 835-850 850 
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Coal (million tons) 726 780-800 795 
Electricity (Bkw-hr) 1,544 1,840-1,880 1,860 
Hydropower (Bkw-hr) 215 n/a 245 
Nuclear (Bkw-hr) 167 390 390 
Note. From Gustafson, Thane. 1981. “Energy and the Soviet Bloc,” International 
Security 6(3): 72. 
 
The level of hard currency earnings from oil exports waned throughout the 
second half of the 1980s. The share of oil and gas hard currency earnings declined from 
80% in 1981 to 34% in 1988. The USSR incurred current account deficits in 1985, 1986 
and 1988. The current account deficit reached unimaginable levels in 1989, and the 
USSR started diverting crude oil exports from CMEA nations to hard currency payers in 
an attempt to balance the deficit. This gave Soviet policymakers less room to maneuver 
than they would have liked, and the pressure for radical reform strengthened. In June 
1990, the Soviet Union announced its intention to stop all subsidized trade with the 
CMEA (Hanson, 1980). 
Unable to realize any of the above solutions, the Soviet Union started to borrow 
money from abroad while its international credit rating was still strong. It borrowed 
heavily from 1985 to 1988, but in 1989 the Soviet economy stalled completely. In 1985 
the idea that the Soviet Union would begin bargaining for money in exchange for 
political concessions was unimaginable to the Soviet leadership. In 1989 it became a 
reality, and Gorbachev understood the need for at least $100 billion from the West to 
prop up the oil-dependent Soviet economy. The chairman of the State Planning 
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Committee Yury Maslyukov in one of the meetings even said to have commented: “If 
there is no oil, there is no more a national economy”. (Gaidar, 2006)   
 In addition, the Soviet population, encouraged by the glasnost policies, started 
voicing concern over environmental pollution, nuclear power plants and huge water 
reservoirs. The workforce, which was compelled to bear with the terrible working 
conditions in Siberia, complained in an increasingly loud tone (Hewett & Winston, 
1991). 
 Gorbachev’s efforts to reform the Communist system offered promise, but 
ultimately proved uncontrollable, resulting in a cascade of events that eventually 
concluded with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Initially intended as tools to bolster 
the Soviet economy, the policies of perestroika and glasnost soon led to the collapse of 
the whole system. The new economic and political transparency created even greater 
economic inefficiency due to the double direction of these policies. Some segments of 
the economy were freed, such as wages, while other segments of the economy were still 
being planned or regulated, namely prices (Hewett & Winston, 1991).  
The oil sector, which had possibly peaked, and the gas sector, which experienced 
a sudden boom, both would face a new era. At the same time, the pressure of demand on 
the sectors would ease and investment budgets would be cut severely. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
YELTSIN AND THE TRANSFORMATION  
OF THE RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS SECTOR: THE BUST 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
At the turn of the 1990s, there was no reason to be positive about Russia’s 
prospects. The domestic political and economic situation pointed to an overall failure of 
the state apparatus. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, all constitutive 
elements of the national economy, namely industry, agriculture and natural resources 
started a free fall. By mid-1990s, the GDP of the Russian Federation stood around a 
fraction of that of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
Politically, the power struggle between the communist establishment and the 
reformers culminated in a coup attempt which was repelled by Boris Yeltsin and his 
 123
supporters. However, the tension between the Soviet apparatchik and the new Russian 
reformist elite remained visible in every aspect of the political scene. The Duma, 
dominated by the Communist Party, acted as a powerful check against the powers of the 
presidency. The possibility of a communist reaction heavily influenced many political 
decisions and choices. Another dimension of power struggle was between the central 
authority and the federal constituencies. Towards the end of the 1990s, the Russian 
Federation came the brink of a federal collapse with open war with going on in the break 
away republic Chechnya. 
Through out the 1990s, the Russian foreign policy had to adjust itself to the 
significant shift in its material capabilities not to mention the new geographic realities 
after the Soviet Union gave birth to new independent states. Although Russian 
Federation was still a major nuclear power and a member of the UN Security Council, 
its super-power status was lost. It did not possess the economic capacity to mobilise and 
effectively utilise these military and diplomatic assets. However, in the emerging 
international order, where the US was left as the sole super-power, spheres of influence 
were created more by economic and socio-cultural strength than sheer military power.  
The Russian foreign policy in the first half of the 1990s was surprisingly 
cooperative with the West. So much that for Russian diplomacy preserving relations 
with the West almost became a key priority. Immediately following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, Yeltsin even openly declared that the US was not considered as an 
adversary country. Russia sought and widely used Western financial assistance. Indeed 
cooperation with wealthy western democracies and multilateral organizations, e.g. the 
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G7 and IMF was crucial for economic reasons. The Russian economy needed the 
external support and there were no other alternatives to seeking financial aid from the 
EU and the US. Russian-Western cooperation was also crucial in terms of the European 
and global security architecture. 
Yeltsin’s biggest trouble was to solve the dilemma of protecting Russia’s 
interests defined as potentially clashing with the interests of the West but at the same 
time securing firm connections to the EU and the US for access to credits. It was most 
evident when the US-lead NATO started expanding its power towards the newly 
independent states of Eastern Europe. For Russia, it has been one of attempting to 
balance potentially competing objectives of primacy within the CIS area and the 
trappings of great power status further afield versus the cultivation of Russia's ties with 
the G-7 states, collectively as well as individually.  
It is a curious question to speculate whether it would have been different for 
Russian foreign policy if the oil and gas prices were around today’s level. How Russia 
would have gone through the transition period, if the economy was awash with sufficient 
capital in the 1990s. Would Yeltsin still have undertaken the privatisations and would 
there be oligarchs?  
In this respect, what makes 1990s distinctive for the Russian economy was the 
sharp fall in the prices of the oil and natural gas as well as other minerals and metals in 
the international markets. As it can be observed from the chart below, the downward 
trend for oil prices which started in mid 1980s, continued through out the 1990s.  
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Figure 10 
International Oil Prices 1970-2007 
 
Figure 10: International Oil Prices 1970-2007 
Note: From WTRG Economics web site  
 
The price of natural gas, which is calculated a derivative of the oil price, 
followed the same trend.  
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Figure 11 
International Natural Gas Prices 1970-2005 
 
Figure 11: International Natural Gas Prices 1970-2005 
Note: From International Energy Administration web site 
 
The loss of oil and gas revenues came at the worst moment for the Russian 
economy. The cash starved economy did not have many other alternatives to generate 
hard currency revenues other than these exports. And the economy badly needed to earn 
cash to relieve the budget strain and the ailing financial system.  
To make matters worse, the oil production started a nose dive as because there 
was no money around to support the industry’s field operations. Due to its 
uncompetitive structure, Russian industry was not able to substitute for the revenue 
losses by increasing exports in other products. The general industrial collapse allowed 
more oil to be allocated for exports, but to no avail as the international oil prices 
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plummeted. A combination of low production, low international oil and gas prices was 
heralding a decade of turmoil for Russian Federation.  
In order to understand the extent of this turmoil, this chapter notes some 
important aspects of the transformation of the political and economic context in Russian 
Federation and their impact on the Russian oil and gas industry. The new ownership 
structure that resulted after the privatisations is also crucial to understand as those results 
have become integral to the political developments following Yeltsin’s presidency. The 
privatisation deals may have been done differently, had the oil prices been higher. Also 
the chapter analyses the adverse effects of many other regulations such as taxation, 
exports, prices and foreign investment on the development of the oil and gas industry.   
 
4.2. The Transformation of Russia’s Economic and Political Context 
 The Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991 without much violence or 
bloodshed. The rapidity of the collapse, the relatively peaceful geographical 
disintegration and the smoothness in the transfer of power surprised many scholars of 
international relations.  
None of the mainstream theories of the international relations recognized 
beforehand the possibility of such a momentous change. There was little or no debate 
about the underlying causes of systemic change, the possibility that the Cold War could 
be peacefully resolved, or the likely consequences of the Soviet Union's visible 
economic decline. The scholars of international relations did not recognise the 
possibility that the kind of change that did occur could occur.  
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Few expected any major change in Eastern Europe even after the Soviet Union's 
foreign policy had undergone radical changes and was trying to adjust to the economic 
difficulties of maintaining such a vast empire. Most analyses of the end of the East-West 
conflict focussed on the high profile issues such as arms reductions or perestroika of 
Mikhail Gorbachev. This is understandable to a certain extent because Gorbachev’s 
attempt to reform the Soviet system, acquiescence to political change in Eastern Europe, 
and commitment to disarmament were the catalysts of such an accommodation. (Risse-
Kappen and Lebow, 1996) Yet, major visible changes took place in Cold War relations 
long before Gorbachev came to power in 1985. The Soviet economy was decaying over 
the last decade and a half.  
 Although the immediate effect of the Soviet collapse on the international arena 
was relatively calm, the first decade of the Russian Federation was chaotic. The era was 
marked by severe political power struggles, disunity among the elites, the problems of 
federalism, difficulties regarding economic transition, privatization, corruption, 
criminalization and issues associated with the fundamental political and economic 
changes that were taking place (Phillips, 2000). The collapse also fundamentally 
changed the economic and political context in which the Russian oil and gas industry 
was operating. 
The most striking aspect of the initial years of Russia’s transition to democratic 
capitalism was the lack of a state apparatus – a stable institutional structure operating in 
a solid regulatory framework. In fact, the primary goal of the political and economic 
transition was to dispose of the Soviet-era paternalistic state. Establishing a market 
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economy required increased engagement from economic actors other than the Russian 
state, which at that point possessed of nearly all of the country’s important economic 
assets. Initially, a deliberate policy of weakening the state allowed the market forces the 
ability to increase in scope (Kuznetsova & Kuznetsova, 2003). 
 The first president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was acutely aware 
that the window of opportunity for political and economic reform could only remain 
open for a short time. Therefore, he sought to spur the decision to dismantle the roots of 
communism. Yeltsin, acting as prime minister, enacted the economic reform program on 
January 2, 1992 (Lysubsky, 1994). 
 The economic reform program adopted by Yeltsin was ambitious and had two 
fundamental goals: economic restructuring and macroeconomic stabilization (Ulyukaev, 
1995). Macroeconomic stabilization required implementing tight fiscal and monetary 
policies that supported economic growth through inflation control and the control of 
exchange rates. Economic restructuring was the harder part of the task, as it required 
establishing a fiscal and operational framework via legal and regulatory tools. The most 
important steps to reaching these goals included opening domestic markets to foreign 
trade and investment, which linked the economy to the rest of the world, achieving 
privatization and forming a robust financial system (Hedlund, 2001).  
The reform program was called ‘shock therapy’ because of its aim to deliver a 
heavy blow to the remnants of the communist economic system. Yeltsin was aware that 
a gradual transition program in Russia risked strong political reaction. Therefore, he 
aimed to overturn the whole political and economic system at once and irreversibly. His 
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prime minister and chief economist, Yegor Gaidar, knew that there was a price for such 
a fast track reform program, but the threat of a communist backlash was real (Hoffman, 
2003). 
Soon after the introduction of the reform package, prices skyrocketed, 
government spending was slashed and heavy new taxes were introduced.18 Inflation 
wiped out most of the population’s savings in short order. The evaporation of savings 
had a disastrous impact on investment. Many industries, including the oil and gas sector, 
were drained of investment funds and had to cease operations. The Russian economy 
passed through a long and wrenching period of depression. According to the official 
Russian economic statistics from 1990 to the end of 1995, the Russian GDP declined by 
roughly 50%. There were dramatic falls in industrial and agricultural production 
(Klugman, 1995). 
 Another immediate result of the 1992 price and trade reform was an acute cash 
starvation, which occurred because of two reasons. First, the liberalization of the foreign 
trade regime paved the way for capital flights, which averaged $10 billion to $15 billion 
per annum until 1997 (Tikhomirov, 1997, 2000a). Second, ending foreign currency 
controls sapped public savings. The capital available for public finance and investment 
vanished because the Soviet system distributing revenue between different enterprises 
(sectors) ceased as a result of the privatization program. Mounting internal and external 
debt, a depreciating ruble and shrinking gold reserves, colossal arrears in tax collection 
                                                        
18 In 1992, the first year of economic reform, retail prices in Russia increased by 2,520%. A major cause 
of the increase was the deregulation of most of the prices in January 1992, a step that prompted an average 
price increase of 245% in that month alone. By 1993 the annual rate had declined to 240%, still a very 
high figure. In 1994, the annual inflation rate was still 224%. 
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exacerbated the situation for the already strained financial system. As the capital 
availability fell, priority in allocation of scarce resources was given to the revenue 
generating sectors of the economy (Menshikov, 1999). 
 In the new environment, companies had to rely on their own sources or the 
financial system for investment capital. The share of public investment in gross capital 
investment decreased from an average of 90% in the 1980s to an average of 20% in the 
1990s. Company contributions to gross capital investment increased dramatically, from 
3% in the 1980s to almost 70% in the 1990s (Tikhomirov, 2000a). Approximately 58% 
of capital expenditure in the oil, gas and electricity sectors was centrally financed in 
1990. In 1994, this figure was only 1%. As suggested in the table below, the share of 
energy sector in productive investment (excluding social investments) rose from 17% in 
1990, to approximately 44% in 1994. In constant terms, this was 38% of the level in 
1990. (Joint Committee for Programme Development, 1994)  
 132
Table 20 
 
 The decentralization and deregulation of the Soviet economy was accompanied 
by a restructuring of the taxation system. However, the plethora of new taxes resulted in 
a radical decrease of the revenue base, as either enterprises stopped paying or tax 
officials were unable to collect taxes. Central political power and economic development 
declined, which gave regional officials and enterprise directors more power. They 
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refused to pay taxes, which further pressured the already-strained financial situation of 
the central government. Political opposition to the reform program from the Central 
Bank and the Duma led to weak monetary policies such as disproportionate wage rises, 
continued state subsidies to unprofitable sectors and belated privatization (Phillips, 
2000). 
In response to the mounting public reaction, from 1993 onward the post-Soviet 
Russian governments decided to follow the same economic strategy as the late Soviet 
government, but from a more limited base of financial resources. Instead of making 
incomes directly dependent on GDP and labor productivity, Yeltsin, for political 
reasons, chose to pay people more than they were producing. In order to do that, Russia 
incurred significant debts during the period (Alexseev, 2001).  
 Most of the loans, however, were spent on debt servicing and repayment, as well 
as supporting industry and agriculture. In a sense, the Russian government continued the 
Soviet economic policy of cross-subsidization. While the Soviets had at their disposal a 
mechanism to recuperate losses of some enterprises from more profitable enterprises, the 
Russian government did not have ownership of Russian economy (Tikhomirov, 2000). 
 The ultimate aim of the Yeltsin regime was to diminish the Soviet ideological 
and administrative heritage, and complete transition to capitalism at the fastest possible 
pace. The rapid pace of this transition, however, created problems for the oil and gas 
sector, along with the rest of the economy. The most challenging difficulties during this 
period of transformation included, the sale of assets, the control and liberalization of 
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price structure, the receipt of tax revenues, export capacity and financial difficulties 
(McFaul, 1996).  
 Relations with the West as well as with states in the CIS, the amalgamation of 
weak democratic institutions and Yeltsin’s political success allowed a small, well-
organized coalition of economic interest groups to occupy a central role in the making of 
Russian foreign policy. The combination of powerful president, a fragmented party 
system and impotent countervailing forces representing pluralist interests meant that 
these economic lobbies dominated policymaking in Russia, including foreign policy 
(Khripunov & Matthews, 1996). 
 Most importantly, the political and economic winners in Russia’s transition were 
the very groups that would not benefit from an aggressive international stance. These 
groups actively pursued foreign policies that avoided international conflict because they 
were the political and economic actors in Russia that stood to gain the most from 
peaceful foreign policies. In contrast, those in Russia who may have stood to gain from 
more belligerent foreign policies were radical communists, extreme nationalists, 
segments of the armed forces or parts of the military-industrial complex, which had 
persistently lost in political struggles for state control (Pappe, 1996).  
 Gazprom, oil companies, mineral exporters and bankers began to replace the 
Soviet apparatchik and became important economic interest groups influencing foreign 
policy. The impact of these interests was clearly visible in the two significant issues 
relating to Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s. Russia aimed to integrate with the 
West and welcomed international assistance. Russian exporters desired access to 
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Western markets, Russian importers needed Western goods and Russian bankers wanted 
partnerships with Western capital. 
 When security issues, such as opposition to NATO expansion, threatened these 
interests, the coalition of liberals within the Russian government and their allies in 
Russia’s economic society cooperated to sustain engagement. A billion dollars in 
transfers from the International Monetary Fund to help close the budget deficit was a 
billion dollars that Gazprom did not have to pay in taxes. A multimillion-dollar World 
Bank investment in restructuring the Russian coal industry also represented costs 
avoided by domestic capitalists. Further, with respect to relations with states in the CIS, 
Russian capitalists used their influence over the Russian state to ensure that the terms of 
trade remain favorable to local entrepreneurs (McFaul, 1997). 
 
4.3. The Transformation of the Oil and Gas Sector  
4.3.1 The New Bureaucratic Structure of the Oil and Gas Sector 
 Immediately after Gorbachev’s official resignation as Secretary General of the 
Communist Party, Russia began to work establishing a new oil and gas sector for Russia. 
Governmental bodies were established at three layers: federal ministries, federal service 
institutions and federal agencies. While the federal ministries were responsible for 
policymaking, federal services were responsible for supervision if these policies failed. 
Federal agencies controlled the state property and provided the services to the end users. 
The presidential administration was also established at three levels: directorates 
(upravleniye), departments (departmenti) and administration (apparati) (Larsson, 2006). 
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 After the Soviet Union dissolved, it abandoned its oil and gas ministry. In its 
place, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy (MFE) of Russian Federation was established. 
MFE did not resemble its Soviet predecessor, as it neither had the sprawling bureaucracy 
nor any direct control over the production units in the regions. The new ministry 
consisted of four executive organs, one of which was responsible for regulating the 
energy sector. 
 The enterprises (production associations) of the Soviet Union took over the 
administrative functions of the previous union and republican ministries. The control of 
productive assets remained with these regional units, which became important actors in 
the oil industry, as well as regional monopolies, in the early days of the transition. The 
enterprises, at least for a period of time until privatization, were more or less 
independent in their management (Lane & Seifulmulukov, 1999). 
 In 1991, 47 regional oil extraction units voluntarily came together to establish 
Rosneftegaz, purporting to be a central coordinating body for the oil sector. However, 
this type of association lacked the required hierarchy, as the management was elected by 
the participant units and was generally weak and prone to excessive compromise. It was 
a short-lived attempt, as Rosneftegaz was converted into a joint stock company in 1993, 
now named as Rosneft. Governmental Resolution No. 357 outlined the role of Rosneft in 
detail in April 1993. Accordingly a broader mandate to act as Russia’s national oil 
company was foreseen. 
 Rosneft controlled the state-owned shares in nearly 240 enterprises (some of 
which were privatized as joint stock companies), including 26 crude oil producers, 22 
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refineries and 59 product distributors, as well as others involved in gas processing, 
lubricant manufacturing, drilling, geophysical research, engineering and other oil-related 
services. Along with the formation of Rosneftegas, many local enterprises asserted 
autonomy and began to form independent companies (Considine & Kerr, 2002).  
The conversion of producing divisions of Soviet Ministry of Oil into private 
companies in fact started in the last year of the Soviet Union. The first successful 
example was “LangepasUraiKogalymneft” which was set up by the Resolution of the 
USSR Council of Ministers No.18 of November 25, 1991. The company later on came 
to be widely known with its acronym Lukoil. It united on a voluntary basis three oil-
producing enterprises - "Langepasneftegaz", "Uraineftegaz" and "Kogalymneftegaz", 
and three processing enterprises - "Permorgsintez", the Volgograd and Novoufimsk 
Refineries. Later on Lukoil was re-established as a joint stock company with the 
Resolution No.229 of April 5, 1993. 
Meanwhile, Gazprom, which was established in 1989 as an extract of the Soviet 
Ministry of the Gas Industry, remained an exception to this tide, preserving its central 
decision-making powers and unitary hierarchy (Stern, 2005). In July 1989 Secretary 
General Mikhail Gorbachev merged the ministries for oil and gas as part of his 
economic reforms, into a single industry, the Ministry of the Oil and Gas Industry of the 
USSR. A separate Soviet gas industry was again created in the early 1990s, before the 
break up of the USSR.  
 In June 1992, Gazprom was declared the national gas company of the Russian 
state, and a decree issued in February 1993 transformed it into a joint stock company. 
 138
Gazprom’s equity was sold within Russia during 1994. In accordance with the 
privatization, 60% of the shares were sold in the following manner: a) 15% went to the 
300,000 employees of Gazprom; b) 35% went to the 61 regions covered by the different 
Gazprom enterprises as privatization vouchers to around 750,000, and (c) 10% was 
bought by Gazprom itself in the form of privatization vouchers. Nine percent of these 
shares was to be offered to foreign investors during 1995 privatizations. The remaining 
40% the equity remained with the Russian state, representing four chairs in the board of 
the company. 
On January 26, 1993, Rem Viakhirev became the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors and the Managing Committee. The breakdown of shares ensured that Gazprom 
remained effectively under the state control. Towards the end of the 1990s, two decrees 
ensured that foreign presence in the company did not exceed 14% of the shares and 20% 
of the charter capital.  
 The limitation of foreign capital in the company prevented growth of a 
transparent shareholder structure in the company. In 1996, a presidential decree allowed 
Gazprom chairman to vote 35% of the government’s 40% share. Gazprom’s 
involvement in politics was also the subject of significant criticism. It provided Yeltsin 
with substantial financial support during the 1996 presidential elections. During the 
1990s, the political influence of Gazprom increased to a great extent. However, 
increasing political clout brought with it an opaque structure which came be referred as 
‘a state within the state’. 
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 In early 1990s, the proven gas reserves of Russia stood around 49 trillion cubic 
metres (tcm), representing 35% of world reserves. Gazprom produced 95% of the gas 
and owned all of its high-pressure transmission lines and associated infrastructure.19 A 
large number of regional and municipal gas companies carried out gas distribution. The 
vast of majority of these companies have been privatized, though still operated under the 
umbrella of the former state distribution company, Rosgazifikatsiya (Kryukov & Moe, 
1996). 
 With respect to the transport of hydrocarbon resources, Glavtransneft (an all-
union ministry), which used to manage the pipeline system during the Soviet Union, was 
transformed into Transneft, a joint stock company in 1993 with 100% state ownership. 
The Transneft stock company was formed under government resolution No. 810 of 14 
August 1993. This resolution named the new company as a successor to the old pipeline 
association. However, the company was explicitly prohibited from becoming a privately 
owned corporation.  
 Similarly, Transnefteprodukt was transformed into a joint-stock company in 
September 1993 under government resolution No. 871 of 30 August 1993. The Russian 
Government retained broad powers within the company and the federal government still 
has a direct representative in the boards of both companies. Transneft is nominally a 
regulated common carrier that is required to offer equal access and non-discriminatory 
                                                        
19 The industry currently operates some 140,000 km of high pressure pipelines, 230,000 km of low 
pressure pipelines, compressor stations with a total capacity of 36.5 million kilowatts, and 31 underground 
gas storage facilities with a total active working capacity of 40 Bcm. production is highly concentrated in 
three Siberian associations (Urengoy, Yamburg and Nadym), plus Orenburg. These four associations – 
basically centering on four fields – comprise 90% of Russian output.  
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tariffs to all accredited shippers. An independent regulator was established in March 
1995 in order to monitor the activities of Transneft. (History of the Transeft, 2007)  
 The pipeline tariffs at this point were determined by the independent Federal 
Energy Commission on the basis of every tonne of oil transported per thousand 
kilometres. The Ministry of Fuel and Energy acted as the broker while the actual export 
quotas and prices were determined by the oil coordinators, a commission established by 
the oil companies’ representatives to set quarterly prices and quotas for export 
destinations. (Tariff Policy, 2007) 
 The disappearance of colossal Soviet bureaucratic establishment also led to a 
situation where the local governments encountered a number of challenges and 
opportunities in the management of oil and gas reserves. The power struggle between 
the regional administrative units and the federal government was another important 
development. Regional differentiation in post-Soviet Russia took place against the 
background of a catastrophic decline in the economy as a whole and in manufacturing 
industry in particular (Glatter, 1999).  
 The oil and gas rich local jurisdictions struggled among themselves, with the 
federal government and with the oil and gas companies on a number of significant 
issues. Those issues ranged from contribution and receipt to the federal budget, direct 
taxation of natural resources, and their role in production sharing agreements. The 
political disputes had many determinants. Overall, the disputes further complicated 
development and transformation of the oil and gas industry during Yeltsin’s presidency. 
The regional intervention regarding the taxes and the production licenses discouraged 
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many investors, particularly foreign, from engaging in business activities. Moreover, the 
uncertain legal arrangements provided ample space for corruption. Local leadership 
became an important means for achieving wealth (Kellison, 1999).  
 
4.3.2. The New Ownership Structure: Privatizations and the Rise of Oligarchs  
 The aim of privatisations in Russia was to replace the state-administered 
planning system with private and institutional ownership structure which was expected 
to increase efficiency and avoid distorted market signals. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the central defects of the planning mechanism were its inefficient capital and 
labour allocation. Privatisation and new regulatory framework based on competition was 
expected to reform the inherited industrial inertia characterised by horizontal and 
vertical concentration. (Schusselbauer, 1999).   
Moreover, in the framework of a general hardening of budget constraints, 
privatisation was a source of income for the state budget. Other sources of budget 
revenue such as taxes and exports of raw materials were greatly diminished. The 
financial difficulties associated with the downfall in revenues substantially affected the 
course of development for Russia during the 1990s.   
Ideally before the privatization of especially industrial giants, the scheme 
initiators need to spend some time on necessary financial, organisational and 
technological restructuring that has to take place in the state-owned industrial sector 
(Schusselbauer, 1999). There is a certain trade off between the pace of transformation-
privatisation and social costs of transformation. Rapid and radical reform provides 
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higher allocated efficiency gains (efficiency gains through radical adjustment), but also 
results in higher transformation costs. In this case, financial compensation has to be 
borne by the public financial system and is a threat to fiscal stabilization (Vagliasindi & 
Vagliasindi, 2003). In the case of Russian privatisations, the political circumstances 
seem to have drawn the reformers to a corner and forced an alleged urgent agenda for 
privatisation at any cost (Hoffman, 2003). 
 The task of privatising the Russian enterprises was given to Anatoly Chubais 
who unveiled his plan in 1992 in line with the general reform strategy. In the later years, 
the name of Anatoly Chubais became associated with the process of privatization, as the 
later clash and resignations in the State Property Committee [Goskomimushchestvo] 
were simply labeled as those on Chubais’s club, (“V privatizatsionnykh,” 1995) while 
his name often appeared in case of appeals to the Supreme Court on matters related to 
privatization (“Isk k pravitel’stvu Rossii,” 1995).  
 The ultimate goal Chubais sought was to sow the seeds of competition and 
destroy the foundations of the Soviet system by changing the ownership of companies 
from state to the private initiative (Appel 1997). For purely practical reasons, the 
privatisation programme started by distributing all minor businesses, such as shops and 
restaurants, which were sold or in some cases simply handed over to the employees. 
This was known as the small privatisation and it was implemented in a fairly similar way 
in all the former socialist countries (“Isk k pravitel’stvu Rossii,” 1995). 
 Anatoly Chubais used vouchers to distribute property quickly and to win public 
support, but did not structure the programme to create a widespread distribution of 
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property ownership in the long run, nor to establish a system of employee ownership. 
One of these measures, attributed to Chubais was the well advertised promise that each 
Russian citizen would receive a voucher that could be exchanged for Volga cars 
(“Privatizatsiia,” 1992). These vouchers, however, were often sold for a next to nothing 
or a bottle of vodka (“Butylka vodki,” 2007).  
Chubais’s team believed that a wide distribution programme, even if 
economically problematic, would be beneficial in the short term. Then, once public 
support for the programme was mobilised and the rights to property were transferred to a 
wide range of private owners, the process would be irreversible and a more efficient 
structure of ownership could later be developed through the workings of the market 
(Chubais, 1999). 
 The real trouble started with the large enterprises, some of which had tens of 
thousands of employees. Here, the idea was to undertake a mass privatisation, via a 
combination of sales and a free distribution of shares. The specific plan for the oil sector 
foresaw formation of a number of vertically integrated holding companies20, along the 
lines of the international giants of oil industry. In the gas industry, Gazprom was to 
remain under partial state ownership ensuring full control (McFaul, 1996). 
 The principal actors in the privatisation process were the central government, the 
leaders of local jurisdictions, financial institutions, and the executive management of the 
oil companies. The general rules for privatisation of the oil complex were laid down in 
                                                        
20Vertically integrated companies formed by governmental decree, successors of the former state 
enterprises organised in production associations include the following: Lukoil, Yukos, Surgutneftegas, 
Sidanko, Slavneft, Rosneft, Sibneft, Tiumenskaia Neftianaia Kompania, Vostochaia, Neftianaia 
Kompania, Onako, Komitek, Tatneft. This sector accounts for 93% of the oil production in Russia as of 
2005.  
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presidential decree no. 1403, issued on November 17, 1992. This decree, which among 
other things envisaged the division of assets between subsidiaries and holding 
companies, (Blasi, Kroumova & Kruse, 1997) stipulated the transformation of the state 
oil companies, research centres and oil-processing plants into joint-stock companies 
[Article 1], set the share (40 percent) of the capital of the oil companies to be sold out at 
investment sells [Article 5b], set a share of the capital (38 percent) as the state property 
for a period of three years [Article 5a], while the remaining share to be sold out for the 
investment vouchers [Article 5v]. While privatisation was the prime goal, the idea was 
to keep at least 45 to 51% of the voting shares with the government in order to ensure 
the flow of accrued profits as well as to keep a large public stake in the ownership of 
strategic industrial assets. For the subsidiaries, the stock was divided into two parts. 25% 
was composed of preference shares that did not give its holder any voting rights. These 
were to be distributed free of charge among the employees of the enterprises. (Ukaz 
Prezidenta, 1992)  
 The remainder, the ordinary voting shares, were to be divided as follows. 38% 
was placed with the holding company with an objective to give the controlling stake of 
50.7%. Ten percent was offered for sale at advantageous terms to the workers. Another 
5% was sold at advantageous terms to the management of the enterprise. 3.75 % was for 
sale by check auction to small nationalities of the north and employees of joint stock 
companies of oil pipeline transport enterprises. Finally, 18.25% was for sale through 
auctions to other buyers, foreign or local. As a general rule, 51% of the voting shares 
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were to be held as government property for three years. This meant that the effective 
government control was to end by the spring of 1996. (Ukaz Prezidenta, 1992)  
 Under this scheme, enterprise managers with access to capital were favorably 
placed to ensure effective control. That was exactly what happened and this is the reason 
why the first round of privatisations came to be known as the Nomenklatura 
privatisations or the insider buy-outs. According to the official statistics, about 70% of 
the shares in the average privatised enterprise went straight to insiders, of which 17% 
ended up in the hands of managers. Out of the remaining 30%, 16% stayed with the 
property funds. When the first stage of voucher privatisation had been concluded, a total 
of 16.462 enterprises had taken part in voucher auctions. Shares corresponding, on 
average to 20% of the total capital had been sold (“Privatizatsiia gospaketa,” 2003). 
 Further, a large proportion of the state elite that governed Russia in 1993 also 
consisted of people who were at one time the managers of state enterprises. This group 
formed a power bloc within the new elite, blocking radical reform in favor of a 
gradualist approach that gave these individuals time to convert their formal authority and 
social capital into economic assets (Hanley, Yershova & Anderson, 1995).  
The primary reason for Yeltsin and Chubais to allow such an insider takeover 
was the necessity of undertaking the privatisation project at the maximum speed 
possible. The programme managers were aware of this even stating publicly that if 
insiders could not be offered attractive terms privatisation was a still born idea 
(Hoffman, 2003).  
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However, forms of preferential privatisation which included ownership transfer 
to insider groups lead to weaker efficiency and failure of the company restructuring 
progress (Schusselbauer, 1999). Russia was no exception to this rule. The employee-
dominated ownership inevitably distanced the companies from market discipline. The 
wages were increased but usually not paid and investments were curbed in view of 
capital shortage. Until around 1996, due partly to the lack of competition, many 
enterprises did not even have enough working capital to pay the wages and taxes on 
time, and traded with one another using barter. Upgrading the industrial base and 
modernising were not a priority (McFaul, 1997).  
As a result, the 1993 Russian privatisation had two major results: ownership in 
the privatised small enterprises was concentrated in the hands of their old management, 
and the enterprises that did have real economic value remained under state control 
(Hedlund, 2001). Another major defect of the privatisation was that it failed to bring any 
significant change in the way Russian companies were managed (Lieberman & Rahuja, 
1995). The goal of market discipline that was supposed to be imposed by the widespread 
ownership of shares in public companies did not materialize. Lastly the privatisation did 
not raise the necessary finances for the Russian government. In the end, Chubais 
admitted that the privatization initiatives were disorderly and for the most part, his fault. 
He did, however, fulfil the promise (“Chubais,” 2008) and, as a result, the 500 largest 
privatized companies in Russia, with an estimated market value of $200 billion, were 
sold for about $7.2 billion (“K razvitiiu,” 2000). 
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 In 1995, fiscal stabilisation appeared to be growing. Inflation fell to around 
100%, the budget deficit was reduced to 3% and the printing of money was controlled to 
around 8% of the budget deficit. Almost the entire budget deficit was financed through 
external (52%) and internal (41%) borrowing. The principal and interest payments had 
grown by 500%. Debt servicing constituted the largest item in the Russian budget. The 
inter-bank credit crisis scheme in August 1995 suddenly led to a fragile financial 
situation for the Russian government. In order to avoid a financial collapse, the Central 
Bank had to make voluminous interventions in currency markets that required 
significant cash resources at its disposal. The government hoped to finance the debt 
through the intensified privatisation efforts in 1996 (“Indikatory,” 1995). 
 However, the Duma was not supportive of further steps in privatisation of oil 
companies and the extension of government control was considered a more favorable 
option. The Governmental decree No. 421 of 12 April 1996 urged all oil-producing 
companies to revaluate their assets and property under the supervision of government 
(“O pereotsenke,” 2008). This led to a growing confrontation with the Duma that had a 
negative impact on the privatisation revenues, which remained around 2.5% of the 
expected revenue in 1995. However, the ever worsening financial conditions and the 
urgent need for further cash flow in view of the widening budget deficit left the 
government face to face with consideration of other alternatives (Hoffman, 2003).  
 One of the alternative proposals came from the Russian banks, which were also 
in difficult position with regard to their decreasing profitability from regular operations. 
Russian banks proposed to provide the government with credit in return for security in 
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federal shares, which were held in the semi-privatised companies. The idea was 
publicised in a government hearing on March 30, 1995, when Vladimir Potanin, 
president of Oneximbank, made a speech on behalf of a consortium of commercial 
banks. The leading Russian banks, including Imperial, Stolichnyi, Menatep, Sberezhenii 
and Alfa, were eager to provide the government with credit in return for the management 
rights of the governmental share holding (“Banki predlozhili,” 1995). 
 The Yeltsin government, in urgent need of financing, had few options. The 
government, in turn, instituted the loans for shares proposal of the commercial banks. 
Later on in separate interviews Chubais and Potanin justified the loans for shares as 
necessary to curb the power of nomenklatura management that was in control of the 
Russian economy. The power of “red directors” (as they were called) blocked any 
reform attempt to be implemented at the company level. Since the first round of 
privatisations the Russian enterprises remained as opaque structures (Hoffman, 2003). 
The management had not changed and the governmental control was simply exchanged 
for entrenched Soviet era management control.  
 According to the scheme adopted by the presidential decree on August 31, 1995, 
Russian investors were to take over parts of the federal shares, through auctions for a 
specified period, during which the investor had to supply credit to the government. 
According to the auction regulations (Article 5), the winner of each auction lot was the 
one who offered the largest amount of credit. If the government failed to pay back the 
original credit, the banks were to organise privatisation tenders and sell the shares to 
take back the original loan. The banks were to benefit from organising the privatisation 
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schemes by drawing commission for their services. However, Potanin’s privatisation 
plan was much grander than anyone foresaw.  
 Investment tenders were organised for the federal shares exceeding the 
controlling interest, (which were placed under trust management). The company that 
won the investment tender was to become the owner of these shares and had to invest 
the committed amount in a specified period of time (“Bezuderzhnuiu fantaziiu,” 1996).  
 In April 1995, the banks offered the Russian government $872.8 million in 
exchange for control of the state shares of several companies which included Russia’s 
most profitable companies in oil production, metallurgy, wood processing, and 
transportation that were privatised during the voucher privatisation stage in 1993 (White, 
1995). The winners of the loans for shares scheme paid insignificant sums for acquiring 
the controlling shares by any standard. In some cases the offered amounts were 
corresponding to less than two years of the revenues of these companies (Tikhomirov, 
2000a).  
 The term of the trust management of the shares expired a year after, in 
September 1996. There were two options for the Russian government; either to buy back 
the federal shares from the trust management or leave them to the ownership of the trust. 
The financial situation made it clear that there was no possibility to take the first option. 
Hence the government, in coordination with the Security Council, drafted a joint letter 
leaving the shares to the trusts but requesting that the shares can be sold on the 
conditionality that the government is informed beforehand (three months prior) and the 
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government is represented in the auctions. This time the foreign presence was allowed 
but limited to the 15% of the total shares in a company (Khartukov, 1997). 
 Initially, the initiative of the Security Council, as mentioned in the letter of Oleg 
Lobov, the Secretary of the Security Council, was to restrict the privatization of the 
military-industrial sector, (“Boris Yel’tsin vernul,” 1995) however, in 1996, the Security 
Council, this time under Aleksandr Lebed’, took an even more radical attempt. General 
Lebed’ proposed in his letter to return the state share holdings of the companies at pawn 
for the credit of the banks, and to postpone the selling out of these shares at an auction 
and limit the amount at 10-15% of the shares (“Sovet bezopasnosti,” 1996).  
In the auctions that took place during November-December 1996, Moscow based 
commercial banks emerged as the only institutions capable of generating the required 
sums of money (Thornhill, 1997). This was firstly because foreign investors were 
effectively “ousted” from participation. So there was no real competition for the offer 
from the international capital market. This competition could have provided a means for 
the Soviet era management and governmental control of the privatization process to be 
shifted to the control of international market driven investors.  
Secondly, there was no other investor around with appropriate access to 
financing sources. When Russia did not have a central treasury, the government 
instituted a controversial decision in 1992 to authorise some banks to act as a depositor 
of state accounts and disburser of state money.  
 The system was corrupt at the outset and was abused by the commercial banks to 
a large degree. The huge sums of money that were deposited in these banks were 
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effectively kept captive and were not transferred when the state requested. The 
authorised banking system was the making of most notable oligarchs like Potanin, 
Smolensky, Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky and Berezovsky through which they have 
acquired the sufficient capital to come forward with loans for shares deals 
(“Kommercheskie,” 1995).  
 With this decision, some of the Moscow banks gained an enormous advantage 
vis-à-vis their competitors as they had significant sums of cheap capital for short term 
crediting in good terms (Hoffman, 2003). Almost 60% of all financial assets, totalling 
worth $ 125 billion, in the sector were controlled by 20 banks. Five major banks, namely 
Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank, Oneksimbank, Inkombank, Menatep, held 40% of the joint 
capital stock in the banking system (Tikhomirov, 2000a).  
 The loans-for-shares auctions were controversial not only for their lack of 
competition but also for the resulting extremely low auction prices. As discussed earlier, 
the lack of market competition for the bids significantly deteriorated the supposed 
intended impact of the policy action. The auctions were dominated by two banks, 
Menatep Bank (Mikhail Khodorovsky) and Oneximbank (Vladimir Potanin), both of 
which enjoyed close ties to the government. In several instances other participants 
placed significantly higher bids than Menatep and Oneximbank but were disqualified for 
reasons such as tardiness or using treasury bills as deposits (Appel, 1997).  
 One of the crown jewels of the loans for shares auctions was Yukos that was 
founded as private company in 1993 with Yuganskneftegas at its disposal, the second 
largest oil producing association in West Siberia. It then acquired Samaraneftegas in 
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Volga-Ural region and quickly moved into the downstream market. In December 1995, 
78% of Yukos’ stock (45% as loan for shares and 33% as investment tender) was 
auctioned with a starting price of $300 million. In addition the winner had to invest 
another $200 million in the company. Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Menatep, the organiser 
of the auction, won the tender after making a token increase in the tender price by $9 
million. According to the accepted industry accounting standards, this meant that 
Menatep paid 6 cents per barrel for Yukos at a time when a barrel of untapped oil ranged 
between $1 and $6 per barrel and the price of Brent crude was $17 a barrel (Grace, 
2005).   
Boris Berezovsky secured the 51% stake in the ninth largest oil concern in 
Russia, Sibneft, for $100.9 million. The most interesting feature of this scheme was that 
Sibneft was created as a vertically integrated oil company via a presidential decree 
literally the night before the deadline for loans for shares auctions was over. Berezovsky, 
like Menatep did for Yukos, paid six cents to one untapped barrel of Sibneft when the 
international price of same barrel of oil ranged between $1 and $6. Vladimir Potanin, 
founder of Oneximbank, acquired Norilsk Nikel, producing 20% of World’s nickel 
supply, for $ 130 million. Potanin also bought 51% of Sidanco, fourth largest oil 
concern, for $ 130 million (Grace, 2005).  
 Upon severe criticism on the whole scheme of this venture, the press secretariat 
of the Russian President had to distribute the information, that the President Yeltsin 
signed a decree that forbade the shares of the defence companies to be taken over by the 
banks (“Aktsii oboronnykh,” 1995). Moreover, the purchase of the strategic industries 
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by the leading banks and investment companies brought in speculations about the 
primary specific interests of certain banks in certain sectors (“Pishcha bankov,” 1995). 
As a response, the banks were emphasizing their interest in investing and developing the 
companies they purchased, as Bank Menatep did for Yukos, which according to its head 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky would be managed by Russian investors only (“Upravliat’,” 
1995).  
 The loans for shares deals showed the weakness of government’s reform strategy 
as the money raised following the tenders corresponded to only a portion of the assets 
that were being offered. The auctions were opaque and organised in such a way that 
there was usually one bidder who won without any competition. No foreign participation 
was ensured, not for even smaller bits of shares. The privileged relationship between the 
government and Russian banks was at display, raising doubts on the legitimacy of these 
schemes and putting Yeltsin’s fairness under severe public scrutiny (Tikhomirov, 
2000a).  
 The whole process of Yeltsin’s privatisation scheme was received ambiguously, 
if not negatively, especially with the appointment of Boris Berezovsky as the Deputy 
Secretary of the Security Council and who, after his resignation from this post, still 
retained his membership in the Council. (“Berezovsky ne rasstalia,” 1997). Besides, the 
personal protection of Berezovsky by President Yeltsin, especially in connection with 
the privatisation of Rosneft was broadly covered in the press (“Boris Yel’tsin ne,” 1997).  
 It could be argued that also the banks hardly had a business plan and strategy 
when tendering for the federal shares. The prevailing mood was more to exploit the 
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opportunity and develop better relations with the government. All in all the banks had 
two main areas of operational interest for taking over the companies. The range and 
volume of bank services were extended to the oil companies. All accounts of the 
company were transferred to the bank. The more important aspect, however, was 
intervention in the management and restructuring of the oil companies. The management 
of the oil company was changed along with a restructuring of the managerial 
organisation. Also the subsidiaries as joint stock companies were abolished and single 
shareholding companies were established (Kryukov & Moe, 1999). 
 These two types of operational interests were visible in different cases for 
Lukoil, Yukos, Sidanko, Surgutneftegas, Sibneft and the associated banks. For instance 
Lukoil and Surgutneftegas founded the investment institutions and used them in taking 
over the controlling shares of the oil companies. However, the banks did not have a role 
to play in management and operations of the companies. Another example could be 
Sibneft, which was founded in 1995 as a part of the strategy that was developed by Boris 
Berezovsky’s Logovaz-United Bank. During the auction Stolichnyi Bank Sberezhni 
(SBS), for which Sibneft was an important client, acquired the federal shares in 
connection with the Logovaz-United Bank. In Yukos and Sidanko, the banks which won 
the auction were those that were in close relationship with the company as creditors and 
financial advisers. After acquiring the controlling shares Menatep and Oneksimbank 
started playing important roles in restructuring of Yukos and Sidanco respectively 
(Kryukov & Moe, 1999). 
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 The development of the alliance between oil company managements (such as 
Sidanco or Yukos) and the acquiring banks (Oneksimbank or Menatep respectively) 
followed largely the same pattern. As a first move, the acquiring bank’s position in the 
top management of the company was strengthened. Then, a strict control over the 
financial flow and production was established by transferring payments and accounts of 
the oil company to the acquiring bank. During the last stage, the remaining shares of the 
oil company were further acquired in investment competitions that solidly consolidated 
the bank’s ownership. The final step in the process was integration of the oil company 
into a financial-industrial group (Kryukov & Moe, 1999).  
 With the loans for shares auctions, new external owners were introduced. By 
1997 the privatisation process illustrated that the ownership of assets shifted from the 
state to the banks and financial companies, which acquired large holdings working 
through nominees. The major players in the privatisation stakes have been Russian 
banks particularly Alfa-Bank (40% of Tiumen Oil), Oneksimbank (85% of Sidanko), 
Menatep (85% of YuKOS) and SBS/Berezovsky (99% of Sibneft) acting through 
intermediaries such as Laguna, NFK, Interrosoil, Sins, Rifainoil, Monblan, and FN 
(Blasi, Kroumova & Kruse, 1997). 
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Table 21 
Percentage Share of the Government Holding 
Company 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Sidanko 100 85 51 0 
Vostsibneftegas 100 85 38 0 
Sibneft  --- 100 51 0 
Yukos 86 53 0.1 0 
Surgutneftegas 40.1 40.1 40.1 0 
KomiTEK 100 100 92 0-22 
LUKoil 42.1 26 16.6 6.6 
NORSI-Oil --- 100 85.4 45 
Tatneft  46.6 46.6 35.1 20-25 
Transneft 100 100 75 51 
Rosneft  --- 100 100 100 
Tiumen Oil --- 100 91 51 
Sibur 100 85 85 51 
Vostochnaya  100 85 85 51 
Slavneft 93.5 92 90.1 56-68 
ONAKO 100 85 85 85 
Note. From Khartukov, Khartukov, E. 1997. “Incomplete Privatization Mixes 
Ownership Of Russia's Oil Industry,” Oil and Gas Journal 93(33): 38. 
 
The loans for shares scheme was the start of Russian banks offering financial 
assistance to the state in return for certain privileges. After this point, in view of the 
rising need for financial resources, the involvement and intervention of the banking 
sector in state policy grew rapidly. In the run up to the 1996 elections, Russian banks 
openly declared their support for Yeltsin. Yeltsin won the 1996 election on the shoulders 
of large financial and media support from the oligarchs. This meant that oligarchs 
influence was to grow to unprecendented degree.  
The privatisation deals in the oil industry created significant results for the future 
political development of the Russian Federation. The loss of strategic assets to a group 
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of private investors in rigged deals was never digested neither by the entrenched 
conservative interests nor by the larger population. It was apparent to that a handful of 
prominent oligarchs came to dominate the financial system, most important industrial 
holdings and all of the influential media outlets. Aware of this strength, the oligarchs 
grew insolent.  
 
4.4. Yeltsin’s Oil and Gas Policy  
 
 The importance of oil and gas sector for the Russian economy was noted by 
Yeltsin and his team during the early stages of assuming power. In line with the general 
reform programme, central planning in the oil and gas sector was abolished, prices and 
trade were, however slowly, liberalised, and fiscal space was created to support the 
sector which was essentially de-monopolised. Yeltsin, backed by the international 
community, took all measures, at least on paper, to rejuvenate the oil and gas industry. 
Despite these attempts at rejuvenation, many factors contributed to one of the most 
catastrophic periods of the Russian oil and gas industry (Wallander, 1996).  
 The first stage of the development of an energy policy for Russia in the new 
economic order was completed in September 1992. In order to elaborate the basic 
concepts of the energy policy into a national implementation programme, a joint 
committee was established in accordance with the Council of Ministers’ decree 
[postanovlenie] (No: 218, 14 of March 1993). The joint committee, headed by Minister 
for Fuel and Energy Yuri Shafranik, included the Ministry of Economics, Ministry of 
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Finance, Ministry of Science, Ministry of Environment, representatives of regional 
jurisdictions, Russian academy of Sciences (Joint Committee for Programme 
Development, 1994).  
 The joint committee finalised a document entitled “The Energy Strategy of 
Russia” in 1994. In the document the fuel and energy structure was regarded as a vital 
element of the Russian economy, one of the key factors in safeguarding the vital work of 
the productive forces. The natural resource potential of Russian Federation was to 
provide internal and external financial resources required for general economic growth 
and to raise the quality of life for its citizens (“Joint Committee for Programme 
Development…”, 1994). 
The most urgent problem of the oil and gas sector was the investment crisis that 
led to a sharp fall in capital spending. The investment problems hit the oil sector just as 
the sector was in need of maintaining the capital intensive field operations. The oil 
sector lost 50% of its exploitative drilling. Specifically, oil production declined by 100 
million tonnes. The gas sector which was already at its peak production levels, managed 
to preserve its production flat in the 1990s. In order to prevent a future bottleneck in 
production, new projects (in Yamal peninsula) were necessary (“Neftianoe 
gosudarstvo,” 2005).  
 In the early 1990s, hyperinflation and high interest rates for borrowing made it 
impossible to raise financing for capital intensive field development projects. Voucher 
privatisation left even the most reliable and financially viable enterprises with an influx 
of share capital. Excessive taxation, non-payments and barter trade, decreasing revenues 
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from lower oil prices, insufficient export infrastructure were the key problems that 
hindered the healthy functioning of the energy industry (“Itogi raboty,” 1993).   
 Under these circumstances, the most important challenge facing Yeltsin was to 
decide on what to do with the looming crisis of the oil and gas industry. The competitive 
viability of Russian energy resources depended on the ability of companies to adapt to 
changing market conditions inside Russia and the access to foreign markets. The price 
controls made it very difficult for the producers to continue production particularly in 
view of the progressive aging – on average 50% wear and tear – of the machinery stock. 
Allowing the prices to adjust freely meant a price rise of nearly forty times for a 
strategic commodity, which was central to industrial production and household heating 
(Grace, 2005).  
 Yeltsin opted for the gradualist approach in which prices for oil and gas were to 
increase incrementally. This decision left the industry in arrears. The desperate state of 
the Russian economy forced President Yeltsin to ‘turn towards investments’ 
[povernut’sia k investitsiiam] from abroad, as he mentioned in his appeal to the Russian 
Federal Assembly in 1995. Another vital aspect of rejuvenating the ailing energy 
industry from crisis was considered as the privatisation of enterprises (“Den’gi iz-za 
granitsy,” 1995). 
  In this respect, special emphasis was put on creation of investment funds, which 
were capable of generating investment capital. In the short term, as it was not realistic to 
expect a sudden increase in investment capital. Priority was given to maintenance and 
renovation of the existing production facilities. It was recommended to form joint 
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ventures with foreign capital to accomplish joint financing to buy new technology (Joint 
Committee for Programme Development, 1994). By January 1995, 16,063 joint ventures 
with foreign capital were registered in Russia, although the growth was obstructed after 
the annulment of privileges and about 40 % of these joint ventures with foreign capital 
remained inactive (“Joint Committee for Programme Development…”, 1994).   
 Along with the privatization, energy efficiency and conservation were top 
priority items on the energy agenda. The wasteful and energy intensive Soviet type 
production was a hurdle to the country’s industrial competitiveness in the global 
markets. An innovation investment program for energy conservation was developed 
which was administered by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. The program estimated the 
potential for savings from gas consumption of around 100 billion cubic meters and the 
same figure for oil was 65 million tonnes. According to estimates developed by the 
Institute of Energy Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, conservation 
potential in 1995 ranged as high as 40 - 45% of energy consumption (“Joint Committee 
for Programme Development…”, 1994).  
 The primary solution to address all of these impending problems, according to 
The Energy Strategy for Russia, was the creation of a regulated market for energy. The 
state had to establish an effective pricing and taxation policy. The prices for oil and gas 
were to be determined between survival level and the prevailing world prices. The 
improvement of legislation and supportive normative acts was considered necessary to 
regulate the inter-relationship between the subjects of energy market and those of public 
bodies.  
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 While offering certain preferential advantages to small and medium businesses, 
the state floated the idea of creating large integrated companies in the energy sector 
covering various stages of the production, processing and distribution of energy 
resources, particularly those dealing with oil and gas, which will help the Russian capital 
to enter the world market (“Reorganizatsiia,” 1995). 
 By implementing these measures, the Russian government intended to recover 
the gas and oil production to pre-collapse levels by 1997. The goals were to increase 
refining capacity by 67%, extend the downstream network, and expand the raw materials 
basis through exploratory efforts in remote areas such as East Siberia, Timon-Pechora, 
Archangel. The main priority with respect to the production of resources was identified 
as the production of natural gas and rehabilitation of the gas supply system. The second 
priority was established as the modernisation and reconstruction of the oil refining 
industry and switching of oil with gas in electricity production (Joint Committee for 
Programme Development, 1994). 
 The external dimension of Yeltsin’s oil and gas policy was geared towards 
changing the structure of Russia’s participation on foreign markets and creating the 
necessary conditions to attract foreign investment that is required for competitive 
extraction and production capacity. Again an effective pricing and taxation policy, stable 
legislative basis to set up reliable contractual inter state-company relations, switching 
from export of primary fuels to processed products were identified as necessary steps for 
success of the external energy policy (“V ekonomicheskom,” 1994). 
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 Yeltsin’s early oil and gas strategy was largely in line with the contours of the 
general reform strategy. It foresaw establishment of a regulatory framework and players 
in it through large-scale privatisations. The strategy seemed to take into account the 
heightened profile of oil and gas for the prosperity of Russian citizens. Conservation was 
promoted. The strategy had the backing of all the important international organisations 
in identifying the issues and challenges in developing the oil and gas industry. However, 
it was one thing to have identified the problems as they stand and another to have 
tackled them. The transformation years made it clear that there was no easy way to 
become a capitalist state without capital or to become a properly functioning state 
without institutions.  
 
4.5. Immediate Post-Soviet Era Issues for the Oil and Gas Sector  
4.5.1 The Impact of Dissolution  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the demand and supply management of the 
Soviet oil and gas industry was lavishly wasteful. The USSR had reached the world 
record of 12 m/b per day in oil production in 1987. While oil and gas were provided for 
free to all, there was no consideration of the balance between producing a barrel of oil 
and the cost of production of that barrel. At some point, oil and gas production became 
an end in itself that consumed a disproportionate share of the nation’s wealth. This was 
because of the fundamental role these resources played in keeping the overall economy 
going. The strategy was also unlikely to survive at lower oil prices even if the Soviet 
Union had not collapsed. (Grace, 2005).  
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 Primarily oil and to a lesser extent gas exports to the West European countries 
had become the backbone of the Soviet hard currency revenues towards the end of the 
1980s. Thus, for the year 1980, the Soviet exports to the Socialist countries decreased to 
54%, while that to the capitalist countries increased to 46% (Kazankova & Sudo, 1998). 
The revenues from the oil and gas exports constituted 60% of the hard currency 
earnings, or in absolute numbers, between 1975 and 1989, the Soviet Union earned 
around 100 billion rubles from the export of oil and oil products with currency rates of 
that time (Stern, 1997). When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the production of oil 
and gas stood at 12 million barrels per day (520 million tonnes) and 643 bcm 
respectively (Kazankova & Sudo, 1998).  
 The dissolution of the Soviet Union had a colossal impact on the oil and gas 
sector in many respects. First and foremost, the ceaseless political pressure exerted from 
the central authority as well as the ever increasing investment budgets to increase 
production abruptly vanished during the early years of collapse. The primacy of the oil 
and gas production was relegated particularly during the ensuing political crisis for 
supremacy (Grace, 2005).  
 The loss of political pressure on production was exacerbated by the 
unavailability of capital even to conduct the simplest field works like repair and 
maintenance. Investments in upstream and midstream activities were brought to a halt 
with the end of command economy. Remnants of Soviet enterprises started effectively 
controlling the production. In the new environment, the oil and gas companies had to 
rely on their market revenues for their operations. As the government fixed oil prices 
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well below the international levels, export revenues were left as the only source of 
reliable income, which were also effectively drained by government tax and 
transportations tariff policies. Oil production turned into a money losing affair unless 
corruption was involved (Grace, 2005).  
 
Figure 12  
Russian Gas Production and Exports 
 
Figure 12: Russian Gas Production and Exports 
Note: From Wold Economic Outlook 2004, p.308 
 
Deprived of critical Soviet investment funds, and unable to ratify contracts for 
Western direct investment, the oil industry suffered from a severe and growing shortage 
of critical inputs during the initial years of the transformation. This had a devastating 
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impact on the drilling and repair efforts. While no new long distance pipelines were put 
into operation, a few pipeline routes closed down.(Considine and Kerr, 2002) Again the 
lack of investment, in this case would prove detrimental to the future of the production 
regime.  
 
Figure 13 
Russian Oil Production 1992-2007 
 
Figure 13: Russian Oil Production 1992-2007 
Note: From WTRG Economics Web Site 
 
Deprived of critical Soviet investment funds, and unable to ratify contracts for 
Western direct investment, the oil industry suffered from a severe and growing shortage 
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of critical inputs during the initial years of the transformation. This had a devastating 
impact on the drilling and repair efforts. While no new long distance pipelines were put 
into operation, a few pipeline routes closed down (Considine & Kerr, 2002). Again the 
lack of investment, in this case would prove detrimental to the future of the production 
regime.  
 According to the official data of the Russian Statistical Yearbook by the Federal 
State Statistics Service [Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki], the budget 
expenses for the industry, energy and construction sectors, as mentioned in the 
consolidated budget of the Russian Federation, remained essentially unchanged despite 
the growing needs (“Raspredelenie dokhodov,” 2003).  
 Producers were forced to curtail investment and operational expenses in view of 
sharply rising costs and low prices. The result was a significant growth in the number of 
idle wells, as producers had few resources to allocate for repair and maintenance. New 
field development and drilling almost stopped. This further diminished the future 
production capacity, removing the means through which production lost due to natural 
decline21 and well failures would normally be replaced. According to estimates provided 
by Minneftegas the number of well completions fell to 11,091 in 1991, a 30% reduction 
from the 15859 reported in 1988. The number of idle oil wells soared to 17918 in 1991 
and peaked around 29,101 in 1993, almost four times more than the 7707 reported in 
1989 (“Main indicators,” 2008). 
                                                        
21 According to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, reserves in the Volga-Urals region are 68% depleted, 
83% depleted in the North Caucasus, 48% in the Komi republic and 40% in West Siberia. 
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 The efforts to arrest this decline were rooted in the stabilization programme 
initiated in mid-1992. The main goal of the programme was to stabilise oil production 
drilling at 25 million metres in 1992 and to increase such drilling to 35 million metres by 
1995. However, development drilling fell to 20 million metres in 1992, to 11.2 million 
metres in 1994. In the late 1980s it was estimated that the development of the smaller, 
lower quality reserves would require five to 10 times more drilling per tonne than the 
larger fields. The capital investment required per tonne of new capacity doubled between 
1970 and 1985, doubling again between 1985 and 1990. When the capital availability 
fell, year-on-year output inevitably fell by 7% in 1990, 10.5% in 1991, 13.6% in 1992, 
11.5% in 1993, and 10.5% in 1994 (“Joint Committee for Programme Development,”, 
1994).  
 Another long standing consequence of the Soviet collapse was seen on the 
structural transformation of the export markets for Russian Federation. There were three 
main visible results. One of them was the new political map emerging after the break up 
led to new transit relations as the flow of energy exports started changing its route. 
Russian exports to international markets beyond the former USSR have steadily 
increased, while those to former Soviet republics have contracted dramatically as these 
countries began their economic transition (Winrow, 2004).  
 Related with this phenomenon, a struggle for more economic and secure export 
routes was triggered. The competitive struggle not only included Russia but all former 
Soviet states that were endowed with hydrocarbon riches. The routes that were secure 
and granted during Soviet times emerged as potential bottlenecks and in some cases 
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overt security problems for the Russia. Given the fact that the Russian energy complex 
earned most of its hard currency revenue from exports to Europe, the issue of how to 
transport gas and oil from their deposits (most of them in Siberia) to Western Europe 
became a question of enormous importance (Balmaceda, 1998). This issue reduced in 
importance but only slightly over the better part of the next two decades. Overall, the 
percentage of Russian oil production exported to the United States grew to about 4.5% 
during that next period. 
 Despite those increases, Europe still remained the most significant source of 
exports. Byelorussia, Ukraine, Baltic States on the immediate Western borders as well as 
Romania, Hungary, and Poland on the Western routes moved from being constituent 
republics or orbit states to new jurisdictions to be dealt with. The Baltic oil export 
terminals of Klaipedia in Lithuania and Ventspil in Latvia became major points of 
friction. A much larger proportion of the oil exports were directed to Russia’s major port 
on the Black Sea, Novorossiysk. Still, however, easy access to cheap and abundant 
Russian oil and gas maintained the Russian dominance in energy supplies of the CIS 
region (Hill, 2003). 
 One of the best and recurring examples of this new reality was the case of 
Ukraine, the most important transit country for Russia. In the early days of dissolution, 
Russian gas sales to Ukraine and the fees paid to it for transit of gas destined for Eastern 
and Western Europe had to be negotiated and established. The negotiations proved to be 
rather complex. In the end Ukraine was unable to pay the price agreed with Russia and 
has amassed debts which by the end of 1994 had become so large that they were 
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unlikely to be repaid in full. Gazprom proposed to off set the debt by acquiring the 
Ukrainian gas pipeline and storage assets in return for payment of debt. The deal did not 
go through but it became crystal clear that evolving political and strategic relationship 
between Russia and the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was to remain 
undiminished. Despite the significant increase in stature of Belarus and Poland as 
alternative transit countries, there were strict limits to the payment pressure Gazprom 
could exert on these transit states (“Joint Committee for Programme Development…”, 
1994).  
 Faced with this new geographical reality, Russian strategy focused on mitigating 
the source of transit risk by developing alternative transit strategies and establishing 
control of objects of the oil and gas infrastructure in the former Union republics. The 
strategy worked through seizing the assets of oil and gas complex in privatisations or 
taking over them as compensation for debts emanating from Russian energy deliveries. 
This strategy created tensions which usually resulted in reciprocal threats of turning off 
the oil and particularly gas deliveries (Balmaceda, 1998). 
The development of general political, economic and strategic relations between 
Russia and transit countries, and the specific issue of gas and oil commerce between 
these countries remained the key to the future success of Russian exports. The new 
transit situation also led to apprehension on the European importers which viewed the 
security of Russian gas supplies as imperative. 
After 1992, Russia effectively used its energy lever for putting political or 
economic pressure on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia. 
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There were dozens of incidents during which energy supplies to a certain state were cut 
off. The immediate reaons for Russia’s coercive policy was to extract political and 
economic concessions or commandeer infrastructure take over. In most cases Russian 
demands for payments were legitimate but in some cases political motivations seems to 
have drawn the action. (Larsson, 2006) For instance, in the winter fo 1992-1993, Yeltsin 
quadrupled the prices of gas deliveries and then cut-off energy supplies to Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania after these Baltic countries demanded the removal of Russian 
troops from their territory. (Smith, 2004) In 1993, when Russia and Ukraine disputed 
over the nuclear arsenal and the fate of Black Sea Fleet, the gas supply to Ukraine went 
down by 25%. (Bukkvol, 2001)  
The growing role of energy issues was reflected in the energy strategy of 
Russia’. The strategy document specifically mentioned that “Unlike USSR which used 
to be the World’s largest energy resources exporter and utilised large currency receipts 
to support its military requirements in a closed economy situation, Russia’s export 
policy will to a maximum degree promote the integration of its domestic economy into a 
peace oriented economic co-operation” (Joint Committee for Programme Development, 
1994, p. 33). It was recognised that “the global character of energy problems and their 
ever increasing political character, also objectively influential position of the Russian 
fuel and energy structure in the world energy system are bringing forward the energy 
factor as one of the main elements on which Russian diplomacy is based upon in its 
quest to secure a more tangible participation in world affairs” (“Joint Committee for 
Programme Development…”, 1994, p. 35). 
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This was an accurate recognition that the oil and gas industry was to form the 
basis of the future Russian diplomacy. More importantly this recognition came at a time 
when the industry’s contribution to the Russian economy was almost at a minimum. In 
addition, in 1990s, energy security was not on top of the national security agenda of 
many Western states.  
 However, Russian motives should be seen in a long term geopolitical and 
strategic context. Russian Federation utilised its oil and gas policy to underpin the 
economy, extend political influence and avert geopolitical and macroeconomic threats. 
Morover, Russia still had strategic priorities to keep its influence over the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and its energy policy (primarily oil, gas and 
electricity) turned out to be the most effective tool at its disposal in the post-Cold War 
context. 
 
4.5.2 Tax Arrangements  
 In developing a tax system for the oil and gas sector, any government ideally 
aims at a level of taxation that leaves producers with sufficient incentives and means to 
reap benefits to carry out investment activity. The taxes also have to be reasonable 
enough to provide revenues to the federal and regional budgets. The taxation system 
needs to be stable and predictable which targets profit and not the revenues. Finally, the 
system has to be simple and workable, avoiding evasion (Oppenheimer & Maslichenko, 
2006). The post-Soviet Russian taxation system, until the re-arrangements in 1995, 
provided the opposite incentives. 
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 During the initial years of the Yeltsin presidency, the Russian government 
recognised that federal budget revenues relied heavily on foreign debt and taxation of 
the oil and gas companies. Therefore, oil and gas production, which had the potential to 
generate economic rent, attracted special rates of taxation (Grace, 2005). 
 The enterprises, who were long accustomed to paying only token charges for 
using the centralised assets during the Soviet rule, were suddenly subjected to a plethora 
of taxes and levies and duties imposed by federal, regional, and local governments and 
authorities (Ivanenko, 2005).  
 Royalties on oil production varied between 6 - 16%. An absolute 26 ECU/tonne 
export tax was introduced which was increased to 44 ECU/tonne by mid 1992. An 
excise tax was levied as an absolute amount per tonne of oil, and regularly adjusted to 
the ruble/US dollar exchange rate and to the profitability of individual fields. The 
implicit excise rate was 20% on average. A geological fee of 10% and various other 
smaller taxes were levied by federal, regional and local bodies. The excise tax and 
geological fee were paid into the federal budget, and revenues from royalties were 
shared between federal, regional and local budgets. The corporate tax was established at 
32%. Deductions for Federal Oil Investment Fund were introduced in 1992, which was 
28% after deduction of the excise tax (“The Mineral Resource,” 2007). 
 Special-purpose levies included: road users tax (1.54% of products sold); land 
tax (levied in rubles per hectare); various social payments (tied to wages or the 
“remuneration fund” – employment fund at 2%, social insurance at 5.4%, pension fund 
at 28%, medical insurance at 3.6%); transportation tax (1% of the remuneration fund); 
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educational charges (4.5% of product sold); environmental charges (forests at 0.02%, 
territorial “cleaning” at 0.5% of the remuneration fund, and various assessments for 
excess discharges); water fees (0.05% of product sales); vehicle taxes (rubles per 
horsepower for the entire fleet; a percentage of value for new vehicles); militia tax (3% 
of the minimum wage multiplied by employment); tax for urban transport (2% of the 
remuneration fund); advertisement tax (0.005% of product sold); and the fund for 
support of agriculture (3% of production cost) (“The Mineral Resource,” 2007). An 
example of how the taxes were applied is shown in the table below: 
Table 22 
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The situation was same for the gas producers, particularly Gazprom. A flat rate 
excise tax of 25%, and a royalty varying from 6% to 16% was established on the 
wholesale price of gas including its transport. Gas exports were taxed at (by then) ECU 
two per thousand cubic metres. The advantage of gas sector was its relatively benign 
production cost profile that promised to operate for another two decades without much 
investment in the upstream (“Joint Committee for Programme Development,”, 1994).  
Although the imposition of taxes was at a wide and creative range, the tax 
collection efforts were not robust as such and the companies usually declared huge 
amounts of tax arrears. For example, Gazprom was responsible for half of the country’s 
tax bills but the head of Gazprom was reported to have filed a tax return for 1996 based 
on a salary of only $8031 (or $2.50 per hour). The measures to cover the tax arrears 
were more or less limited to bluff and compromise rather than prosecution. The taxes 
owed to the federal government by the oil sector stood around $ 4.7 billion in 1997 
(Gregory & Brooke, 2000).  
 By the end of 1992, fiscal charges and payments on the oil sector had reached 
69% of the ex-field gate wholesale enterprise price. The tax payments to the government 
effectively eliminated gross profits, forcing the typical domestic enterprise to operate at 
a loss of approximately 327 rubles per tonne. In 1994 the average profitability of a 
Russian oil company went down as low as 7% compared to 50% in 1992. The burden of 
tax on the ex-gate wholesale price stayed around the unsustainable level of 62,5 % in 
1994 (Considine & Kerr, 2002).  
 175
 Starting from 1994, attempts were made to reduce the tax burden on the oil 
companies. Forbidding the entrepreneurs from profit and investment incentives invited 
evasion and led to shrinking of the tax base. Particularly production based taxes, which 
were insensitive to the costs, discouraged the development of high cost fields that 
otherwise could have produced profitable oil benefiting not only the producer but also 
the state budget. In early 1995 the Russian government adopted a plan to gradually 
phase out the export tax and replace it with an increased excise tax, levied on all oil 
produced in Russia rather than just that part sold abroad (Ivanenko, 2005).  
 The tax cuts had a slight impact beginning in 1997. The Russian oil companies 
enlarged the profit margin to an average of 12.5% which also encouraged further 
production. The minor increase of 1% in oil production volumes was important as it was 
the first recorded since 1988 (Gaddy & Ickes, 1998). 
 
4.5.3 Price Adjustment  
 Yeltsin’s economic reform had two primary tools for transition to a market 
economy: establishment of a market pricing mechanism which necessitated gradual 
elimination of price controls and the attempt to create a solid regulatory foundation for 
transition to free market economy (McFaul, 1996). In line with this strategy, in January 
1992 the government abolished price controls for 90% of wholesale and retail trade.  
 However, oil and gas prices as well as the prices of some other key sector 
products like agriculture, precious metals and freight tariffs were held under tight 
government control. Particularly energy products were considered as strategic 
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commodities with a social face. The authorities feared that decontrolled energy prices 
would significantly add to the roaming inflation wave and paralyse the Russian society 
and industry (Tikhimirov, 2000b). 
 The administrative price control over the oil and gas industry reached crisis 
proportions at the end of 1991. The cost of producing a tonne of oil exceeded the 
contract price imposed by the government. Crude oil prices became unsustainable to 
continue production. The wholesale prices per tonne of oil rose from 25.7 in 1990 to 65 
rubles in 1991. The costs of production increased at a much faster rate, reaching 57.39 
rubles in 1991, scoring a 171% increase over the 21.13 rubles of 1990 (Considine & 
Kerr, 2002).  
 In September 1992, crude oil prices were also partially liberalised via decree no: 
1098. Cost plus profit was to be implemented for the first time on an individual 
company basis. Accordingly, the wholesale enterprise price was defined as the sum of 
all production costs, taxes, and a standard 50% profit margin. A price ceiling of 1.5 
times the production costs was imposed. The prices, which had been around 2,000 
rubles, or 10% of the world market price at that time, increased dramatically. With the 
liberalisation, refined product pricing became increasingly market determined, and the 
government’s influence in this area was diminished. Virtually all domestic sales started 
to be negotiated between the buyer and the seller. However, skyrocketing oil prices met 
with serious consumer resistance in the market (Leitzel, 1997). 
In June 1993, a base level, which corresponded to less than quarter of world 
prices, was established for also industrial gas prices. The prices were then indexed to 
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inflation monthly. Each month Gazprom submitted its recommendation for price 
increases based on its service costs. The frequency with which Gazprom submitted 
recommendations for price increases depended on the speed with which inflation was 
increasing. Residential gas prices were not indexed to inflation. A new federal entity to 
regulate prices was set up (Kryukov & Moe, 1996).  
 The first wave of price liberalization measures, government trying to control the 
deregulation through out 1991-1992, resulted in appearance of a huge black market. 
Yeltsin was forced to implement a second wave of liberalization policies by which 
administrated prices were maintained for a few politically sensitive commodities such as 
rents, utilities, public transportation and state grain procurements. The liberalization of 
oil and gas prices was delayed until 1995 due to its crucial impact on the economy 
(Alexeev & Letizel, 1996).  
 The tables below shows the development of key wholesale prices over the 1990-
1994 period, presented on the basis of yearly averages. When absolute energy price 
levels in rubles are converted into indices of relative or real prices, their evolution over 
time can be seen with respect to general inflation, as represented by the producer price 
index. Average producer price of crude oil at the wellhead by June 1994 had risen to 
77,000 rubles per tonne which, the 1994 average exchange rate (about 2,200 rubles per 
dollar), was about US $35/Mt, or 31% of the world market price. However, the Russian 
oil industry did not materialise the profits that accrued from the price reform due to the 
new taxation regime introduced immediately afterwards (Considine & Kerr, 2002).  
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Table 23 
 
 
In addition to the partial price liberalisation, the government introduced a two 
tiered pricing system that allowed a quota of 30% of oil production to be sold at free 
market prices prevailing in the domestic market. Another 10% was earmarked for 
exporting to the non-CIS countries at the prevailing world prices. The export quotas 
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were decided using a rather easy formulation i.e. by deducting the anticipated production 
volumes from the domestic consumption. Up to 1994, the export quotas remained 
around 10 to 15% of the total Russian oil production (Bakoulev, 2004). 
 This rigid system of export quotas and taxes was crucial to maintain the price 
control mechanism and the low crude price domestically. By restricting the volume of 
exports, the government soaked the domestic oil market. As a consequence producers 
stopped producing since they neither had export quotas nor storage space and the 
domestic buyers were solvent. As the domestic prices of petroleum products were kept 
artificially low until 1995, the companies sought to export their products, legally or 
illegally, and provided the basis for speculation, fraud and corruption. Gradually the 
concept of special exporter was developed which were intermediaries between producers 
and government to realize the export quotas. 
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Figure 14: Russian domestic oil prices versus international prices  
Note: From Mäkivierikko A. 2007. “Russian Oil a Depletion Rate Model estimate of the 
future Russian oil production and export”, p. 47 
 
The nadir was achieved in 1994 when the Russian producer lost $6 per barrel 
produced based on an average sales price of $10 per barrel. In early 1995, the Federal 
Board of Bankruptcy Affairs found that all Russian oil production companies except 
Surgutneftegas were insolvent. Between 1993 and 1998, the combination of low 
domestic and world prices, and the high deductions drawn from sales revenues, 
produced annual losses on the production of oil in Russia. In 1995 the Russian 
Federation decided to take serious measures to rejuvenate its ailing oil industry (Grace, 
2005).  
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The full price liberalisation for crude oil was introduced in March 1995. The gas 
prices continued to be regulated by the state. In April the plan to reduce and gradually 
abolish the export tax was announced. Moreover, the Soviet system of annual quotas 
was replaced by quarterly export allocations to be approved by the government *(“Iz 
resheniia,” 1994).  
 
4.5.4. Exports 
 The export problem in the post-Soviet Russia was at visible at two levels. First of 
all, due to the wide differential between international and domestic prices at the initial 
days of transition the government restricted, through a quota system, the amount of oil 
that could be exported. This export quota system also acted a major policy instrument in 
regulating the oil industry, especially in maintaining the low internal price level. 
 Second, with the dramatic decline in oil demand in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet republics, a large proportion of the total flow within the system has 
become focused on the small number of export ports that dispatch crude to the western 
market. Bottlenecks have occurred at export ports and the pipelines supplying them, 
particularly at the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. This gave the government 
one of the most effective tools to exert control on the oil and gas companies as the 
ownership of the pipeline system remained with the state (Trenin, 2005). 
 The combination of tight domestic price controls and non payments problem 
drastically elevated the importance of export sales for oil companies as foreign 
companies paid on time, in cash and at international prices. Although, the transport 
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tariffs, excise taxes imposed directly on the volume sold, taxes imposed by the local 
governments such as severance tax, road tax, surface tax, environmental tax, social 
welfare tax, exploration taxes narrowed the margin between the world price and cost to 
the producer, it was the only door to profits (“Obzor ekonomiki Rossii,” 1995).  
 From 1991 to 1995, the exports were regulated via a preferential quota system. 
Under this system, the export quotas were allocated as an aggregate figure by the 
Ministry of Economics based on an analysis of expected production volumes and 
consumption requirements. The institution of special exporter status was introduced. 
These were usually producers or trading companies, which were the only entities legally 
authorised to export, acting as agents for producers in realising their export quotas. 
 In February 1995, with the decree no 209, equal access to pipelines was 
introduced. Domestic producers were granted equal access to the pipelines in accordance 
with Transneft’s through put allocations. The criterion was based on oil production of a 
company in the previous quarter of access request. This process was led by the Ministry 
of Fuel and Energy but also including the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry for 
Cooperation with CIS Nations, and the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations 
(“Pravitelstvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” 1995). 
 In July 1995, the producers were given the right to re-sell their allocated space. 
In October 1995, Federal Energy Commission was established to monitor and regulate 
the export allocation system. 35% of the network capacity was spared for the integrated 
Russian producer companies. The rest was annually auctioned to the highest bidder. In 
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1996, a surcharge fee was introduced and in 1997 it was decided to consider the level of 
arrears of a company in allocation of export capacity.  
 The physical export capacity constraints inevitably led to stiff competition 
among the producers for access to pipeline network. Allocation of network capacity, 
which determined in effect the share of company’s in economic rents, became an 
exercise of political struggle and corruption, considering the benefits accruing from it. 
The effect of these many regulatory changes was to inhibit investment in oil field 
development and more importantly, investment in pipelines and other transport related 
facilities. Until the end of 1998, the administrative restrictions on crude oil exports did 
not ease. The oil producing companies had to overcome the difficulties resulting from 
centralised allocation of export capacity (Stulberg, 2007).  
Russian oil production experienced significant improvement from the institution 
of the above reforms until the present. The chart below shows Russian monthly average 
barrels per day produced from 1992-2008: 
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Figure 15 
Russian Monthly Oil Production  (in thousand barrels)  
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Figure 15: Russian Monthly Oil Production  (in thousand barrels)  
Note: From the Economagic Web site  
 
Production continually fell after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and did not 
begin to increase until the reforms from 1992-1998 came into effect. The 12-month 
moving average growth rate of production in terms of monthly averages or barrels per 
day reveals the difference between pre-1998 production growth rates and post 1998 
production growth rates.  
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Figure 16. Russian monthly growth in oil production rate 
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Figure 16. Russian monthly growth in oil production rate 
Note: From the Economagic Web site  
 
Currently, rates of growth of production in Russia have been falling significantly 
after peaking in 2003. Further evidence of the increase in exports from Russia comes 
from analysis of the imports of Russian oil in the United States. During the Cold War, 
exports to the United States were negligible. Following the dissolution of the Union, 
they increased and remained relatively stable until directly after 1998. The following 
chart shows the progress.  
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Figure 17. Russian petroleum exports to the United States  (in thousands of barrels per 
day). 
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Figure 17. Russian petroleum exports to the United States  (in thousands of barrels per 
day). 
Note: From the Economagic Web site  
 
Despite the increased capacity to export, there were still other problems that 
plagued the oil industry in Russia during the post-Cold War period. Specifically, non-
payments became a trublesome issue.  
 
4.5.5 Non-payments 
 Even as the domestic prices for oil rose and remained flat for natural gas, the 
industry faced another market phenomenon unique to Russia: non-payments. Many 
major industrial enterprises refused to pay for what they consumed. The government, 
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acutely aware of the importance of these resources for the amenities like basic heating 
and public transportation or as input to industrial production, was not in a position to 
take radical measures to enforce payment of producer’s debts (Grace, 2005).  
The non payments problem was related to the general economic collapse in a 
very wide geography and also rose at two levels. The inconsistent price liberalisation 
policies and the plethora of taxes and levies that were imposed on the industry as well as 
increased customer prices in 1992 led to a severe non-payments problem for the oil and 
gas industry. Lack of uniform accounting procedures and bankruptcy laws friction in the 
banking sector resulted in delays of up to six months for payment settlements. In 
addition consumers were making profit out of non-payments and were very reluctant to 
pay under conditions of high inflation. The ever hardening financial difficulties of 
market players, the lack of reliable short term financing instruments such as letters of 
credit and exchange aggravated non-payments problem (Tikhomirov, 2000a). 
 Central and local public authorities and state financed enterprises were among 
the most significant consumers of oil and gas industry. Out of the total, 45% of non-
payment was by the power generation plants. A large chunk of the remaining belonged 
to the state-owned enterprises that were outspoken in their belief that they were immune 
from disconnection of energy supplies. Therefore, their payment discipline was 
absolutely poor. In some cases the same thinking also affected those large scale 
companies not financed by the public budget. All of them simply refused to pay their 
energy bills that led to development of a vicious cycle. The oil and gas enterprises that 
were not paid by these industrial complexes and public authorities, in turn were unable 
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or unwilling to pay their taxes, which further reduced the ability of public authorities to 
pay their bills (Ellman, 2000).  
 Energy suppliers had to deliver to non-paying clients in view of the importance 
of oil and gas in the industrial production and household heating. This was another 
doubled edged problem as these clients who were aware of this situation consequently 
had no incentive to consume less, or increase their energy efficiency as a result of higher 
energy prices.  
 The non-payments problem was central to the crash of Russian oil production 
starting in 1993 and was very influential in 1994 and 1995. As much as 30% of 
receivables for domestic sales were either not paid at all or paid in barter. The bartered 
goods were usually of questionable value and always required additional costs to 
liquidate. As regards the gas, Gazprom in 1994 estimated that non-payments in the gas 
industry reached 56% and the commercial value the unpaid gas delivered to Russian 
consumers amounted to 4.5 trillion rubles, approximately US$2 billion (Joint Committee 
for Programme Development, 1994).  
 In the second half of 1990s only 10 to 20% of the oil deliveries were paid in 
cash. The cash payments were rewarded by generous discounts in the price of oil. The 
remaining part of the trade was realised through barter agreements or short term 
promissory notes. The non-payments problem, in effect, established a de facto ceiling to 
the price of crude oil in Russia. 
A second aspect of the non-payment problem was between Russian exporters and 
their customers in other CIS republics, especially regarding gas deliveries to Ukraine. 
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Ukraine controlled pipelines of Russian oil and gas exports to Europe. Gazprom has 
been obliged to continue deliveries with only slight volume reductions. As of 1 October 
1994, overdue payments from CIS clients were US$2.0 billion, with Ukraine accounting 
for nearly US$1.3 billion of this. In the 1997, the debt increased to $ 4.2 billion 
(Voloshin, 1997). 
The question of non-payments for energy supplies clearly placed itself at the 
centre of the political agenda between both countries. In the 1990s, Russia used the 
energy dependency of Ukraine to pressure on political questions such as ownership of 
the Black Sea Fleet and the extent of Ukraine’s participation in intra-CIS agreements. 
Ukraine in return tried to exploit its transit status in the transport of oil and gas via its 
territory and put pressure to bear on Russia (Smolansky, 1995). 
 The strategy of intimidating former Soviet states through energy dependence was 
visible in all of Russia’s dealings with its immediate periphery. The link between 
politics and economics became all the more apparent as the debt or energy dependence 
reduced the options in other areas as well. The amenable states like Belarus was charged 
half of the price that Ukraine was paying for the delivery of Russian petroleum and gas 
(Smolansky, 1995).  
 
4.5.6. Corruption and Criminalization 
 To be able to analyze and assess the widespread corruption in the Russian 
Federation, it is important to grasp the prevailing psyche of widespread acceptance and 
resort to corruption at the historical background. The Soviet production processes were 
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inflexible due to political repression and the cumbersome mechanisms of the command 
economy. The economic system did not promote innovation and was unable to react to 
economic needs of the population with adequate adjustment mechanisms. A side effect 
of this inertia was widespread corruption, which was a means of resort to weaken the 
state’s control and for the practical purpose of introducing flexibility to the system 
(Nove, 1969).  
 In a system where the major performance indicator was the fulfilment of 
production quotas, the enterprise managers had to break law in order to obtain the 
required supplies, and to meet the planning targets. Also the desire for personal 
advantage allured many apparatchiks into corruption. (Pleines, 1995).  
 The people who were involved in corruption during the Soviet times were 
exactly those who took on significant posts after the dissolution. The transition to market 
economy changed the nature of corruption. Under socialism, power and influence were 
sought through corruption which in a way also ensured personal wealth. In post 
communist Russia, personal wealth became the central value (Gurov, 1995).  
 In the initial years of the transformation, corruption was so widespread that it 
was not anymore an individual phenomenon. During the mid-1990s a stage was reached 
in which only engagement with corruption offered protection from criminal prosecution. 
Within this framework, the oil companies pursued their own agenda that essentially 
consisted of creating favorable market conditions for their activities, increasing profits 
illegally through smuggling, and laundering the profits (Pleines, 1999).  
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 The most important reason, which allowed or even induced the formation of 
criminal groups that had strong ties with the oil industry, was the exclusion of domestic 
oil prices from price liberalisation. The intention to protect the domestic market caused a 
wide margin between the domestic and the export price. As a corollary, the producers 
opted to export their oil by any and all means rather than save it for domestic market 
where the consumers were either bankrupt or offered barter. Access to the pipeline 
network was limited through a complex quota system (Alexeev, Gaddy & Lietzel, 1995). 
 There were significant problems with the preferential export quota system. On 
the one hand the means of control for the Russian government were not effective in 
ensuring that the oil was not smuggled out of the country to be sold at world prices. On 
the other hand the incentive for smuggling was so great on the face of the wide margin 
between the domestic and the world price of the crude oil as well as the problem of non-
payments in the domestic market. The amount of money that was involved in these 
transfers was substantial (Alexeev, Gaddy, & Lietzel, 1995). 
 In early 1998, D. Makarov, head of a division in the Analysis and Information 
administration of the Tax Police, identified the following forms of tax evasion: 
unrecorded operations, partially concealed operations, bogus operations, unregistered 
operations and false accounting. Using these forms of tax evasion, the most common 
practices were: cash settlements, moving money around corporate subsidiaries or partner 
enterprises, trading by goods bartering and the improper use of promissory notes, which 
acquired the status of a surrogate currency. In each case, a corrupt action was required 
on the official side to make the transaction look legal (Makarov, 1998).  
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 The non-profit organisations, which were exempted from taxes and customs 
duties, also became effective tools of oil smuggling. By mid 1990s the management of 
the most influential organisations were taken over by armed gangs and the organisations 
were used as middlemen in exporting oil and importing consumer goods 
(“Kriminologicheskaya,” 1995). 
 In the wake of economic reforms, corruption also spread to the privatisation 
process and to the liberalised foreign trade regime in 1995. In other words business 
opportunities in the oil and gas sector attracted the attention of the organised crime 
element22 which made its presence dominantly felt around 1995-1996 to such an extent 
that in February 1996, Russia’s Minister of the Interior, Anatoly Kulikov, stated that the 
oil industry was included in the spheres of interests of organised crime and that three 
leading oil companies, Yukos, Rosneft, and Lukoil already had strong connections with 
criminal groups (Olson,1995). 
 Another aspect of pervasive corruption was the necessity to launder money. Until 
1997 the Russian legislation did not distinguish between what would be termed capital 
transfers abroad and money laundering from illegal activities. There were three main 
ways of exporting capital from Russia using foreign trade deals: (1) barter trade; (2) 
sham credits; and (3) double-invoicing (double-contracting) (Holmes, 1997). 
 In the oil sector, signing export contracts with companies abroad was the most 
commonly employed method to launder money. The official contract/invoice was used 
as a basis for reporting and taxation, while the second, unofficial one regulated the split 
                                                        
22 The influence of organised crime led to an escalation of violence. As was the case in Megionneftegaz’s 
transition into Slavneft and the struggle for presidency, many executives fell victim to murders. 
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of profit from the deal between the two contracting parties. The parties to the contract 
were either off-shore subsidiaries or companies that were somehow related with the 
exporting company. The Russian exporter rarely received hard currency back in Russia 
in return for the delivered oil but either in the off-shore account or another account in a 
Western country. Generally when the contract was between the off-shore subsidiary and 
the parent company, the oil price was kept artificially low so the payment was done to 
Russian company but necessary premium was provided for re-selling the oil by the 
subsidiary at the prevailing market prices (Frisby, 1998).   
 The total amount of capital which made its way out of Russia during 1991-1997 
is estimated around $ 168 billion. In 1997, the foreign exchange regime was liberalised 
and legislation was reformed to recognise the distinction between money laundering and 
capital transactions (Tikhomirov, 1997). 
 With the liberalisation of the export and the exchange regime, the influence of 
the banks over the oil and sector grew substantially and profits from illegal activities 
declined drastically. The incentive for the companies and the banks to cooperate with 
organised crime waned. Also for the organised crime the increasing regulation of the 
state combined with the less attractive profit margin from illegal activities heralded a 
decrease in the activities of the organized crime (Erickson, 1995).  
 At the turn of the 1990s, revenue from exports of oil and gas, the main artery of 
revenues, decreased substantially due to historically low weak oil prices around $9. The 
domestic political and economic situation pointed to an overall failure of the state 
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apparatus. In 1998, Russia declared moratorium on its internal and part of the external 
debts. The federal structure started to be questioned by the constituent republics.  
 Expectations of a likely Russian economic recovery seemed weak for the 
foreseeable future. However, two changes fundamentally reversed the course of events 
for Russia: the change in leadership and the sharp rise in the oil and gas prices in the 
international markets. Strong leadership and energy resources became the two most 
important elements of the Russian recovery. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONSOLIDATION, STABILIZATION AND NATIONALIZATION  
UNDER PUTIN: THE BOOM 
 
 
 
5.1. Yeltsin’s Legacy  
In a rather unexpected move, Yeltsin resigned as the President of the Russian 
Federation on the 31st of December 1999. In his farewell speech (“Obrashchenie 
prezeidenta,” 2000), he apologized to the Russian nation and asked for forgiveness for 
all the failed dreams of a bright, civilized future. He also made it clear that he 
accomplished his lifetime goal: destruction of the communist system. When Yeltsin left 
the office, the Russian politics, economy, and society was in disarray. Important aspects 
of what Yeltsin created as a system of governance were a failed state apparatus, 
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kleptocracy, criminalization, societal de-generation and federal collapse (“Dozhit’ do 
reformy,” 2007).  
Under Yeltsin, the structure of the economy radically changed from the 
command Soviet system but the many of the structural reforms stood out. The half 
hearted reform attempts resulted in partial price and trade liberalization associated with 
huge budget deficits (Kuzmichev, 2000). The creation of a market without rules and 
institutions gave rise to insider privatization, corruption and oligarchic capitalism 
(McFaul, 2000). 
The failure to establish a healthy private banking system was one of the biggest 
failures of the Yeltsin period. It led to significant net disinvestment, which accumulated 
a huge backlog of delayed investment in many sectors (Khanin & Suslov, 1999). The 
banking sector rose to pre-eminence via insider fed currency operations, subsidized 
Central bank loans, and by taking state deposits hostage. The banks were the winners of 
privatizations and took over many of the attractive assets for a portion of their value, a 
situation that was loathed by the larger population (Ellman, 2005).  
 Yeltsin’s governments chronically failed to control spending and collect taxes. 
Instead, they borrowed from domestic and international markets heavily to finance the 
budget deficits. In the end, two external shocks combined with the structural weaknesses 
of the economy turned the deficit into a crisis in August 1998. Ruble was devaluated and 
government defaulted on its debt (“Bez deneg,” 1998; Yergin & Gustafson, 1998).  
 In 1999, the state was literally bankrupt after a decade of borrowing spree. 
Lacking the necessary investments and operating in a de-monetized economy, 
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manufacturing and heavy industries collapsed. Services and commodities, i.e. oil, gas 
and metals sectors supported by their banks grew in importance. Military spending was 
slashed. Subsistence and barter economy boomed while agricultural production fell in a 
size comparable only to Stalin’s collectivization (Wegren, 2000).  
 Russian society was poor and de-moralised as a result of omnipresent poverty 
and inequality. The state was unable to deliver the basic public goods such as order or 
education. Unemployment rose to unprecedented levels. The workers’ wages were 
delayed for months only to be paid in kind. Criminalization and corruption spread to all 
layers of public life. The morbidity, alcoholism, smoking and narcotics rates increased 
(Milanovic, 1998).  
 Yeltsin was obsessed with breaking the communist system irreversibly. That is 
probably why he paid little attention to the administrative capacity of central authorities 
and their ability to provide an institutional framework. Russia went into a vicious cycle: 
poor institutional structure emasculated the state and the weak state lacked legitimacy to 
advance institutional reforms. As a result, although the framework of action was broadly 
defined for the market, the rules were not clearly set. Politics became a tool of wealth 
distribution favoring a small clique (Volkova, 2000) at the expense of the people 
(Holmes, 1997; Abalkin, 1997).  
 As Russia failed to develop a durable and sustainable modus operandi, the 
federal constituencies exerted immense pressure to bear on the centre. Therefore in the 
aftermath of the August 1998 financial currency crisis, the country faced the risk of a 
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federal collapse (Bobin, 1998). The financing for police, military, education came from 
regional constituencies which risked a default on the federal order (Herd, 1999).  
 Yeltsin used the power sharing treaties to fill in vacuums created by the Federal 
constitution. The constituent parts were not sovereign, devoid of the right to secede, did 
not dispose of independent leadership, and did not have the right to hinder the 
application of federal laws. However the appetite for more sovereignty was visible 
(Alexseev, 2001). 
 At the end of Yeltsin’s tenure, the upstream oil development in Russia was still 
facing major problems. Gas production, thanks to Soviet heritage, was not suffering 
from production cuts, but had many reasons to worry over its future. The domestic 
prices of oil and gas were still not fully liberalised. The tax regime was burdensome. Oil 
and gas companies struggled with non-payments. Finances for the industry were running 
low (“Pravitel’stvo gotovo,” 1998). There were still numerable administrative 
restrictions on exports of crude oil notably centralised allocation of export capacity and 
barriers concerning the level of tax arrears (Considine & Kerr, 2002). For instance, the 
companies that had tax debit to the state were deprived of their rights to use pipelines for 
export (“Pod davleniem,” 1998). 
 
5.2. Putin’s Vision for Russia: A New Tsar in the Making? 
 It has been argued by many analysts that Yeltsin’s departure was pre-ordained 
and organised by his closest associates, known as ‘the family’.23 It was never fully 
                                                        
23 Includes Tatiana Diachenko (Yeltin’s daughter), influential journalist Valentin Yumashev, Chief of 
Staff Alexander Voloshin, and Boris Berezovsky. 
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understood why Vladimir Putin, who has spent his entire career in lower profile ranks24, 
was selected as the president of Russia. At the time some commentators even thought he 
was a caretaker who would leave the stage soon to the real owner (McFaul, 2000). 
Indeed, his political competence was still a matter of controversial debates and 
discussions months after his premiership (Tret’iakov, 1999). Perhaps, Putin’s 
unshakable loyalty in his previous career and his low profile gave the impression that he 
could be controlled by Yeltsin’s circle in Kremlin.25 Putin was considered as a 
seemingly dependent, politically unattached and ambition free personality (Shevtsova, 
2005).  
 Putin was born and raised in St Petersburg, the former imperial capital. His 
background in one of the closest points of Russia to the West had two implications on 
his thinking. He believed that Russia is a part of Europe and its greatness came from the 
strength of the state. After the Soviet collapse, he witnessed the rapid decline of state 
power both at home and abroad (Trenin, 2003).  
 Russian society, in the run up to the elections, did not have great expectations but 
sought a leader who could give hope and ensure order. Just before the elections Russian 
Public Opinion Research Centre conducted an opinion on the expectations of the 
Russian citizen. The results showed that 71% of the Russians sought a strong leader and 
59% hoped for a stronger Russian state (Sedov, 2008).  
                                                        
24 Putin served as an officer for the Russian Federal Intelligence Service and was an advisor to the St. 
Petersburg Mayor before his appointment as Prime Minister.  
25 The questionnaire “For whom Putin works?” carried out by Kommersant in September 1999 among 
prominent Russian politicians; some were still confident that “he will work upon the will and directives of 
Tatiana Diachenko. He already proved that.” See “Priamaia rech’,” Kommersant, 1 September 1999.  
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 Accordingly, Putin’s presidential election campaign was based on a manifesto 
(“Otkrytoe pis’mo,” 2000) that included three major promises to the Russian electorate; 
a worthy life, a strong state and dictatorship of the law (Alexseevna, 2000). To many 
analysts the election programme of Putin appeared as, almost deliberately, vague. It 
consisted of an image of demonstrated strength traces of which were not evident in 
Putin’s professional career. The 3 promises were carefully selected, indeed, the most 
pressing needs of the Russian society after a decade of traumatic socio-economic 
transition. Putin’s manifesto foresaw also a fight against corruption, which was claimed 
to be present at all layers of the economy (Shevtsova, 2005). 
 Putin, already at the very start of his political life as the Prime Minister, showed 
that he could indeed live up to these requirements. His tough stance against the Chechen 
separatism, his stern media image and his accurate diagnoses of Russia’s need for a 
strong state made him enjoyable to the Russian public. Putin has consistently promoted 
the necessity of reconstituting a stronger Russian state, a policy objective that he valued 
above all others (Tompson, 2000).  
 The presidential elections were held on March 26, 2000 and, as expected, the 
Prime Minister Putin won the elections. When Putin was elected, in contrast to his 
predecessor, he had many advantages. He did not need to create a new ruling class, as 
the ruling class, which took him to power, was at his disposal, almost servile (Tompson, 
2000). In the Yeltsin era, the Duma (the parliament), the Federation Council (the upper 
house of parliament), the media, the oligarchs, and the regional leaders all acted as 
checks on presidential power (Goldman, 2007). 
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 Putin’s strategy for strengthening the state targeted primarily on eliminating 
these checks and balances on presidential power, rather than strengthening the 
effectiveness of state institutions. Consequently, at the start of his presidential term he 
devoted tremendous time and energy to weakening every independent source of political 
power within the Russian political system (McFaul, 2005). 
 When Putin took over the presidency, the Duma, which had been dominated by 
the communists through out the 1990s, was already balanced by a newly created 
political party loyal to Kremlin, the Unity. The Unity proved to be a success, winning 
23% of the total vote, 1% less than than the communist party, in the December 1999 
parliamentary elections. The newly established party was ultimately dependent on the 
Kremlin for finances, media and political backing. After ensuring a majority in the 
Duma, Putin felt confident enough to turn his attention on to the Federation Council 
(Hesli & Reisinger, 2003).  
In the Russian constitution, Federation Council is an important institution. For 
instance if the Duma takes any action in matters pertaining to taxes and spending, it 
must be sent to the Federation Council for review and consideration with a 14 day 
deadline. If the Federation Council rejects legislation passed by the Duma, the two 
houses may agree to form an agreement commission to resolve their differences. Duma 
is able to override a Federation Council veto by a two-thirds vote. The Federation 
Council also has certain exclusive prerogatives. For instance, its approval is sine qua non 
for the use of the armed forces outside Russia, for the calling of presidential elections, 
and changes in boundaries between federal subjects (Remington, 2003). 
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 Until 1995, the Federation Council members were directly elected from each 
region. The members were representatives of the legislative and the executive bodies. 
After 1995, the law was amended to allow for direct appointment of the executive and 
legislative heads to the Federation Council. Under the law, the chief executives and 
chairmen of the legislatures of each of the 89 subjects were to be the members of the 
chamber by virtue of their office. This was a formula that gave the prominent regional 
figures greater legitimacy against the federal clout. It enabled them to block or at least 
delay legislation that the president might support. Moreover, parliamentary status 
provided legal immunity, which made it more difficult to use the threat of criminal 
proceedings. The senators had perfect access to the governmental information and 
offices (McFaul, 2000).  
 In May 2000 Putin proposed a new law on the formation of the Federation 
Council. Accordingly, chief executives and heads of regional legislatures, rather than 
directly serving as senators, would select representatives of the Federation Council 
directly to serve on a full-time basis. It remained a question mark how the majorities 
were going to be formed in a parliamentary chamber where members had neither party 
ties nor electoral mandates (Remington, 2003).  
 In fact, the appointment of low profile, almost technical, figures was designed to 
curtail the effectiveness of Federation Council in acting as a buffer between the Duma 
and the President. The Federation Council was the only barrier on the path to 
strengthening the powers of presidency. The reform of the Federation Council has had 
significant consequences for the role of the chamber in federal law making. The single 
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strongest effect was to make it a more reliable ally of the president in passing legislation 
proposed by the government. The President’s ability to neutralize the vetoes of 
Federation Council also gave the office the ability to re-constitute the organization of the 
national system of government (Whalen, 2000).  
 Along with the changes in the functioning of the Federation Council, Putin, one 
week after his official inauguration on the 7th of May 2000, issued another decree, which 
fundamentally changed the functioning of the federal system. The decree foresaw 
formation of 7 Federal districts [federal’nyi okrug] among the 89 federal units of Russia. 
The new supra-regional okrugs also had direct authority over all federal employees 
working in the regions, including tax inspectors, treasury employees, and regional 
divisions of prosecutor general’s office, the FSB, and the Ministry of the Interior. The 
more important was that the okrugs were to be governed by the Presidential appointees 
[predstavitel’ prezidenta] (“V Rossii,” 2000).  
 Moreover, during the Yeltsin years, these federal employees were dependent on 
local governors. In July 2000, a new law gave the president the right to remove elected 
regional governors in case of accusations by the prosecutor general’s office. By these 
acts, Putin addressed the fears of a federal disintegration and aimed to increase the 
central control (Shevtsova, 2005). 
 Putin in the early months of his presidency proved to be very active. He managed 
to inflict severe damage to all power shareholders in the system by the pre-emptive 
strikes one after another, showing all the concerned parties that he was ‘the boss’ and 
subordination was the only way of survival. Oligarchs were no exception.  
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 The issue of oligarchs loomed increasingly large for the Kremlin as well as the 
Russian public opinion. From their perspective, the oligarchs were guilty of taking over 
the state assets through manipulation of the privatization processes. The economic 
results, Russians believed, would have been considerably different, had the privatization 
been carried out in a competitive and transparent method (“Taming,” 2004).  
 When, in February 2000, Putin was asked in a meeting “what then should be the 
relationship with the so-called oligarchs?” he replied: “The same as with anyone else. 
The same as with the owner of a small bakery or a shoe repair shop.”26 In the summer of 
2000, Putin made it clear that as long as the oligarchs stayed out of politics and remained 
silent, he would not interfere with their businesses or renationalize state resources 
(Goldman, 2004).  
 Putin, at the very start of his reign, made real progress towards consolidation of 
his own political power in Russia. He demonstrated that he is willing to use the power of 
the state in the pursuit of important objectives, such as state building and economic 
reform (“Putin versus,” 2000). His prescription for Russia’s many ills was the 
strengthening of the state. Internally that translated into a political system organized 
tightly around the president. The powerful Kremlin administration and custom-tailored 
political party the Unity, and the ‘siloviki’, the new power elite drawn largely from the 
old KGB and the military, were the other major players in this system (Caryl, 2001). 
 Putin’s economic line of thinking did not fundamentally alter from his 
predecessor. He was in favor of a functioning liberal market economy though with some 
                                                        
26 The same statement was also mentioned in his open letter to the public. See “Poriadok Putina.” 
Kommersant, 26 February 2000. 
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reservations. The most important change from Yeltsin to Putin was in the approach to 
the role of economy in the development of Russia.  
 In his 1999 essay on mineral natural resources in the strategy for development of 
the Russian economy, Putin rightly identified that the structure of the Russian economy 
had altered. He was aware that the key positions in the national economy were held by 
the fuel industry, electrical energy, and ferrous and non-ferrous metals. Putin believed 
that sustainable development of Russia’s economy must be based on systematic growth 
in these already developed sectors to reach an overall annual growth rate around 4–6 per 
cent. The value added created from the extraction, processing and exploitation of 
mineral raw material resources were considered essential to reach economic 
diversification and to modernize the military sector (Putin, 1999).  
 Putin also considered Russia’s natural resource endowment as the most 
important economic and political factor in the development of productivity. The 
structure of the natural resources, he believed, had a direct correlation with the economic 
potential. Putin saw the proper development of the oil and gas sector as an essential 
condition for modernizing the military industrial complex as well as providing social 
stability (Putin, 1999).  
 Moreover, Putin believed in the role of the state in achieving the re-structuring of 
Russian economy and in regulation of the resource sector. While relying primarily on 
market mechanisms, he foresaw a responsibility for the state to influence economic 
development by ensuring an appropriate mix of market and administrative measures 
particularly for the extractive and processing industries. 
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5.3. Foreign Policy and the Role of Oil and Gas Issues 
 Putin understood and recognised the importance of economic strength in 
pursuing the Russian foreign policy agenda. He thought of Russia’s ambitions in the 
context of capabilities and reconciled himself to a new role for Russia. In 1993, the 
Russian foreign-policy concept (“Novaia vneshnepoliticheskaia kontseptsiia,” 1993) 
called for a unified military strategic space in the CIS and sought both military and 
economic hegemony. In 2000, the revised foreign policy concept (“Konceptsiia vneshnei 
politikii,” 2000) elevated Russian economic interests in the international arena into 
priority.  
 The new foreign policy concept placed Russia in the multi-polar system of 
international relations, of shifting and sometimes conflicting interests. Military power 
was still important but there was recognition that an ever greater role would accrue to 
economic, political, scientific and technological, ecological, and information factors. 
Further strengthening of Russia’s statehood, consolidation of civil society and the rapid 
transition to stable economic growth were assessed among the decisive importance in 
these respects. 
 In contrast to both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Putin has not defined integration into 
the West as the central objective of his foreign policy. He abandoned Yeltsin’s foreign 
policy agenda which desired a continuation of the super power role for Russia despite its 
much limited power base. This policy was resulting in a situation that Russia had to play 
a disproportionate role in world affairs in its quest to balance the US and its attitude 
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towards the CIS integration. Instead Putin preferred to avoid conflict with the US, 
cooperated with the European Union, sought to re-balance relations with China and dealt 
with the CIS countries bi-laterally. After taking office in the spring of 2000, he made 
rebuilding of the Russian state his primary goal. Economic concerns were taken as the 
master key to the Russian position in the international arena (Trenin, 2003).  
 The ultimate success of these changes in the policy rested on Russia’s ability to 
change modalities in exertion of its power from military to economic power. At the turn 
of the millennium it became apparent that Russia’s ability to wield soft power and 
expand its economic and political influence ultimately came to depend on its leverage in 
oil and gas issues. In this respect, Putin’s presidency marked a major change in the role 
that the oil and gas sector played in Russia’s foreign policy engagements. Putin aimed to 
maximise the role oil and gas plays in Russia’s foreign policy. There were various 
reasons behind the rising influence of the energy resources on the Russian policy 
agenda.   
 First, as amply elaborated in the other sections, starting from 2000 Russian 
economic well being came to depend on the uninterrupted flow of revenues from the 
sales of oil and gas in the international markets. This was basically due to the increasing 
oil prices, a fact which was very well understood by Putin even before he assumed 
power. The oil and gas sector has sustained Russia’s economic growth, enabled it to 
push through some important reforms and afforded it the opportunity to become a new 
Russia (Stulberg, 2007).  
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 Thanks to the rise in oil and gas revenues, the overall size of the economy 
increased about five times in current dollars—from $200 billion in 1998 to $1 trillion in 
2007. Russia’s per capita gross domestic product has quadrupled to nearly $7,000, and 
about 20 million people have been lifted out of poverty. Over the 2000–2005 period, the 
average Russian saw a 26% annual growth in income. Inflation was well controlled, and 
direct foreign investments to the Russian economy skyrocketed, making it third in the 
world among developing economies (Tsyganov, 2008).  
 Second, it was evident that economic strength triggered a cultural re-generation 
adding to the strength of Russian soft power. Russia has become a pole of economic 
attraction for its neighbouring states. Between 1989 and 2002 Russian population 
declined 5% (7.4 million) reflecting a lower birth rate and shorter life spans. Three 
quarters of that reduction was off-set by net inward migrations, in particular from the 
CIS countries (Hill, 2004). New arrivals from the CIS substantially outnumbered the 
natural fall in population or the Russian emigrants to Germany, Israel and the United 
States. 
 Third, oil and gas politics were the least cost and the most effective way of 
exerting Russian influence in the immediate Russian neighborhood (Melikova, 2008). 
The stable growth of the Russian economy since 1999 has begun to change the nature of 
Russian power and the way it is exercised. In this new context, the Russian energy sector 
has come to represent the state interests globally. Russian state oil and gas companies 
expanded internationally with the assistance of the Russian government (Hill, 2004). 
The penetrating forces of Russian power in Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia and 
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even in Europe became Russian state monopolies Gazprom, UES, and state oil company 
Rosneft.  
 During Putin’s presidency Gazprom has become an arm of the state foreign 
policy. Gazprom has been very aggressive and is committed to increasing its exports 
rapidly in the next decade. It has been very active in Europe, developed many 
commercial partnerships in Germany, France and Austria. It announced deals with 
Japan, Iran, and even China. By the end of next decade it expects to send LNG from 
reserves near the Barents Sea to ports in the United States. 
 Fourth, the profile of energy politics heightened in view of the rising prices and 
ever-increasing perceptions of scarcity. In the last decade, rapidly growing economies 
and economies under competitive international market pressures are refocusing their 
attention on energy diversity, energy security of supply, and energy efficiency. Within 
same vein, major energy-producing countries are establishing new relationships with 
energy users, leading in some cases to tensions in traditional geopolitical relationships.  
 This effectively means that energy security is becoming a widely shared concern 
among the industrialised as well as the developing nations. Rising global oil demand, 
concern over the adequacy, reliability, and pricing (costs) of energy supplies; and the 
associated environmental implications (green house gas emissions) occupy the state and 
business agendas of developed and developing countries alike. States face an 
increasingly challenging and complex set of trade-offs in their quest for energy security 
(Verrastro & Ladislaw, 2007). Russia, in this respect, had a lot to offer by becoming a 
reliable energy supplier to the Western Europe and even prospectively to the Asia-
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Pacific region. Oil and gas resources gave Russia a prominence it would otherwise not 
have retained in the Post Cold War world (McFaul, 2005). 
Fifth, Russia’s predominant role in the gas resources has become even more 
significant as the natural gas, a more economic and environmentally less hazardous form 
of hydrocarbon, started biting higher shares of the energy balance. In the last two 
decades, natural gas has been widely introduced as a substitute for the oil used in 
industrial consumption. The share of natural gas in total world energy consumption is 
forecasted to climb from the current 23 percent to 28 percent by 2025. This will only 
increase Russia’s leverage as the holder of one third of the world’s reserves (Van der 
Linde et al., 2004).  
 The market structure for natural gas is very different from crude oil because it is 
very expensive and difficult to transport. LNG (Liquefied natural gas) provides an 
option for shipping but even that requires a complex supply chain which adds 
significantly to the costs of transport. Therefore, without a given market and long term 
contract, marketing of natural gas is almost impossible. The whole chain of supply 
forces suppliers and consumers into a long term mutual relationship of dependence. For 
the supplier, the demand is crucial to invest in field development and transport facilities. 
On the demand side, in order to mitigate technical or political risks the consumers 
pursue policies that primarily consist of a healthy energy balance and diversification of 
energy sources. 
 Putin’s Russia has been clever enough to play on these dependencies. Russia’s 
pipeline policy relies on increasing ties to the hard currency markets and on using the 
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existing energy networks as much as in favor of the Russian interests. In other words, his 
stance on oil and gas pipelines puts Russia on the side of Western consumers, and thus 
helps to increase the probability that relations with the United States, the European 
Union, and Japan will, for the most part, remain positive and friendly. On the other side 
of the spectrum, Russia uses the asymmetrical dependencies in the CIS and the Central 
Asia to extract behavior.  
 
5.4. Energy Strategy Under Putin 
 One of the first acts of Putin was to update the energy strategy document of 
1994. In 2000, a document called “Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2020” 
was drafted and it was revised in 2003 (“Energeticheskaia strategiia Rossii,” 2003). In 
the document, the strategic guiding lines of the long-term state energy policy were 
identified as: energy safety, energy effectiveness, budget effectiveness and ecological 
energy security (“Energeticheskaia strategiia Rossii”).  
 The key to achieving aims in the energy sector was identified as formation of an 
energy market and non-discriminatory relations between its members. While the state, 
had to limit its functions of a main subject, it had to strengthen its role in forming the 
market infrastructure as a regulator of market relationship. A change in energy policy 
was considered necessary from the role of supplier of raw resources to become a 
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privileged member of the world energy market. The strategy encouraged strengthening 
of Russian position on the world oil markets and on the gas as a priority task.27 
 There was an explicit recognition that the European markets remained the most 
important markets for Russian natural resources until 2020.28 In the longer term the USA 
had the potential to become an important customer for oil exports. In oil exports, the 
share of Asia Pacific Region countries in the export of Russian oil was planned to 
increase from 3% up to the 30% in 2020. As for the natural gas, its part is expected rise 
up to 25%. This meant that in the coming period, the strategic importance of the Russian 
Federation’s Eastern regions has increased enormously (“Energeticheskaia strategiia 
Rossii,” 2003). 
 The oil production was estimated to increase from 324 million tones in 2000 
(379 mt in 2002) up to 445-490 mt in 2010 and 450-520 mt in 2020. In case of natural 
gas production the same figures were increase of gas production from 584 billion cubic 
meter (bcm) in 2000 (595 bcm in 2002) up to 635-665 bcm in 2010 and 680-730 bcm 
cube in 2020. One of the major failures of the strategy highlighted by the opponents of 
the strategy was the fact that the estimated figures for year 2010 were almost achieved in 
2004 (“Energeticheskuiu strategiiu,” 2004). 
 Similar to Yeltsin’s energy strategy, Putin’s energy strategy was, nevertheless, 
accurate in many of its diagnoses. However it was silent on the question ‘how’. Besides, 
                                                        
27 However, a year after the document’s release, the policy was criticized and found inadequate at the 
parliamentary hearing at the Federation Council. See “Energeticheskuiu strategiiu nado pisat’ zanovo.” 
Kommersant, 10 December 2004. 
28 Actually, Western Europe is mentioned to the principal market for Russian natural gas, with Eastern 
Europe being the second major market. See Energeticheskaia strategiia Rossii na period do 2020 
(Moscow: 2003). Available from http://www.gazprom.ru/articles/article4951.shtml . Accessed 14 April 
2008. 
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there was still controversy among the Russian official statistics on certain figures related 
to the energy policy realization (“Strategicheskie tsyfry,” 2003). The strategy did not 
clearly indicate how to achieve many of the goals that the government has formulated 
for the period out to 2020. The issues of financing arrangements for new infrastructure 
(amounting to US$660–$810 billion overall during the period 2001–20), ownership 
structure, third-party access, and tariffs were left unanswered. Any indication of a 
settlement between the roles of the Transneft and the private sector in new infrastructure 
projects was absent from the strategy (Frumkin, 2003). 
 Moreover, in view of the domestic tariff structure for natural gas, it was obvious 
that the Russian policymakers faced an acute dilemma in arranging the optimal 
development path. The government obviously wanted to shield the energy-inefficient 
economy from the inflationary and destabilizing effects of an overly rapid increase in 
energy tariffs. However, it was reckoned that low prices for energy output to provide 
key inputs will deter investment in Russia’s energy producing and energy-consuming 
infrastructure and industry. 
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5.5. Explaining the relationship between Russian Economic Recovery and 
the Oil and Gas Sector 
 
5.5.1. Impact of the 1998 Crisis  
 The core problem of the Russian economy through out the 1990s was the budget 
deficit. The state failed to slash the government spending and establish an effective 
taxation system, especially a mechanism for the collection of tax revenue. Therefore 
privatisation, along with the short term bonds, became an important mechanism to raise 
the much needed finances for the state budget. In the spring of 1998, the Russian 
government, desperately in need of fresh finances, was again looking for a buyer to sell 
the 75% of shares in Rosneft, the largest Russia state oil company (Rick, 1999). 
 However, the oil and gas sector was not profitable enough to encourage 
investments or to attract new investors. With the bottoming oil prices at around $ 9 a 
barrel, Shell and BP, who had shown interest previously in Rosneft distanced themselves 
from the idea in 1998. The high cost, low revenue structure combined with a 
burdensome tax mechanism discouraged the few Russian companies with the resources 
to participate. In August the same year, crisis hit Russia (Khartukov, 1998). 
 The financial crisis in August 1998 produced quite a controversial effect on for 
the gas and particularly the oil industry. Following the crisis, the net income of oil and 
gas producers started increasing rapidly and substantially as most of the inputs of the 
industry, including all taxes and tariffs paid to the government, was denominated in 
ruble but the commodities were priced in dollars. With the devaluation of the ruble by 
 215
70%, revenue from each dollar covered five to six times more taxes, tariffs and 
operating costs not to mention the stocks that appreciated over night in ruble prices. 
Moreover, after the crisis of 1998, the oil exporters had to sell 75% of their currency 
revenues to the Central Bank compared to the previous rate of 50% (“TsB otkazalsia,” 
2006). 
 To give more concrete figures, in 1998 an ordinary Russian oil company made a 
loss of around $5 per barrel of oil produced. Thus, less revenue was generated by 
producing more oil: the revenue from oil exports in 1998 dropped to $10 billion, 
compared to $16.5 billion in 1997 (“Rossiiskaia neft’,” 1999). The overall loss of oil 
producers in Russia in 1998 was estimated to be around 5 billion dollars (“Plakali nashi 
neftedollary,” 1998). After the crisis, the same Russian company started making $2 
profit per barrel of production (Considine & Kerr, 2002).  
 In addition, as a reaction to the crisis, various cost cutting measures were 
introduced. Many companies reduced in size and fired the excessive staffs, which had 
become a hunchback on the re-organisation and re-structuring efforts. The crisis gave 
many owners an opportunity to adopt better management techniques (Grace, 2005). 
 In 1999, the industry enjoyed the first positive return on production of oil. The 
surge in the world oil prices boosted the benefits accruing from devaluation. In less than 
a year, the value of one barrel of Brent oil increased from around $10 to around $30 in 
2000 and continued its steep rise throughout the first decade of the millennium. The 
chart below provides data on the booming production volumes from non_OPEC 
countries as a response to the rise in prices.  
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Figure 18 
International Oil Prices and Non-OPEC Production  
 
Figure 18: International Oil Prices and Non-OPEC Production  
Note: From WTRG Economics web site 
 
This improved the financial position of firms and the government, and enabled 
firms to reduce their tax and wage arrears, and the proportion of barter in their turnover 
(Berntam & Rabushka, 2006). The 1% increase in oil production volume in 1999 was 
important as it established the recovery trend for the coming decade. At the turn of the 
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new millennium, the Russian economy started an accelerated recovery on the shoulders 
of rising oil prices and growing oil production.  
 For the following four years (1999-2003), the Russian GDP grew on average by 
6.7% (“Osnovnye,” 2004). The budget that never managed to meet ends through out the 
1990s enjoyed a surplus equivalent to 2.6 % of the GDP. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) argued that oil sector accounted as much as 80% of total governmental 
revenue gains in 1999-2001 (Kwon, 2003).  
 
Table 24 
Percentage Change of Macroeconomic Indicators 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP % increase 
 
6.4 10 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.1 6.4 
Industrial 
production 
increase % 
 
11 11.9 4.9 3.7 7 6.1 4 
Fixed capital 
investment % 
 
5.3 17.4 8.7 2.6 12.5 10.9 10.5 
Real disposable 
income increase 
% 
 
n.a 12 8.7 11.3 13.7 7.8 8.8 
Federal budget 
balance as % of 
GDP 
-1.1 2.3 3 2.3 1.7 4.2 7.5 
Note. From Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik – 2003. Available from 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B03_13/Main.htm . Accessed 20 May 2008. 
The windfall revenues from the rising oil prices gave the oil companies the 
needed capital to improve production efficiency. This investment led to a sharp increase 
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in oil production and exports in the following years. Oil sector investment jumped from 
roughly 25% of total industrial investment before the crisis to around 35% from 2000 
onwards. The growth of oil sector investment was led by companies controlled by the 
state or by oil industry insiders. By 2000, their investment was already 70% above 1998 
levels (Ahrend & Thompson, 2005). 
 It also gave every incentive to improve the management of the assets. Idle wells 
were brought into operation; new machinery and technology were imported. The 
continued decline of the Russian heavy industry ensured that the bulk of the marginal 
production was available for exporting. By 2001, the Russian oil production had 
increased to 7 million barrels per day (bpd),29 1 million bpd higher than that of 1999. 
The prospects were even brighter as long as the prices remained above $25 (Hill, 2004). 
The official Russian statistics of the production of oil can be found in Table 25. 
 
Table 25 
Official Russian Statistics of the Production of Oil  
Year Production (in millions of tons) 
199
5 
298 
200
0 
313 
200
1 
337 
200
2 
367 
200
3 
408 
                                                        
29 Or, according to official Russian statistics, 497.8 million tons in 2001. See “Balans energoresursov za 
2001 g.” Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik – 2003. Available from 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B03_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d030/i030020r.htm . Accessed 20 May 2008. 
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200
4 
443 
200
5 
453 
200
6 
462 
Note. From “Dobycha nefti,” Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik – 2007. Available 
from http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B07_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d03/13-27.htm . Accessed 
12 May 2008. 
 
In view of the increasing prices, the petroleum balance also tilted in favour of 
exports. The figure below shows that although Russian domestic consumption was 
relatively stable around 3 million barrels/day, the exports reached 7 million barrels in 
2007.  
 
Figure 19: Russian Petroleum Balance  
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Note: From the Energy Information Administration Web site available on the following 
web site: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Oil.html accessed on 11.07.2008 
 
While surging oil exports provided the economy with the immediate capital 
needs, the bulk of the natural gas production continued to subsidize the power 
generation, the household heating, and the industry. Gradually, the export revenues from 
natural gas also increased as a result of their adjustment to the growing oil prices. The 
gas production remained flat around 550-600 bcm (Milov, 2005). 
 
Table 26 
Official Russian Statistics of the Production of Natural Gas  
Year Production (in bcm) 
199
5 
570 
200
0 
555 
200
1 
551 
200
2 
563 
200
3 
581 
200
4 
591 
200
5 
598 
200
6 
612 
Note. From “Nominal’nyi ob’em ispol’zovannogo VVP,” Federal’naia sluzhba 
gosudarstvennoi statistiki. Available from  
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http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01_19/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/i000170r.htm . Accessed 14 
May 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 
Gas Production in Russia 1999-2004 
 
Figure 20. Gas production in Russia 2002-2004.  
Note: From World Economic Outlook, 2004 
 
There were also other factors that played a decisive role in the recovery of the 
Russian economy. The relative price adjustments and the collapse in the real exchange 
rate resulted in import substitution and provided a stimulus to domestic producers of 
 222
consumer and manufactured goods. The industrial and agricultural production went up 
by 5-6%; the real incomes grew by 6% as a result of a nominal increase in wages and 
pensions above 20%. The ruble was stabilized. Such developments were unimaginable 
during Yeltsin years (Hill, 2004). 
 
5.5.2 Sector’s Recovery and  the Russian Economy  
Starting in 1999, the oil prices started to climb from its historical lows in 1998. 
This had a substantial impact on the performance of the Russian economy in many 
respects. Increasing prices provided an important opportunity to boost the oil production 
and the oil export volumes. Industrial production surged. The increasing export volumes 
and the higher prices changed the current account balance favorably which positively 
affected the consumption. With the reform of the taxation system, the federal budget 
revenues increased substantially. Steadily flowing revenues increased the monetisation 
of the economy, helping the flourishing of a healthy financial system. As shown in the 
table below, the overall macroeconomic performance indicators initially stabilised and 
gradually got better. 
Table 27 
Main Macroeconomic Indicators 
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Note. From “Osnovnye makroekonomicheskie pokazateli,” Investitsii v Rossii – 2007. 
Available from http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B07_56/IssWWW.exe/Stg/01-01.htm . 
Accessed 20 May 2008. 
 
The main driver of Russian economic recovery was the increase in oil and gas 
prices and the export volumes. It is estimated that a $1 per barrel drop in the price of oil 
costs Russia more than $2 billion in export revenues and $1 billion in budget revenues. 
A $1 a barrel drop in oil prices translates into a loss of about 0.4% in Russian GDP per 
year (Jaffe, 2001).A drop in oil prices to $14 a barrel would create budget deficits for the 
Russian government. A fall below $10 a barrel would likely eliminate Russian GDP 
growth altogether. The figure below shows the clear correlation between the world oil 
prices and the Russian economic growth. The Russian economy performs better at oil 
prices above $20.  
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Figure 21. World oil prices and Russia’s economic growth, 1997-2003.  
Note: From Hill, 2004, p34 
According to a World Bank report in 2004, growth above 5% in Russia has 
always come with an increase in oil prices. High crude oil prices triggered a multiplier 
leading to an increased production in other industries, with manufacturing growth 
outpacing resource industries (World Bank, 2004).  
 During 1999-2006, the size of the Russian economy grew by 400%; the 
country’s GDP rose from $200 billion in 1999 to $920 billion in 2006 (Central Bank of 
Russia, 2007). As shown in the below table, the nominal growth in ruble terms was 
almost 1200%. 
 
Table 28 
Russian Nominal GDP in Current Prices 
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Year Gross Domestic Product 
199
8 
2,629.6 
199
9 
4,823.2 
200
0 
7,305.6 
200
1 
8,943.6 
200
2 
10,817.5 
200
3 
13,243.2 
200
4 
17,048.1 
200
5 
21,625.4 
200
6 
32,987.4 
Note. Measured in billions of rubles. From “Nominal’nyi ob’em ispol’zovannogo VVP,” 
Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki. Available from  
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b01_19/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/i000170r.htm . Accessed 14 
May 2008. 
  
An analysis of the World Bank statistics shows that the bulk of the GDP growth 
was actually triggered by boom in services sector rather than the natural resources 
sector. However, it should be noted that the consumption boom was balanced by rapidly 
increasing volumes of oil exports. While growth was increasingly driven by 
consumption, it was largely sustained by increasing export volumes (Ahrend & 
Thompson, 2005).  
 The natural resource sectors also directly accounted for roughly 70% of the 
growth of industrial production from 2000 to 2004. In this growth the oil sector 
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contributed around 45%. The result of this industrial boom was reflected in the GDP 
growth rates. According to various estimations, the natural resource sectors directly 
accounted for more than one-third of Russian GDP growth over the same period. Again 
the share of oil industry alone in this growth was around 25% (Gurvich, 2004).  
 Tax reform also played an important role in sustaining the recovery. A proposal 
adopted in 2000 but came into effect in 2003 simplified the taxation procedures and 
introduced a transparent system which increased the efficiency of taxation. Many tax 
rates were significantly reduced which helped to broaden the tax base. This diminished 
both incentives and opportunities for tax evasion. The creation of a federal treasury, the 
reform of fiscal federal relations and the fiscal discipline helped to establish an efficient 
expenditure management (Ahrend, 2004). 
 Putin also ensured that it was the federal government, which benefited the most 
from the windfall from high oil prices rather than the oligarchs. After his re-election in 
2004, in line with the announced election strategy, the export tariff was made reactive to 
the market fluctuations. As he mentioned, the means to deprived oil companies from 
excessive profits (sverkhpribyl) were the simple instruments like export tax on oil export 
and a tax on exploitation of mineral resources (“U neftiannikov,” 2004). According to 
the new system, the tax to be paid was made a derivative of the price of the crude oil. 
The companies were to pay higher export tariffs when the price of the Ural crude 
averaged over $ 20 per barrel for two months. This helped to increase the revenue base 
for the Russian government (“Russia pledges,” 2004). 
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As a result of better taxation, the share of revenues from customs duties 
increased significantly from 7.1% in 1999 to 16 % in 2004 and 18 % in 2006. The total 
tax payments of the oil and gas sector in 2004 were $ 56.5 billion reflecting 35.8% of the 
total revenue and 6.7% of the GDP (Russian Ministry of Finance, 2008). The chart 
below shows the relationship between the oil prices and the federal budget revenues.  
 
 
Figure 22. Federal budget revenues and the oil price, 1996-2003.  
Note: From Hill, 2004, p.36). 
 
Moreover, the government adopted a disciplined and realistic fiscal policy in 
sharp contrast to the pre-crisis period. The federal budgets aimed for surpluses and did 
not depend on the rising revenues from high oil prices. This approach delivered sizeable 
surpluses and a budget that was relatively immune to the oil prices. The government 
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resisted the temptation to spend this windfall, instead using a significant part of it to 
repay debt and accumulate some reserves (Ahrend, 2006a).  
 Prudent fiscal policy and the resulting budget surpluses played a key role in 
reviving private investment. As explained already, Russia witnessed a drain on 
investment from 1992 to 1998. After 1995, this was due to the excessive pressure that 
the government put on the financial markets to finance its large budget deficits, pushing 
real yields on government paper into double and even triple digits (Oppenheimer & 
Maslichenko, 2006).  
 In 2000s, the Russian private sector started investing again. Yet, it preferred to 
invest with the money that was borrowed from the international markets. Owners of 
Russian enterprises increasingly borrowed abroad to finance the development of their 
enterprises, while at the same time taking large amounts of capital out of their 
companies and beyond the reach of the Russian state (Ahrend, 2006a).  
 Another tool of for effectively exploiting the windfall revenues was the price 
stabilisation fund. It was established in 2004 with Federal Law No: 183. The fund is 
aimed at covering the budgetary expenses such as debt servicing, social commitments in 
case the oil prices fall below the $ 20 threshold. Thus a portion of revenues from export 
duties and severance taxes on oil were to be transferred into this fund when the oil prices 
were above the base price of $20 (“Pravitel’ stvo,” 2004). 
 Resources from this fund were to be used for financing of deficits in state budget, 
pension fund and repayment of foreign debts. The government also aimed at dampening 
of inflationary pressure and limiting the real terms appreciation of the ruble. (Tabata, 
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2006).Since its establishment, the money stock in the stabilisation fund reached from 
$18.9 billion in 2004 to $89.1 billion in 2006 and 157 billion in early 2008.30    
 There were also good developments on the debt servicing front as debt 
repayment from budget surpluses and ruble appreciation have led to sharp falls in the 
ratio of debt service to GDP. Federal interest expenditures fell from 3.4% of the GDP in 
1999 to around 1% in 2005 (World Bank, 2007). 
 In view of the booming exports, both in volumes and increasing prices, the 
current account surplus also increased consistently from $ 34 billion in 2000 to $ 95 
billion in 2006. The current account surplus was, however, not driven by high oil and 
commodity prices alone. Export volumes increased by roughly 50% during 2000-2006 
and this increase was overwhelmingly driven by the oil sector which increased exports 
by more than 80% (Ahrend, 2006b).  
 All these considerations lead to the conclusion that to sustain this positive 
economic picture, Russia has to continue the robust growth in exports. It seems that such 
a growth is not possible without the strategic contribution of natural resources which is 
already providing around 60% of the total Russian exports. Up to 2007, other than oil, 
major export sectors contributed little to overall export growth. Their export volumes 
and terms of trade did not catch up with that of the oil sector. Natural gas exports were 
stagnant but benefited from the increasing prices. Even if Russia managed sharply to 
increase exports of more sophisticated manufactures, their contribution to total export 
                                                        
30 Official Price Stabilisation Fund Statistics are available on the following official web site: 
http://www1.minfin.ru/en/stabfund/statistics/aggregate/ accessed on 28.04.2008 
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growth would remain modest for some years to come, given their small share in the 
overall exports. 
 The share of oil and gas exports in the total exports and their ratio to the GDP is 
shown in the table below: 
 
Table 29 
Statistics on Hydrocarbon Exports 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Oil and gas 
exports in 
billion $  
 
 
27.9 
 
 
31 
 
 
52.8 
 
 
52.1 
 
 
56.3 
 
 
56.3 
 
 
100 
 
 
148.8 
 
 
191.7 
Share of total 
exports 
 
32.3 
 
36.6 
 
 
46.1 
 
 
46.1 
 
 
46.4 
 
49.2 
 
54.7 
 
61.1 
 
63.3 
Ratio to GDP   
10.4 
 
15.8 
 
20.3 
 
17 
 
16.3 
 
17.1 
 
18 
 
18.3 
 
19 
Average Price 
of Ural Crude 
 
10.9 
 
14 
 
18 
 
20.9  
 
21 
 
23.9 
 
34.1 
 
45.2 
 
56.2 
Note. From The World Bank Assessment of the Russian Economy, 1997. 
 
Some certain segments of the manufacturing sector that serves the domestic 
demand and those which face with limited competition from imports may continue to 
thrive in Russia’s booming domestic market. However, the strong export growth brings 
in another inevitable result that is the real appreciation of the ruble. The strong ruble 
becomes a hunchback on the tradable sectors of the economy as long as the efficiency in 
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productivity is not increased. The ruble also drives up unit labor costs, hindering 
competitiveness (Berezinskaia, 2008). 
 As argued by many analysts, countries with the stronger manufacturing 
performance also display higher number of export discoveries and export sophistication. 
In Russia, the inevitable focus on low-sophistication export products, has led to 
stagnation in economic diversification and export sophistication. Oil and natural gas are 
goods that require inputs that have few alternative uses to develop new products. 
 Therefore, vigorous export growth in the short to medium term will probably not 
be possible without further increases in mineral and especially hydrocarbon exports. 
However, due to lack of investment, no major new production facilities have been 
brought on line in the capital intensive oil and gas and metal industries. So growth of 
export volumes may slow down in the near future (Gavrilenkov, 2006).  
 Avoiding such a situation depends on developing prudent policy choices. 
Pipeline infrastructure needs to expand to support the growth of exports. Long term gas 
deals needs to be signed and necessary investments for field development need to be 
made. Fiscal and regulatory policies should encourage development of new fields by 
providing incentives to engage in substantial up front investments (Ahrend, 2006b).  
 Lastly, although Russia experienced various benefits from the revival in the oil 
and gas industry, the resource based economy may complicate the future economic 
development in various other ways. First of all, resource oriented exports leads to more 
corruption. The economic development, if not supported by a clear regulatory and 
institutional framework, may be distorted in favor of rent seeking (da Cunha Leite & 
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Weidmann, 1999). Also resource domination in the economy results in greater inequality 
of incomes. Moreover, the allocation of talent in natural resource economies is biased in 
favor of the resource sector. The best human resources and entrepreneur skills tend to be 
attracted by the opportunities in the sector (Gurvich, 2005). The Russian government 
should establish the conditions for a competitive market environment and sufficient 
incentives exist in other sectors of the economy. Increasing taxes on the resource sector 
can be used to lower the tax levels in other sectors to foster development and provide 
growth stimulus (Ahrend, 2006b).  
 
5.6. Re-nationalization of the Oil and Gas Sector 
 
5.6.1 Who owns the sector: the Tsar or the Boyars? 
The weakness of the state was a key characteristic of Russia in the 1990s. In this 
period, the state was unable to resist the pressure of various interest groups, to ensure 
proper tax collection, or provide business with a standard set of services for the 
protection of property and contractual rights. The oligarchs, who took over the most 
precious assets of the Russian nation in rigged deals, commanded considerable wealth 
and dominated the state apparatus. By the end of 1990s, the combined wealth of the 
largest financial industrial groups in Russia was around 40% of the Russian GDP. Most 
of the prominent media institutions were owned by these financial groups. Oligarchs 
enjoyed a weak and malleable state in which served their interests (Hoffman, 2003). 
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 The relations between the oligarchs and the state in Russia was characterised by 
the so-called piratisation of the state or state capture (Hellman, Jones & Kaufman, 
2000). Thus, the term state capture [zakhvat gosudarstva], capitalism for chosen ones 
[kapitalizm dlia izbrannyкh] (“Kapitalizm dlia,” 2006) or courtiers [pridvornye] 
(“Pridvornye,” 2004) became a synonym for the Russian economy. The elements of 
state capture were particularly visible in the privatisation schemes,31 the extension of 
arbitrary credits from the Central Bank, the selective subsidies to industries, the 
servicing of state budget accounts at commercial banks, the preferential access to foreign 
exchange transactions and the purchase of government bonds and the allocation of oil 
export quotas and provision of preferential import tariffs (Wolosky, 2000).  
 Business performance in particularly banking and finance, export transactions 
and heavy industry depended on decisions of the federal government. In other words, an 
oligarch’s success was a derivative of his connections to the government officials as well 
as on his ability to out manoeuvre or intimidate rivals. Consequently, the above-
mentioned factors provided strong incentives for corruption, bribery and violence 
(Kryshtanovskava, 2002). 
 When it came to dealing with the oligarchs, the government was generally unable 
to exercise much control. Since the state was very weak, the oligarchs paid little or no 
taxes on their purchases. They manipulated business deals, used their media to set the 
political agenda and were particularly emboldened after taking part an important role in 
re-election of Yeltsin (Frye, 2002).  
                                                        
31 The term referring for the privatisation schemes was ‘privatisation of state’ or ‘privatised state’ 
[privatizirovannoe gosudarstvo]. 
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 With the start of the Putin’s presidency, the relations between business and state 
made a shift from the state capture model to the model of informal submission of private 
businesses to state interests, which can be labelled as business capture by the state 
(Yakovlev, 2006). One of the primary reasons for such a move was Putin’s distaste with 
the oligarchs. He did not believe that the oligarchs were acting in tandem with the state’s 
policies and society’s interests. As it is apparent in his own writings, Putin was 
convinced that Russia’s economic recovery and re-emergence as great power rested on 
its ability and effectiveness to exploit the country’s resource wealth. Due to this reason, 
he considered the ceding of control in the oil and gas sector to private hands as a costly 
mistake, which needed to be reversed. Moreover, the existence of the concept of 
oligarchs was against the whole government rationale of Putin: the strong state (Balzer, 
2006).   
 In fact, one of Putin’s other convictions, as opposed to early reformers such as 
Chubais or Gaidar, was that he did not trust the market mechanism in bringing the best 
outcome for the society. Taxation in addition to regulation was not sufficient to secure 
an acceptable outcome for the nation. Taxation and regulation were only the tools of 
state management in natural resource use (Balzer, 2006). 
 According to Putin, the state should provide the regulatory framework to 
establish legal and financial guarantees to facilitate investment. Even the role of the state 
control can go one step further to reach a rational combination of public and market 
means which necessitated creation of an efficient system of state bodies that are 
responsible for stimulating innovation and investment. For Putin, state was the overseer 
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of the strategy in the oil and gas sector. This implied that the state had to have sufficient 
leverage in the sectors to shape the development agenda (Olcott, 2004).  
 Putin was also aware of the insufficient capital basis for further development of 
the oil industry. He was an advocate of foreign investment and creation of vertically 
integrated financial industrial groups. However, in his version, the state also had a 
special role to play. In return for state support, the FIGs had to provide Russia with a 
steady source of mineral resources and products, increase efficiency of exploration, 
expand the export potential and help in diversification of the economy by investing in 
manufacturing (Olcott, 2004).  
 Just after assuming the presidency, in an interview, Putin described himself as a 
supporter of ‘managed democracy’, a system controlled by the top elites to ensure that 
the best interests of the society are not jeopardised by the other dominant factors. He 
explained that this system of governance is in line with the historical development of the 
Russian society; therefore strengthening of the Russian state was on the top of his 
priority list. According to one definition, managed democracies involve democratic 
connotations and tolerate, to varying degrees, political rights and organized political 
opposition. However, those in control of the state can make calibrations to the 
governance system. This gives the governing elites an exemption in selective uses of the 
law to ensure the continuity of their tenure (Mandel, 2005). 
 As an upstart president, Putin understood very well that the oligarchs, who 
survived the 1998 financial melt down, were an extremely powerful interest group. 
These were the men who designed and implemented the loans for shares scheme. They 
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were the group who got Yeltsin re-elected via massive financial and media support. In 
2000, the economic power of Russia’s twenty five richest men far outstripped that of the 
Russian budget (Rutland, 2001). Initially Putin tried to keep the oligarchs at an arms 
length. He formalised the relationship with the oligarchs in a platform of the Russian 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs to serve as an advisory group to the presidency 
(Shevtsova, 2005).  
 In reaction to Putin’s reserved attitude, the oligarchs tried to secure and 
legitimise theirinfluence through participating in the regional or Duma elections. Some 
of the oligarchs, such as Yukos vice-president Boris Zolotorev or Sibneft chairman 
Roman Abramovich, were elected as governors of distant Russian provinces, Evenkia 
and Chukhotka respectively. Khodorovsky generously extended donations to many 
parties in the Duma, including the Communists (“Khodorkovskii gotov,” 2003). The 
influence of the oligarchs was particularly visible on the foreign investment, trade, and 
taxation legislation. Oligarchs were keen to alter the taxation legislation to allow for 
making tax declarations in the regions where their assets were located (“Yabloko,” 
2003).  
 Putin was aware that his ambition to dominate the oil and gas sector could not be 
attained without a fully pliant parliament. For this reason, the parliamentary elections in 
2003 were crucial for Putin’s plans. In the parliamentary elections of December 2003, 
the parties that were supported by Putin won a re-sounding victory. This, in effect also 
meant that Putin was certainly running for a second term in the office (Shevtsova, 2005).  
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 Putin was re-elected in March 2004 with 71% of the vote. Such a high 
endorsement of his presidency, gave him a free hand to shape Russia’s future economic 
and political system. The role of the state in the Russian energy sector and the general 
philosophy of the Russian energy policy changed dramatically after the beginning of the 
second presidential term. After re-election, it became clear that Putin had his own 
economic agenda, quite different from his first term, which would be implemented 
directly from Kremlin (Goldman, 2005). 
 During re-allocation of his government, Putin gave precedence to the prominent 
figures from the energy industry. The former deputy Prime Minister Victor Khristenko 
was appointed to lead the industry and energy ministry. The former governor of Perm 
region Yuri Trutnev was appointed as the Minister of Natural resources. The former 
vice-president of the Rosneft Sergey Oganessyan was appointed as the head of the 
Federal Energy Agency (Kotov, 2003).  
 Also several oil business representatives were elected in the Duma in December 
2003. Among them were the TNK vice president Vyacheslav Timschenko, TNK 
representative Alexander Shilbalkin, Alfa group manager Konstantin Vetrov, Yukos 
chair Sergei Muravlenko, Lukoil representatives Lyudmila Maltseva and Valery 
Prozorovsky, and Sibneft representatives Sergei Kaprlov and Liliana Pepelyaeva.  
 As Putin gained better control of the levers of power, Russia’s policy towards the 
oligarchs changed. Khodorovsky’s arrest signalled a dramatic shift in how Russia 
intended to do business in the energy sector. After the March 2004 elections, it was clear 
that the Yukos affair was not an aberration but rather the first step of a calculated plan 
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and part of a vision for the future development of the Russian oil and gas sector (Weir, 
2007). As was duly stated by a Russian journalist, the Khodorkovsky trial culminates the 
era of liberalism and started the era of dirigisme (“Gosplany na buduschee,” 2004). 
The actions summarised in the following table give an indication that the 
strategic decision making capability was transferred to the Russian state in both the oil 
and gas sector (Milov, 2005). 
 
Table 30 
Hydrocardbon Assets Transferred to State Control 
Year Oil  Gas  
 
2004  
 
 
State-owned Rosneft acquired 
assets of Yukos, Russia’s 
largest private oil firm until it 
collapsed after 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest.  
 
 
Russia cancelled ExxonMobil’s 
rights to develop Sakhalin Ill, a gas 
field in the Sakhalin Islands.  
 
2005 
 
State-owned oil and gas firm 
Gazprom acquired controlling 
stake (75%) in Sibneft for $13 
billion. Sibneft was a last 
minute insertion to the loans 
for shares deals on the 
insistence of influential 
oligarch Boris Berezovsky. The 
company was taken over by 
Roman Abramovich after 
Berezovsky feld the country in 
early 2000s. Both have been 
criticised for poor management 
of their resources. There is no 
synergy whatsoever as Sibneft 
produces negligible amounts of 
gas and the Sibneft little oil.  
 
Gazprom obtained exclusive rights 
to export natural gas. The state 
overtook controlling stake in 
Gazprom. 
 
2006  The government cancelled 
Paris-based oil company Total 
SA’s license to extract oil in 
Gazprom acquired controlling stake 
in the $22 billion Sakhalin II project 
from Royal Dutch Shell. 
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the Arctic.  
 
Russia refused to ratify the 
European Union energy charter 
since it requires third-party 
access to pipelines. 
 
2007 A Moscow court gave Kremlin 
control of six oil companies, 
including Bashneft, Russia’s 
10th-largest oil producer. 
TNK-BP, a BP joint venture, agreed 
to sell its 62.8 percent stake in the 
Kovyta gas field in Siberia to 
Gazprom after authorities 
threatened to revoke its license. 
 
The re-nationalisation of the Yukos was a significant sign that the Russian state was 
willing to take back the commanding heights of the oil and gas industry. The effort was 
accompanied by parallel moves to gain the controlling share in Gazprom and to create a 
Russian national oil company, Rosneft. Under Putin, the Russian state used its internal 
power to change the balance in its favor. Putin considered these changes as necessary to 
increase the external influence of the Russian state.  
 
 
5.6.2. Yukos Affair  
 On July 9, 2003 the Prosecutor General’s Office began an audit of Yukos upon a 
formal request from Mikhail Bugera, one of the Duma deputies. Bugera in his request 
raised charges against the Yukos for tax evasion in relation to the privatisations that took 
place in 1996.32 Following the financial inspection Yukos’ CEO Mikhail Khodorovsky, 
who was found guilty of violating seven articles of the Russian Federation Criminal 
                                                        
32 For the excerpts from Bugera’s interpellation, see “Prokuratura provodit proverku uplaty nalogov 
‘YUKOSom’,” Gazeta.Ru (09 July 2003). Available from 
http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/07/09/last91681.shtml. Accessed 12 May 2008. 
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Code, was arrested on October 25, 2003. The charges were: personal income tax 
evasion, overseeing corporate tax evasion, non-compliance with a court of judgment, 
falsifying documents, and theft.33  
 The arrest, as many commentators observed, was a showdown with one of the 
most prominent oligarchs to deliver a strong message to the others in the business. 
Formally the arrest was linked to the 1996 loans for shares privatisations during which 
Menatep acquired the fertiliser company Apatit for $ 225,000 and pledged to invest $ 
283 million within one year. The investment did not take place. Prosecutors further 
charged that Yukos defrauded the other shareholders in Apatit via transfer pricing 
operations34 directed by Yukos’ off-shore shell companies. There were also other 
reasons behind the arrest (Grace, 2005).  
 Khodorovsky made powerful enemies35 during the August 1998 financial crisis 
when Menatep Bank re-organised its holdings. After the re-organisation, Menatep Bank 
manipulated its debt obligations by diverting the assets of the bank to a St Petersburg 
branch but leaving all debt obligations in a bankrupt holding. This left many account 
holders literally bankrupt. Also he made other enemies during the taking over the 
                                                        
33 For details of the indictment, see“Mikhaila Khodorkovskogo rassledovali.” Kommersant, 15 May 2004. 
34 Transfer pricing is a way of transferring profits from the producing subsidiaries to a off-shore located 
trading company via selling at cheap prices. The trading company is also owned by the same holding and 
usually only exists on paper. The trading company then re-exports the same product to global markets at a 
higher price and avoids any tax obligations. This situation consistently led to an underestimation of oil’s 
share in the Russian GDP.   
35 One of them was “Rosneft’,” whose head, Sergei Bogdanchikov, sent an appeal to the General 
Prosecutor accusing YUKOS of stealing 19% of the “Yeniseineftegaz.” See “‘Rosneft’ podarila 
Genprokuratore kompromat na YUKOS,” Lenta.Ru (08 July 2003). Available from 
http://lenta.ru/russia/2003/07/08/rosneft/ . Accessed 22 March 2008. 
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management of the Yukos when majority of the investors sold their shares pre-maturely 
(“Bank Menatep,” 1999). 
 Furthermore, the international investors who were in partnership with Yukos in 
various projects regularly found out that they had acquired worthless pieces of paper, 
due to transfer pricing by the Yukos holding company. Kenneth Dart, a well known 
American investment fund, who had invested significant amounts in two oil producing 
subsidiaries – Yuganskneftegas and Samaraneftegas – of Yukos had to write off an 
estimated $1 billion as a consequence of transfer pricing schemes. The oil company then 
known as Amoco (and later as BP-Amoco) had a similar experience. Both put money 
into an oil-producing subsidiary that Yukos seized and stripped of its assets (Goldman, 
2004).  
 In contrast to his bad reputation, after consolidating his ownership in the 
company, Khodorkovsky made a new start in 1999 and reformed the company 
management. Yukos hired Western accounting firms to support the re-structuring effort 
and acknowledged a transparent stockholder structure. It began to pay back wages to its 
employees and published an adequate tax statement. Also the Yukos’ board of directors 
was re-organised, bringing in several well-respected Western investors, lawyers, and 
businessmen, including the former British foreign Minister David Owen (“TNK nachala 
okhotu za golovami,” 2002). 
 These changes did not go unnoticed. The interest in Yukos shares grew which 
also increased Khodorkovsky’s self-confidence. Eager to expand its business activities, 
he announced plans to build a new pipeline: one to the Arctic port of Murmansk a base 
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for exports to the United States, another through Siberia towards the Asian markets 
(Skorniakova, 2003). 
 
Map: Russian Oil Export Pipelines  
 
Figure 23. Map of Russian oil export pipelines. (International Energy Agency, 2004). 
 
Murmansk is an area where the Gulf stream ends. It is a non-freezing deep-water 
area (unlike Baltic oil export port Primorsk), allowing large tankers all-year round, 
which ensures worldwide economically viable exports. However, Russian authorities, in 
particular Transneft, opposed and blocked this economically promising private project, 
claiming that all pipelines in Russia must belong to the state (Milov, 2005). 
 Another similarly economic project proposal was in the Russian Far East. The 
Russian resources situated in East Siberia are closer to Far East than Europe.  
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Map: Far East Pipelines 
 
Figure 24. Map of proposed Far East pipeline. (International Energy Agency, 2004). 
 
Both China and Japan had negotiated with Russia on the prospects of imports 
from these massive fields. China proposed the construction of a pipeline from Angarsk 
on the edge of Lake Baikal to its refining facility in Daqing, which is serving the 
industrial regions of North East China. Japan, as an alternative, proposed a pipeline 
stretching from the Baikal region across Eastern Siberia to an export terminal at the 
Russian province of Nakhodka on the Pacific Coast. Both China and Japan were willing 
to finance their preferred pipeline options (Hill, 2004). 
 The Russian energy establishment wanted to avoid the Chinese proposal as it 
would give China the status of a monopoly consumer. A route to the Pacific was more 
palatable for Russia as it would serve Japan and other markets at the same time. Yet, 
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Yukos favored a pipeline to China and openly started negotiations with the Chinese 
government for the construction of the pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing (Blagov, 2005). 
 Although both proposals already were a direct challenge to the Transneft, 
Khodorkovsky announced that he was prepared to build his own pipelines, if required 
(Helmer, 2005). Putin interpreted Khodorovsky’s move to construct private pipelines as 
a direct interference in the foreign policy. Also such a move effectively broke the 
monopoly of the state dominated export pipeline system, for gas as well as oil (“Rossiia 
otkroet,” 2006). 
 Then Khodorkovsky announced a pending merger between Yukos and Sibneft 
and began to negotiate with both ExxonMobil and Chevron-Texaco to sell a substantial 
share of Yukos (Susan, White & Raghavan, 2003). After this point, Kremlin grew truly 
alarmed in fear of loosing one of Russia’s most strategic and valuable energy companies 
to a giant Western corporation. It was one thing for the foreign companies to be minority 
investors, but quite another for them to buy operational control, especially when some of 
their payments to the oligarchs were being diverted abroad (Black, 2003). 
 Also Putin foresaw that the merger of Sibneft and Yukos as well as the sale of 
45% of Yukos shares to ExxonMobil was disturbing his plans for a heightened role for 
the state in the oil sector. If the sale went through, the emerging oil giant was to have a 
strong stake in the future shape of the Russian oil industry (Arvelund, 2003).  
 Still, it seems that it was less Khodorkovsky’s financial deals than his 
interference in political matters that pushed Putin into action. Khodorkovsky was 
reported to have offered Russia’s two liberal parties, Yabloko and SPS (the Party of 
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Right Forces), $100 million to unite and campaign together in opposition to Putin and 
his United Russia Party in 2003 parliamentary elections. And he broadly hinted that he 
would run for presidency in 2008, when Putin’s term is due to expire (Goldman, 2004). 
 In the spring of 2004, the Russian Ministry of Taxation (MNS) officials 
presented a tax audit report of Menatep for 2000 in which they identified the amount of 
unpaid taxes at more than 99 billion rubles ($3.4 billion). In July 2004, MNS brought 
new tax claims against Yukos for 2001 amounting to 90 billion rubles ($3 billion). Then 
in September same year, MNS demanded that Yukos repay tax arrears for 2002 
amounting to 79.5 billion rubles ($2.65 billion). In November, the situation for Yukos 
got worse as MNS claimed additional taxes of 193 billion rubles ($ 6.4 billion) for 2002, 
while Yuganskneftegaz was presented with claims for non-payment of taxes for 2001 
and 2002 amounting to 67.5 billion ($ 2.25 billion) and 29.6 billion rubles ($ 1 billion) 
respectively (Butrin, 2004). All in all, the claims against Yukos reached to a level of $ 
19 billion in 2003. 
 In July 2004, the court marshals announced that to be able to off-set the tax 
arrears from the company they were preparing to sell Yukos’ key production unit, 
Yuganskneftegaz, which produced 62 percent of total output. In 2004, Yuganskneftegaz, 
was sold off for $ 9.4 billion, a price that was lower than its value as estimated by 
experts. Through an opaque financial transaction, the unit ended up in the hands of state-
owned Rosneft, which was the country’s second-largest oil company. With the 
acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz, Rosneft’s production leapt from about one million 
barrel per day of oil to more than 1.5 million (Tompson, 2005). 
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 In taking forceful action against Yukos, Putin was merely employing the only 
really effective tool at his disposal: a state characterised by weak regulatory and rule 
enforcement capabilities but enjoying a capacity for ‘managing’ the democracy (Grace, 
2005). 
 This suggests that the roots of the problem lie, in the final analysis, in Russia’s 
institutional weaknesses. Weak institutions prompt rulers to opt for pragmatic, if sub-
optimal, solutions. In Yukos case the state depended on direct control and coercion 
rather than contract, regulation, and taxation. It became apparent that Russia still lacks 
basic institutions and framework conditions for the market economy.  
 After Yukos affair, restoration of the state control over energy industries, instead 
of the deregulation agenda, became the heart of new policy agenda. The net result of 
these sector related developments was deterioration in the Russian business climate.  
5.6.3. Taking Back Gazprom 
 Under Yeltsin, following the privatisations, the state owned 38.37 percent of the 
Gazprom stock. While this made the state the largest stockholder, it did not give a 
controlling stake. Gazprom remained more or less autonomous, widely referred as a 
state within the state. Rem Vyakhirev, CEO of Gazprom (1993-2001), kept the company 
immune from public scrutiny. The government seats at the Gazprom board were not 
functional or influential to have any say on the course of developments. Gazprom not 
only failed to pay much in the way of dividends to its owners (including the state) but 
also paid little if any of the taxes it owed (Goldman, 2007). Even in the official reports 
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of the Russian Ministry of Taxation, Gazprom was mentioned as the major responsible 
for the tax deficit (“MNS sorvalo pravitel’stvennoe zadanie,” 2002).  
 Privatisation of the gas sector effectively prevented the state from maintaining an 
effective control. Successive attempts at asserting the government’s control over 
Gazprom’s internal operations, increasing tax revenues, and imposing open access to the 
domestic gas pipeline system were countered by the Gazprom management. Yet, 
Gazprom’s dominant market position did not stop the Russian government from 
regulating the wholesale and retail gas prices (Stulberg, 2007).  
 Under Vyakhirev’s management, Gazprom was accused of many irregularities. 
Among them were selling gas at below-market prices to favored companies, diluting its 
stakes in valuable subsidiaries, and transfer pricing schemes. For instance, one outfit, 
called Itera, bought gas from Gazprom and Turkmenistan, resold it on the market to 
Ukraine and other former Soviet states and acted as a sort of guarantor that Gazprom 
would be paid by indebted former Soviet states. Hermitage, a Western shareholder in 
Gazprom, estimated that over a seven-year period, beginning in 1996, Gazprom gave 
away half the revenue from gas markets in those former states to Itera, at a loss of $7 
billion (“Gassing away at Gazprom,” 2000). 
 Gazprom’s domestic operations were a loss since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The largest domestic consumers were charged around 3% of the export price. It 
was able to collect only 40% of the domestic sales in cash. Bulk of the profits of the 
company was from delivering lower volumes of exports to hard currency markets, in 
particular Europe.  
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 Putin was aware of the situation in Gazprom. He was particularly concerned 
about the huge sums disappearing in company’s accounts as well as the unexploited 
potential. He was also acutely aware that without maintaining an effective control in the 
Gazprom, it was impossible to realise his strategy for the energy sector. With these on 
his mind he did not take any action but patiently waited for the expiry of Gazprom’s 
contract with Vyakhirev in May 2001 (Belton & Starobin, 2000). 
 On the May 30, Putin paid a visit to Gazprom headquarters just before the voting 
to elect the new CEO had taken place. It was a short and concise meeting of around six 
minutes in which Putin told the Gazprom board that he was instructing the five 
government-nominated directors to vote for Alexei Miller, a junior energy minister from 
St Petersburg. He suggested that the other six board members followed suit. In view of 
Putin’s presidential performance in defeating opponents in the last 12 months, the board 
members did as they were advised. Alexei Miller became the new boss of the world’s 
most important gas company (“Gasprom boss fired,” 2001).  
 Miller, who had worked with Putin in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office, served 
as a port director, run a small pipeline company and was serving as the deputy energy 
minister. Miller’s appointment was a management take over which brought Gazprom 
under state control with direct links to Putin. It was a change to make Gazprom an 
instrument of government policy (Tavernise, 2001b).   
 It took Aleksei Miller a few years to establish an effective control over the 
company. He purged senior management of his predecessor Rem Vyakhirev’s 
associates. He changed almost all of the high and medium management. Very much in 
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similar fashion with Putin, Miller’s new appointments was people whom he trusted from 
his previous experience. Although the state was dominating the Gazprom management 
decisions, Miller was at the mercy of his board when it came to strategic investment 
decisions (Tavernise, 2001a).  
 In September 2004, the Gazprom board announced that Gazprom was planning 
to merge assets with Rosneft, providing the Russian government a majority stake in the 
new gas and oil and gas mega-giant. By gaining a majority stake in Gazprom and adding 
state oil firm Rosneft along with prime Yukos subsidiary Yuganskneftegaz, the Russian 
state was intending to create the largest energy company in the world. These acquisitions 
would have allowed it to project influence not only within Russia, but far beyond 
Russia’s borders. 
 However, the attempts at the merger were abandoned in May 2005. According to 
some analysts, this was due to the disagreement between the two power bases in 
Kremlin which are operating via the Gazprom and the Rosneft. The Rosneft headed by 
Sergei Bogdanchikov and Igor Sechin could not come to terms with the fact that their 
power base was to be swallowed by Gazprom that was run by Alexei Miller and Dmitry 
Medvedev. The official reason for the break of the merger was stated as the on-going 
legal uncertainty over the take-over of Yuganskneftegas by Rosneftegas from Yukos 
(Bush, 2005). 
 Gazprom merger with Rosneft did not proceed. Instead a special state owned 
holding company, Rosneftegas, was established which owned 100 percent of Rosneft as 
its main asset. The holding company sold debt in the financial markets and used that 
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money to buy the Gazprom treasury shares for cash. The holding company then sold a 
percentage of Rosneft through an initial public offering and used the money to pay down 
the initial debt. Finally, the holding company, fully owned by the state, held 10.7 percent 
of Gazprom as well as the remaining piece of Rosneft. In this way, the state became the 
direct owner of a controlling stake in Gazprom and a controlling stake in Rosneft 
(“Russian Government Prepares,” 2005). 
 In 2005, the Russian government increased its former minority stake to a 
controlling 51%, and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev, a top Kremlin aide and 
potential Putin successor, was appointed as the company’s chairman. It remained unclear 
whether the Russian government has completely abandoned its plan to create a national 
energy company - a mega corporation to be overseen by the Kremlin.  
5.6.4. Rosneft – An Emerging Oil Giant  
 As explained in the previous chapter, Rosneft was established in 1993 as a 
unitary enterprise on the basis of assets previously held by Rosneftegaz, the successor to 
the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Oil and Gas. During the early 1990s almost all Russian 
local oil companies and refineries were extracted from Rosneft to form ten integrated 
companies (later their number was halved as a result of acquisitions). In late 1995, with 
the decree no. 971, Rosneft was transformed into an open joint stock company. In 
October 1998, the Sergey Bogdanchikov was appointed as the president of the company. 
The company had only two obsolete refineries and several low-productive and poorly 
managed oil-producing assets. The government attempted to privatise the company 
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several times but due to the 1998 crisis the most important try had to be postponed 
“Pravitel’stvo ne rasstanetsia,” 1998).  
 In December 2004, Rosneft acquired Yuganskneftegaz in a controversial auction 
that was organised by the government. Yuganskneftegaz was the subsidiary of Yukos 
which drove the company’s exceptional rise in the late 1990s. Its operations are 
concentrated on the south bank of Ob River. Organised as a production association 
during Soviet times, it fell from grace after production halved in its first generation 
anchor field, Mamontovskoye. Yukos introduced most of the modern drilling techniques 
to recover the production in Yuganskneftegaz. The subsidiary rose to importance on the 
shoulders of another oil field, Priobskoye. After its low of 526,000 b/d in 1997, the 
Yugansneftegas’ production raised to 995,000 b/d in 2003, just before the prosecutors 
started their financial audit. It was the largest field in Russia in terms of production 
(Grace, 2005).  
 The take over of Russia’s most promising fields by Rosneft catapulted what has 
been a small state company into a global player, controlling some 20% of Russia’s oil 
production. It also complicated plans by Gazprom to merge with Rosneft as after the 
auction, Yukos shareholders threatened to sue Rosneft and anyone who helped it pay for 
Yuganskneftegas (“Russia’s Rosneft aiming,” 2007). 
 The addition of Yuganskneftegas made Rosneft Russia’s second-largest producer 
of oil by 2005, with an average output of 1.69 million bpd. Rosneft then pursued a very 
aggressive policy aimed at boosting its clout in Eastern Siberia. In November 2005, 
Rosneft acquired a 25.94% share in Verkhnechonskneftegaz for $80 million. The 
 252
company had estimated reserves of 200 million tons of crude and nearly 100 billion 
cubic meters of gas. In addition, in December 2005, Rosneft paid $260 million for a 
license to develop the East Sugdin oil and gas field, with reserves of around 200 million 
tons of oil and more than 40 billion cubic meters of gas. This aggressive expansion was 
desperately in need of finances (Blagov, 2008). 
 In July 2006, Rosneft conducted one of the largest initial public offerings (IPO) 
in financial history. It placed nearly 15% of its shares on the Moscow and London Stock 
Exchange. The offering raised $10.7 billion for the company mainly through bi-lateral 
deals with strategic investors like BP, CNPC and Petronas. Rosneft. Rosneft shares were 
priced at $7.55 valuing the company at $79.8 billion. In the London IPO three oligarchs, 
Roman Abramovich, Vladimir Lisin and Oleg Deripaska, also invested over $1 billion 
each. Yukos objected the IPO and protested at the British Financial Services Authority 
claiming that allowing the Rosneft IPO was tantamount to facilitating the sale of stolen 
goods (Sultan, 2006). 
In May 2007, Rosneft placed a winning $6.8 billion bid at an auction for the 
Siberian assets of Yukos, including Tomskneft, the East Siberian Oil and Gas Company 
(VSNK), and other units. Most of these assets are based in Eastern Siberia. Then, in June 
2007, Rosneft in another sell out paid $731 million to take over Yukos’ transportation 
assets. These last acquisitions allowed Rosneft to overtake privately owned Lukoil in 
terms of oil production capacity and become Russia’s largest oil company. Rosneft’s 
official target became extracting 140 million tonnes of oil by 2012 and to become a 
global top three energy company (“Russia: Rosneft Debuts,” 2006). 
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Starting with Putin’s presidency the role of oil and gas sources in the Russian 
policy construction increased to a considerable extent. The two major reasons behind 
were the change in leadership’s agenda and the increasing profile of energy resources 
globally. Putin believed in strong state and perceived the oil and gas resources as the 
primary driver of Russian strength. Supported by Putin, by the governing elite in 
Kremlin recuperated the strategic ranks in the energy sector. The oligarchs were 
suppressed. The key assets of the industry were nationalised. The lobby around the oil 
and gas sector became the most influential force in deciding the successor to Putin. All 
these point to one fact: the oil and gas sector has become the agenda setter internally and 
one of the priority topics of Russia’s foreign policy.  
Since the Yeltsin era, there have been fundamental structural changes in the oil 
and gas sector in Russia. The prevailing chaos left its place to a clear regulatory 
framework backed by Putin’s authoritarian modus operandi. Since Putin’s inauguration, 
state control over the oil and gas sector has been gradually restored. Wealth and power 
are transferred not only the state but also to a new circle called ‘siloviki’. Putin 
appointed his most loyal personnel to commanding heights of the state controlled 
energyg corporations. By this way, at the end of Putin’s tenure, the Kremlin established 
strong formal and informal ties to nearly all of the major energy companies, Gazprom, 
Sibneft, Rosneft, Surgutneftegaz, Zarubezhneft, ROA UES and Lukoil. Only a few 
companies such as TNK-BP and what is left of Yukos remained at an arms length. It is 
visible that dominating power has shifted to Gazprom and Rosneft under the sponsorship 
of the Kremlin. (Larsson, 2006)  
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The state and company agendas increasingly converged in assuming Russian 
business interests both at home and abroad. The only concern for future remains that the 
tide towards state control may lead to inefficient market structures and a flee of investors 
from Russia in fear of losing money. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION:  
AN ASSESSMENT OF PAST AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE 
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS SECTOR 
 
 
 
This dissertation has analyzed the development of the oil and gas sector in Russia 
with a view to understanding the role of these assets in the formation of Russian state 
interests and consequent policy prioritization. Since their beginning in the Russian 
Empire, oil and later on gas resources have been important aspects of Russian economic 
and political development.  
Energy policy has been central to critical moments in the country’s history. The 
oil fields of Baku served as the battleground for domestic strife in 1905. Oil prices 
soared during World War I, and the Bolsheviks eventually harnessed Russia’s energy 
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resources to economically bolster their revolutionary agenda. In World War II, the 
country’s oil fields were critical frontlines in the clash between Nazi Germany and the 
USSR. While the production of gas and oil in Baku, the Volga-Ural region the West 
Siberia regions had long bolstered the Soviet economy, the slowdown in production and 
decreasing prices precipitated the country’s decline and eventual dissolution. The same 
situation caused socio-economic collapse during the Yeltsin period which was reversed 
almost over-night with surging international oil and gas prices.  
The study has also identified economic and political issues on which the 
influence of the oil and gas resources has been significant. Oil and gas have been a 
convenient source of hard currency for the Russian economy. They have helped Russia 
to produce surplus capital to be invested elsewhere. That specifically meant that the 
Soviet Union had a disproportionate international influence compared to what its 
planned economy could have created. Except the Empire period when grain and timber 
were the major export products, revenues from sale of oil and gas reserves provided the 
backbone to Russia’s economy. These revenues provided enough revenue for the state to 
seek otherwise-unattainable economic and political goals.  
The region’s vast energy resources, in no small part, allowed for the rapid rise of 
the Soviet Union in the early 20th century, provided enormous stimulus to the economy 
in subsequent years and subsidized the country’s domestic and foreign policy agendas 
for decades. It helped the Soviet Union to play a global role and create strategic 
dependencies all over the world. The Soviet economy, particularly towards the end of 
1970s came to depend heavily on oil and gas exports. However, as it did with many 
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other issues, the Soviet planning system could not maintain a rational framework for the 
sector’s development. The production of oil and gas became an end in itself, losing its 
ties with any economic rationality. Energy, even then owing much to German Ostpolitik 
and Mannesmann-built pipelines, in effect kept the system going, and when oil prices 
fell in the early and middle Eighties, it collapsed.  
The dissertation has also elaborated on the various links between Russian 
economic development and revenues from the oil and gas sector and the connections 
between Russian foreign policy and the oil and gas sector. Oil and gas production rates, 
high energy prices and strong revenue flow embolden Russia in its international 
engagements. Low prices and low production rates create strains in the Russian 
economic and political arena. This correlation can be observed in the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1970s and its eventual collapse in early 1990s. The 
1990s was a decade of turmoil for the Russian Federation during which it had to accept 
loss of political influence in Eastern Europe, CIS and the Caucasus. The recent uptide in 
oil and gas prices brought Russia a renewed economic weight and political influence in 
the very same regions.  
Though hydrocarbon policy often critically affected the Soviet Union’s foreign 
policy, it never constituted a foreign policy agenda in itself, perhaps explaining, in part, 
why analysis of these issues is often overlooked in studies of Russia’s foreign policy 
history. Preferential price schemes and subsidised deliveries were common strategies for 
managing political control, mitigating instability and maintaining the cohesion of the 
Soviet bloc during the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, oil and gas 
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diplomacy coloured Russian attempts to revitalize influence throughout the territory of 
the former Soviet Union. Today the policy around these vital resources has become a 
primary driver of Russian domestic and foreign agenda. 
Moreover, in the changing international system oil and gas diplomacy has 
become the least cost and most effective way of exerting Russian influence. In the post 
Cold War international relations, strategic manipulation, communication, persuasion and 
economic incentives became as important as military might or an outright threat in order 
to shape the outcome of international issues. The liberalization of national economies 
increased the number of actors and international organizations: in other words the post 
Cold War is more conducive to the efficacy of these means (Nye, 2005). 
Due to a variety of factors, the Russian oil industry has historically suffered from 
insufficient infrastructure and a lack of investment. This came in part from the 
Bolsheviks’ own understanding as to how foreign investors had managed things: as so 
many of the long-lasting commentators on Communism, beginning with George Orwell, 
have noticed, it became a parody of ‘capitalism’.  Gigantomania, demoralization of the 
work-force, ‘short-termism’ as regards investment, and dis- or misinformation reigned. 
As Vladimir Bukovsky says (1995) the economy ‘only grew by extending itself, 
consuming ever more of its resources.  It was quite incapable of deepening the use of 
these resources.  Thus in the 1960’s labour began to run short, as did arable land in the 
1970’s, and fuel, energy and petrol in the 1980’s, although they were all in nature 
abundant. The system turned out to be incapable even of pillaging its own natural 
reserves’ (Bukovzky, 1995, p. 466).  
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What has been the legacy of all those Five Year Plans? Despite poor long-term 
planning, Russia has often turned to the oil and gas industry as an effective means to 
bolster state power. The Soviets used the country’s abundant resources as a means to 
promote internal cohesion among regions as well as subsidize Eastern Europe in order to 
further Soviet geopolitical goals. The post-Soviet government has also turned to the oil 
and gas sector as a source of political strength. Russia’s hydrocarbon resources have 
served as the basis for its economic recovery, facilitated the country’s cultural 
renaissance and allowed Russia to reassert international political power.   
There was an extraordinary moment when ‘oligarchs’ seized control of this 
fabulous set of tools, and when Moscow’s rulers slavishly followed western precepts, 
expecting, rather in the manner of Dostoyevsky’s Kirillov (in Demons) that ‘The 
kingdom of heaven is at hand’; ‘Oh, when?’ ‘In June’.  The present thesis has examined 
the legacy of these years and the manner in which post-Soviet regimes have dealt with it 
– hectic privatization (of a sort) in the initial period, and re-nationalization (of a sort) in 
the later one, associated with Vladimir Putin. Foreign investment in both periods has 
been considerable, and even vast; it has created its own strains.  
There was a period of near-anarchy, but the foreign investors did return in 
considerable force, and this led to modernization of a serious order.  However, an old 
Russian problem then came up, that oligarchs and foreign investors ran out of control, 
and had to be brought under the state control all over again, by political methods. Yukos, 
Gazprom and Rosneft symbolize what has happened: is Russia now repeating, in less 
crude form, the blunderings of the old Five Year Plan days?   
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The straight reply would be: ‘No’. The study showed that the development of oil 
and gas sector went through different stages since its beginnings under the Russian 
Empire. And the state (in whatever iteration, whether monarchical, communist or post-
Soviet) has always played an important role in the development of energy resources. The 
private and foreign initiative has been equally important for the sector. Although the 
degree of presence changed over time, minimal during the Soviet times, there was a 
constant dependence on the imported technology, foreign capital and foreign field 
equipment. Moreover, under any regulatory framework, the state has been the dominant 
actor in directing and guiding the vision of development for the oil and gas sector. So, 
the Yeltsin years would be an exception to the rule rather than vice versa.  
 One thing is clear: energy is now politics. This does not necessarily involve 
blackmail, as Ukrainians loudly claimed when they did not pay their bills and had their 
supplies cut off.  It is not in Russia’s interest to impoverish its own clients. Historically, 
conservation, the balance of energy sources and providing capital for investment in 
energy production have been major topics in the development of Russia’s energy policy. 
These issues will continue to grow in importance in the future as Russia continues to 
assert its influence in a globalized world. Further, the current Russian government has 
recognized the historical efficacy of leveraging their energy resources as a means to 
affect foreign policy. Russia’s prominence relies on its ability to continue using its 
resources to assert its economic and political will, both domestically and internationally.  
Undoubtedly, future political leaders in Russia will continue to conflate energy 
policy with foreign policy to the country’s benefit. Undoubtedly, oil and gas will 
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continue to play an important role in Russia’s political development. Not only does 
revenue from the energy sector sustain Russia’s economic growth, which affects the 
country’s political outlook, but also now the energy lobby plays an instrumental role in 
influencing presidential succession. Indeed, energy policy will also affect a majority of 
Russia’s foreign dealings, from negotiating with its global neighbors to install 
international pipelines to supplying oil to the developing countries. 
Further, however, this study acknowledges recent developments in global politics 
and the field of international relations. Following the end of the Cold War, the world 
entered upon a new, unprecedented era of foreign relations, in which long-held 
analytical paradigms lost their explanatory power. No longer could scholars explain the 
international system through the lens of the bi-polar geopolitical struggle between nation 
states. The dissolution of the Soviet Union not only forced countries around the world to 
reconceptualize their role in a new globalized international system, but it also redefined 
basic concepts in international relations. Non-state actors threatened global security and 
challenged notions of sovereignty. As a result, national borders and the accumulation of 
arms no longer guarantee security. Further, power can no longer be defined primarily in 
terms of military might; rather, power in the new international system has dissolved into 
countless different political, economic, social and, yes, military facets.  
In this geopolitical landscape, understanding energy policy is paramount. Instead 
of explaining Russia’s role in the international landscape by citing its military stature or 
relative economic strength, scholars of international relations should consider the 
strategic implications of Russia’s evolving energy policy.  
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In this respect, one last perspective should be provided on the prospects of 
Russian oil and gas development. If Russia’s economic and political weight now 
depends on the magnitude and extent of its oil and gas resources there is another 
important question to pose: Where would Russia be without the inflow of these 
revenues? Would it return to the years of collapse if oil prices drop or production rates 
decline? As oil and gas resources are not infinite, when is Russian oil production 
expected to peak? Will Russia grow stronger or weaker in the coming years? 
From the late 1980s to the end of the1990s Russian oil production fell and 
natural gas production stagnated. Especially for oil production it seemed that peak level 
had been reached. During that period Russian oil production as a percent of global oil 
production decreased to a low of 8.5%. It has since rebounded to 12.7%. The figure 
below shows Russia’s historical place and prospects in the oil production.  
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Figure 25: Oil Production Rates and Countries  
 
It is not an easy task to estimate the remaining recoverable reserves of a country, 
especially with a country like Russia, where reliable data are hard to find. Production 
rates provide the most reliable data since the oil flow can easily be measured at the 
production plants. The behaviour of an oil field is difficult to predict and depends very 
much on the consideration of many different parameters such as the type of source rock, 
the rock’s permeability, field pressure etcetera. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to 
make an accurate estimation of how much oil is left in the field, how much more can be 
produced, and how future production will appear. Even with today’s most advanced 
technology it is impossible to know exactly how much an oil field holds. Usually, the 
original estimates from the field petroleum engineers tend to be exaggerated in order to 
encourage investments in the field.  
In spite of individual differences, most fields will have a rise, peak and decline 
phase. So by adding many field data together and by applying a model, a country’s 
production pattern can be estimated which will somewhat be similar to the normal 
distribution curve (Hubbert’s Peak) in chapter 1 (figure 1). However, that kind of 
modelling requires quite some knowledge which differs widely in every single field.  
The crux of the matter here is to know the level of oil (which is generally 
associated with gas) that is left in the Russian production fields. Only then a depletion 
coefficient rate can be applied in a time horizon which may help predict the date and 
quantity of the last barrel of oil in Russia. Of course, exports are another side of the 
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story. Exports from Russia, unless very efficient substitutes of hydrocarbons are 
discovered, will have to stop at some point in the future. Again forecasting such a date 
greatly depends on the re-structuring of the Russian domestic oil and gas usage. The 
dissertation has shown that conservation has become a top priority agenda item for the 
Russian governments since the late 1970s but progress in this area has been slow and 
without any significant results. Yet, as resources will grow scarcer and global demand 
increases, Russia is expected to adjust and optimise its domestic use of oil and gas 
sources by introducing stricter conservation measures, and using more alternative energy 
resources as well as renewable energy.  
A normal decline rate for a single giant oil field is somewhere around 6-16%  A 
country that consists of many fields of different sizes that are taken into production at 
different times has a much lower depletion rate.(Robelius, 2007) The figure below 
shows the example average depletion rates for different regions and countries. 
 
Average Depletion Rates 
 
Figure 26: Examples of Average Depletion Rates 
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Note: Mäkivierikko A. 2007. “Russian Oil a Depletion Rate Model estimate of the future 
Russian oil production and export”, Thesis submitted to the Uppsala University.  
 
The depletion rate of an oil field is dependent on the amount of oil that is left. The oil 
fields deplete at a much faster rate at their inception. The speed of depletion is in fact 
limited with the physical ability to extract resources. Gradually the depletion rate slows 
down. The table below shows the actual depletion status in the Russian major oil fields. 
The table can give the reader an idea that the depletion rate in Russia has already slowed 
down. However, with the discovery of new fields in Eastern Siberia and the Arctic off-
shore, the speed of depletion may incresae again, though the decline in Russian overall 
supply of oil will shift further in time.  
 
 
 
Figure 27: Depletion at Russia’s Largest Oil Production Fields  
Note: The table is taken from the IEA Web Site available on the: www.iea.doe.gov.tr 
accessed on 12.07.2008   
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A graphical representation of the Russian producing regions is provided below.  
 
Figure 28 
 
Graphical Representation of Production in Russian Oil Fields- 1949-2000 
 
 
Figure 28: Graphical Representation of Production in Russian Oil Fields  
Note: From Theodor F. “Russian Oil – Current Status and Outlook”,  IHS Presentation 
Available at http://energy.ihs.com/NR/rdonlyres/26C6F43E-29F7-4486-9B39-
B9A07C40AB6F/0/felder.pdf 
 
Additions to reserves, a better conservation policy and application of better 
technology are very likely to maintain oil production levels for a long time in Russia. 
The crucial question is for how long? Mäkivierikko (2007) contends that depending on 
the level of oil left in the producing fields Russia is expected to peak between 2006 and 
2036. He uses three resource base scenarios, 70-120-170 billion barrels, to apply a 
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depletion model. These 3 figures are based on common estimations of a wide range of 
petroleum companies working in Russia.  
Accordingly, as can be observed in the figure below, if Russian reserves are 
around 70 billion barrels then production can peak around 2011 at the latest. If the 
reserves are 120 billion barrels, then the peak production can be expected around 2016. 
In case of the most optimistic scenario of 170 billion barrels, the peak will occur in 
2020. Existence of 120 billion barrels reserve is the most likely. Although currently 
Russian proven reserves are given around 70 billion barrels, the new discoveries will 
certainly add on this potential while the better technology will keep production rates flat, 
largely non-responsive to the rising demand.    
In this case Mäkivierikko’s model predicts that Russia’s will have to stop its oil 
exports around 2040 to be able to meet its domestic demand. (Figure 29). However, 
Russia needs to consider the political implications of supplying more oil to meet global 
demand if alternatives to oil has not been developed and are economically in use. In 
other words, it might consider stopping exports earlier than 2040.   
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Figure 29 
 
The Russian Hubbert Curve   
 
 
Figure 29: The Russian Hubbert Curve   
Note: Mäkivierikko A. 2007. “Russian Oil a Depletion Rate Model estimate of the future 
Russian oil production and export”, PhD Thesis Submitted to the Uppsala University 
 
Still a word of caution would be that only in a region where the regulatory 
framework is ideal and oil production is only limited only by natural constraints, can the 
Hubbert curve work accurately. Yet, in an imperfect regulatory framework, where 
political decisions come into play, the time horizon in results displayed may 
substantially differ. To give a simple example, most of the Volga-Urals peaked earlier 
than expected which led to the crash development of Western Siberia. Another good 
example is the fall of the Soviet Union, which had severe consequences for the oil and 
gas industry. The peak oil production suddenly made an accelerated downturn.  
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When it comes to natural gas, Russian prospects are more promising. Russian 
problems on the gas front are more related to the investment needs required than to the 
recoverable reserves. The substitution of oil by natural gas is a continuing process. The 
dissertation has already discussed the rising share of natural gas in the energy balance of 
various countries. Natural gas cannot replace oil in many areas but in energy generation 
certainly it is one of the best substitutes.  
The figure below compiles the data taken from the Energy Strategy of Russia 
2003 and shows the expected volume of Russian natural gas production. Total Russian 
production will increase from the current level of annual 580 billion cubic meters to the 
680-730 billion cubic meter range in 2020. Most of the marginal supply is expected to 
come from new fields in East Siberia and their independent producers other than 
Gazprom. Natural gas exports will rise from its current level of 180 billion cubic meters 
to around 230 billion cubic meters in 2030. As long as Russia does the required 
investments, the natural gas will continue to grow in importance.  
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Figure 30: Russian Natural Gas Production  
Table Note:  Webb J., Vorobyov P., and Yermakov V. “Russia’s Energy Strategy to 
2020: An Incomplete Road Map”, CERA Decision Brief, October 2003 
 
The discussion above points to one direction: Russia will certainly grow in its 
economic and political weight thanks to the availability of its vast oil and gas resources. 
The world economy is growing every day which means that unless radical conservation 
measures are taken demand for energy sources will continue to grow in the foreseeable 
future. The discoveries of new fields and well-completions will not be able to keep up 
with the rising demand, particularly from East Asia. That may herald more price hikes. 
There is also another argument that higher prices may trigger a wave of investments 
which will take on board previously unfeasible fields. When new fields are 
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commissioned supply will inevitably increase and the prices may drop again. Still, in the 
long run, this argument needs to consider that the production of hydrocarbons cannot 
continue infinitely.   
The dependence on Russian energy imports will continue to grow in the 
European Union, the CIS and even among the East Asian nations. The ability of Russia 
to transform the accruing economic strength in to new spheres of influence will show if 
Russia is becoming once again a super-power. Russia needs to modernize its military, 
re-structure its industrial base and upgrade its human resource potential. All these can be 
achieved in two generations but requires a systematic approach as well as a 
strengthening of institutionalisation.  
Policy around the production and exports of oil and natural gas are becoming 
Russia’s major drivers of strength. This is exactly why Russia’s foreign policy is 
expected to be busier with pipeline politics, strategic aspects of resource development, 
and prices of supplies. The ownership of oil and gas resources will continue to be a point 
of contention in domestic politics. It is becoming more obvious that the control of these 
resources has become equivalent to the control of the state. The interests around oil and 
gas are powerful in the Kremlin, deciding as to the presidential succession and key 
positions in the government.    
Therefore, understanding the energy dimension of Russia’s evolving policy is 
essential. This also helps in bridging a gap between the field of international relations 
and domestic politics. Rather than trying to explain Russia’s role in international 
relations by referring to its dealings on a state-state level, scholars of international 
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relations should consider the strategic implications of Russia’s evolving energy policy 
which has its roots inside Russia. This study aimed to add to this ongoing dialogue. 
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